A systems theoretical approach for anti-money laundering informed by a case study in a Greek financial institution: Self-reference, AML, its systematic constitution and technological consequences. by Demetis, Dionysios S
th e  Lo n d o n  Sc h o o l  
o f  E C O N O M IC S  a n c
P o l it ic a l  S c ie n c e  ■
A Systems Theoretical approach for Anti-Money 
Laundering informed by a Case Study in a Greek 
Financial Institution:
Self-reference, AML, its systemic constitution and technological 
consequences
Dissertation submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the award of 
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Dionysios S. Demetis
http://www.demetis.com
Department of Management 
Information Systems and Innovation Group 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK
1
UMI Number: U615520
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U615520
Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
TMS5SS
F
<5 S 2 - t
Libra'y
BttShUx-ary1 *o*w>
aKj&OOom* ^
i Q f e i H
Abstract
This dissertation constitutes a systems theoretical analysis of Anti-Money Laundering 
that dismisses the projected ideals of holism and delves into the core of Systems Theory 
(ST) in the tradition of second-order cybernetics. This theoretical approach of ST is 
appropriated in order to describe the domain of Anti-Money Laundering (AML) as a 
system in itself and at the same time examine the consequences that technology comes 
to play within the system of AML. While the contemporary phenomenon of AML has 
been reduced mostly into a set of technological consequences from profiling 
technologies (technologies that attempt within financial institutions to model and 
simulate money-laundering behaviour for the generation of suspicious transactions), this 
dissertation takes a different approach. Instead of focusing at profiling technologies that 
are believed to be the core technological artefacts that influence AML within financial 
institutions, this dissertation examines a variety of information systems and their 
interplay and describes through empirical findings the multitude of interactions that are 
technologically supported and that construct a much more complex picture of dealing 
with AML and thereby influencing how money-laundering is perceived. The empirical 
findings supporting the theoretical treatise come from a longitudinal case study of a 
Greek financial institution where a systematic examination takes place regarding a 
variety of information systems that may affect AML within the bank. Beyond isolated 
interferences of information systems to AML, their interrelations are further examined 
in order to reflect on the emergent complexity that often distorts cause-and-effect AML 
manipulations. The theoretical contributions put forward, constitute a systems 
theoretical application and an expansion of technological/systemic interferences, while 
the practical contributions to AML cover broader systems-theoretical reflections on the 
domain, technological integration within financial institutions for targeting ML, 
feedback relations between financial institutions and Financial Intelligence Units, as 
well as the systemic consequences for the newly implemented risk-based approach.
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(Red rose o f  the w ind and o f  the fate, 
You have fingered in my memories, fihe a heavy rhythm 
(Rpse o f  the night, you have passed, tempest o f  a redveif 
Tempest o f  the sea ... The world is simple.
Qeorge Seferis 
J it hens, 1929
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Prologue
As any dissertation contains and confronts an antithesis, this one cannot but 
wholeheartedly embrace its own. The antithesis I speak of has been the challenge to 
combine, confront and reflect on somewhat different levels: that of philosophical 
abstraction represented by theory, and that of specificity represented by the somewhat 
more pragmatic domain of Anti-Money Laundering (AML). In dealing with deep 
philosophical issues and confronting theoretical challenges I have found tremendous 
pleasure in choosing Systems Theory as the theory that would guide this research, and 
unavoidably, a theory that has for myself constituted an entire paradigm of thinking 
about any problem. At the same time, I have found a great deal of pleasure in dealing 
with the domain of AML as a pragmatic problem affecting financial institutions 
worldwide.
In dealing with AML, I have come to witness its evolution throughout a number of 
years and under a number of capacities. First as a young researcher into the problem 
domain by examining a few financial institutions, then as a PhD student in dealing with 
a single institution for a long period of time, then as an associate and author for two 
European Commission funded projects on AML (Spotlight1 and Gate2) and various 
other publications, and most recently as an independent AML-expert giving 
consultation seminars in a number of financial institutions and organisations in Europe 
and the Middle East. Many things have changed over these years, even though global 
evidence that the AML domain is becoming more effective in dealing with the problem 
domain is consistently missing. One thing is certain, for those observing the problem 
itself: its complexity increases and so is the complexity of AML.
In discovering Systems Theory during my Masters degree in Information Systems at the 
London School of Economics when Professor Ian Angell -  later on to become my PhD 
supervisor -  outlined the fundamental constructs of the theory, I have come to realise 
that there is something terribly appealing in that theory. It was much later that I 
discovered how my first Degree in Physics would conceptually help me tackle systems 
theoretical concepts in dealing with systems of greater complexity and/or descriptive 
variation. Within the multitude of theoretical constructs in existence, I cannot think of 
one that could surpass the theoretical richness and depth of examination that Systems 
Theory can offer.
This dissertation has been the product of a long intellectual journey that now strangely 
seems to have ended, or rather has reached a new beginning (one always keeps the 
prologue for the end). I hope that the reader finds this pleasure on both fronts, those of 
theory and practice, but more importantly in their combination.
1 http://www.spotlight.uk.com
2 http ://www. exodus. gr/gate
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Chapter /; Introduction
Anti-Money Laundering has become an important contemporary phenomenon that has 
generated a great deal of attention, predominantly in the past two decades. While the net 
of stakeholders involved in AML has expanded due to regulatory initiatives, financial 
institutions remain at the forefront of the fight against money-laundering. Consequently, 
the study of how financial institutions deal with this important problem domain remains 
crucial. Financial institutions, however, do not exist in a void. They are part of a 
complex socio-political and economic arena that is advancing in particularly structured 
ways, but with unstructured consequences.
Whatever modernity may come to mean in this regard, modem society may be 
characterised by a number of attributes, although it is evident that technology has come 
to occupy a central role in this self-proclaimed modernity. Technology as broadly 
understood has of course little to do with both the wider study of information systems 
and the very concept of systems as will be developed and analysed in this dissertation. 
Still, our dependence on technology has increased considerably, and it is becoming 
evident that a technology that fails to function no longer comes to a halt, but triggers 
unanticipated effects of possibly catastrophic dimensions. Such catastrophic dimensions 
not only permeate problem domains like AML, but also, and even worse, they often go 
unnoticed or they become masked as an operative success by the systems that employ 
the technological function and all that this implies. Hence, in a large number of fields, 
society has come to rely on technology functioning, and develops its own structures 
more and more on the basis of this precondition of reliance.
This technological precondition is not an exception merely within AML. Financial 
Institutions have always been technologically astute, and have expanded their own 
‘closed’ organisational structures to include technological developments that were 
viewed as beneficial within their own structures.
The current conditions in the broader AML domain appear therefore to have acquired a 
highly unstructured complexity - a complexity partly due to the regulatory initiatives 
that have spawned a myriad of reactions, and partly due to the technological 
implementations improvised to accommodate and automate aspects of those reactions.
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Such complexity is also reinforced by an unrestrained opportunism shown by the 
software industry that for a number of years has exploited the fact that technology was 
deemed by regulators as a necessary tool in the development of the fight against ML. 
Consequently software has found a vulnerable ground that has resulted in considerable 
automation with adverse effects for Financial Intelligence Units. Last but not least, the 
risk-based approach and its introduction with the 3rd Directive has created a multitude of 
additional ambiguities. Even though the European Union (EU) has rightly taken the step 
o f introducing a more flexible approach in the fight against ML, a series of difficulties 
and uncertainties have been introduced in how such a risk-based approach should be 
implemented, and furthermore, how individual institutions and Financial Intelligence 
Units are to make sense of this newly-born complexity that comes with the very elusive 
nature o f risk. Typical stances within these new difficulties sourcing from the risk-based 
approach can be found not only in financial institutions but also in the regulators. In the 
UK for example, the Financial Services Authority has scrapped the detailed AML guide 
and introduced high-level principles in line with the risk-based approach. At the same 
time, however, checking compliance becomes compromised. How will risk-based 
supervision be put into practice when the internal document that is the basis of checks 
by the FSA is labyrinthine? Even the Chairman of the FSA accepts this to be a problem, 
noting: ‘The policy question is the balance between the two, and in particular the extent 
we can rebalance between the present very large (8500 pages and growing) rule book on 
the one hand and principles on the other... this rebalancing will not be easy’3.
To put it simply, no one knows how to go about introducing, supervising and managing 
a risk-based approach for AML as the underlying infrastructure for doing so is simply 
non-existent. Such a strong assertion is not carried out here with the purpose of 
overemphasizing the problems. This section merely remains a preface to the academic 
discussion that follows. The reality however also remains, that feedback between FIUs 
and financial institutions is at a primordial state, interoperability issues are barely 
considered, while stakeholder fragmentation as well as the sharing of intelligence -  
even at an anonymized form that would not jeopardise data protection and privacy 
issues -  is left unattended.
3 http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/2006/1031 cm.shtml
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Within this dynamic, between regulatory initiatives and technological development 
(even though development here should not be taken to imply improvement in any 
regard), the domain of AML is considerably reconstructed.
Much like a biological organism that encodes its own survival and evolution within a 
double-helix of genetic code, the Anti-Money Laundering System becomes structurally 
coupled with the system of technology with which it co-evolves. Examination of such 
an interplay implies two things to be considered together: how is AML a system? And 
also, how is technology a system? Beyond the realm of technology, as commonly 
perceived, this dissertation seeks to offer an insight (through the empirical data gathered 
and the analysis put forward) into the broader effects that various information systems 
have within a financial institution in relation to Anti-Money Laundering. This implies 
that the commonly perceived technological structures that currently affect ML, those of 
profiling technologies that attempt to simulate money-laundering behaviour and hence 
capture suspicious transactions, remain but a single instance of a broader structure of 
various information systems that have similar (if not more powerful and propagating) 
effects on AML.
This dissertation seeks to give an answer to the following research questions:
i. What theoretical description can be developed in order to describe the domain of
Anti-Money Laundering through the lens of Systems Theory?
ii. What is the role that various information systems come to occupy within
financial institutions, which in their own turn try to tackle the problem of 
ML, and how do the complex interactions between various information 
systems employed affect AML?
In seeking to outline the path for answering the aforementioned research questions, a 
general literature review is provided that deconstructs the problem of money- 
laundering, while reviewing the issue of defining ML, estimating the ML market, 
reviewing some key legislative initiatives, and outlining global AML characteristics. 
This general contemporary review is done in the chapter that follows, Chapter II.
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Chapter III, the methodology chapter, outlines both the basic research principles that 
guide the research process throughout its stages, and the methodological choices being 
made, while also seeking to contribute to the broader construction of a methodological 
process.
Chapter IV presents the key theoretical principles of Systems Theory that constitute the 
foundational basis for developing a further theoretical treatise and for relating systems 
principles to AML.
Chapter V describes the empirical findings that have sourced from a longitudinal case 
study carried out in a major financial institution in Greece, and relates the various 
information systems instances in order to ponder the second research question outlined 
above.
Chapter VI, the final chapter, analyses and discusses a number of systemically 
theoretical instances that lead to a description of AML as a system (in the systems 
theoretical sense of the second-order cybernetics tradition). There is an attempt to 
synthesize, in systemic terms, both the domain of AML and the domain of technology, 
all the while examining their interplay. This is followed by an endeavour to extrapolate 
these observations in order to provide both theoretical and practical contributions.
The dissertation concludes with some final remarks and offers some suggestions for 
further research.
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Chapter II: Literature Review
Chapter Structure
This chapter reviews the literature on anti-money-laundering in four different 
sections. In this prologue, a brief description of each section follows:
i) Section I tries to deconstruct the problem of defining money-laundering. The 
problem of definition (besides being a semantic issue) is one of crucial 
importance. Using Searle’s social construction of reality, an effort is made to 
articulate a description of what money-laundering is, through the very nature 
of money per se. The focus lies partly on the functionalities that money 
serves.
ii) Section II describes the plethora of problems that come into existence when 
we try to estimate the scale of the money-laundering market. There are 
reasons to suggest that the market has increased, despite the attempts to 
estimate it proving highly problematic.
iii) Section III presents the major international initiatives against Money 
Laundering. As the initiatives are many, and their contents often 
complicated, an effort is made to present these in a clear chronological order. 
A brief description follows of the most important initiatives, ending with an 
attempt to categorize the major contributions.
iv) Section IV describes some features of the global anti-money-laundering 
arena, which will hopefully provide the reader with a broader perspective of 
the domain, and will solidify some of the arguments put forward.
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Section I: Deconstructing Money-Laundering
What is Money-Laundering?
In order to formulate a definition on what money-laundering (ML hereinafter) is, we 
must take into consideration the fact that ML is first and foremost a process that is 
dynamic and can therefore change considerably. Furthermore, we must also ponder the 
question of what the nature of the money being laundered actually is. I will commence 
by examining the latter.
The nature of the laundered money
The way money is used, and perceived of today, has nothing to do with the early years 
of banking, which preceded the discovery of coinage. The first use of ‘money’ as a 
medium of exchange was based in commodities like ivory, leather, gold, etc. Banking 
these commodities meant storing them in warehouses and keeping track of the 
exchanges. The diversity in the physical properties of the medium of exchange in 
ancient times meant that the value being exchanged was inherent in the medium itself. It 
would therefore be pointless to define money here by connecting it to the physical 
properties of the medium of exchange (Davies 2002). A better understanding comes 
from acknowledging the functions that money serves as a medium of exchange, as a 
means of payment, and store of value.
These functions that are ascribed to money are the dominant characteristics of its 
constitution. If we strip money from its functionality, or cease to believe that something 
functions as money, then money has no meaning and therefore no functionality. Money 
is an institutional fact (as is marriage), sourcing from the collective intentionality that 
assigns -  to money -  the agentive functions that define its purpose (Searle 1995). In his 
book ‘The Social Construction of Reality’, Searle (1995) gives a compelling account of 
how institutional facts are created, and he thoroughly examines the example of money.
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Critical in the process of creating institutional facts is the collective intentionality4, 
which cannot be reduced to an individual’s intentionality. As Searle frames it (p.41):
“The central span on the bridge from physics to society is collective 
intentionality and the decisive movement on that bridge in the creation of social 
reality is the collective intentional imposition of function on entities that 
cannot perform those functions without that imposition.” (Emphasis added) 
-  (ibid)
Applied to money, this brings us to the realization that without the collective intentional 
imposition of function on money, money would not be able to function as such. 
Impositions of functionality on money are typically done by institutions that express the 
aforementioned collective intentionality. These institutions have a status that is not 
easily contested, disputed or refuted. For instance, central banks can be seen as the 
primary institutions that engage in such impositions by issuing money, and at the same 
time as entities with a commonly shared status. Such impositions however do not only 
occur within the legally defined scope of function-based utilisation of money. Such 
impositions are also carried out in systems like Hawala, whereby a token functions as 
money, because the agentive functions that are ascribed to the token are recognized as 
such. Hence, the token that encompasses these collectively imposed functions (even if 
that happens ‘underground’), is as good as money5.
Most academic-related material that examines the nature of money usually distinguishes 
three common forms [i.e. (Davies 2002)]:
Commodity money: Gold6 or other materials.
Contract money: Pieces of paper that promise to pay the bearer in gold.
4 According to Searle (1995, p.46) collective intentionality ‘assigns a new status to some phenomenon, 
where that status has an accompanying function that cannot be performed solely in virtue of the intrinsic 
physical features of the phenomenon in question. This assignment creates a new fact, an institutional fact, 
a new fact created by human agreement.’
5 Money here refers to the commonly shared institutional fact that we recognize as legitimate. 
Underground tokens have the same functionality in their respective institutional reality, but are not 
recognized as legitimate by governments.
6 Because of its physical properties gold is considered valuable and it is therefore easy to attach -  to gold 
-  the function of money.
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Fiat money: Not attached to gold. They are just certificates that have resulted from a 
collective intentionality, and that has ascribed to them the agentive function of 
‘functioning as money’.
It could therefore be said that the transitions that have been made from commodity to 
contract, and from contract to fiat money, were such that the ascribed function was 
gradually detached from the perceived inherent value of the medium of exchange (see 
Figure 2.1). Interestingly enough, it took ‘a stroke of genius to forget about the gold and 
just have the certificates’ (Searle 1995). Thus, today we are using fia t7 money, or money 
that functions as such because some institutions (like Central Banks) have been given a 
status for expressing a collective intentionality, and can therefore impose -  to a 
particular currency -  an agentive function that is subsequently widely accepted. Such an 
acceptance stems from the trust that is the basis of any monetary order. Fiat money 
seems to be the most pure expression of this, as it is intrinsically useless (Selgin 1994).
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Figure 2.1: towards fia t money
The next level of detachment, which is yet to occur in its full scale, is one that will 
detach the functionality from any physical properties o f the medium (paper-issued 
money) and the only reference will be the functionality itself. Electronic money, which 
will have no reference to dollars, pounds or yen, might well be next on the horizon, and 
some research has examined the possibility of privately-provided e-money that could 
replace government issuers (England 2000). Barriers towards that direction include: the
7 In Latin, the noun ‘fiat’ means ‘let it be done’
- I  »
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pre-established base of government issuers that will be hard to compete against; that 
different e-money issuers will not be easily identifiable; the place of government in 
regulating these new monies. This transition will hard because the control-oriented and 
will-to-power-driven governments will not easily let go. Electronic money will create a 
mobility that will diminish their control-abilities (Greenberg and Goodman 1996). 
Furthermore, electronic money at that level of functional-detachment may considerably 
exacerbate ML.
With electronic money under consideration, and in connection to the ascribed 
functionalities of money, it could be said that:
Money is an institutional fact that may or may not take on a physical form (i.e. cash, e- 
cash), and has a variety of collectively ascribed agentive functions that allow it to serve 
as a medium of exchange, a unit of account, or a store of value. Subsequently, any 
definition on money laundering must also encompass the nature of the money being 
laundered, with reference to the functionality that it serves.
Money-laundering then becomes the process of trying to disguise illicit-profits in order 
to enjoy the use of all ascribed legitimate, standardised and commonly shared agentive 
functions of money while the criminal origins of the entity incorporating these functions 
{money) are hidden.
By focusing on the agentive functions that money performs, the above definition 
distances ML from the physical (paper-money) or electronic (bits of information) 
properties of money. In short, whatever it may be that governments impose an agency o f 
functioning as money upon, this can be laundered or made to succumb to fraudulent 
activities. Even though it is difficult to perceive such a differentiation, the first examples 
are already here and considerably test our understanding of how money functions, how 
it is to be regulated, or how can it open new avenues for money-laundering. Online 
games for example, which have introduced virtual online economies with fictional 
currencies, have broadened the scope of the interactivity between real and virtual cash.
8 This has its basis on ‘network economics’
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In only one such game-example entitled ‘Project Entropia’9, more than half-a-million 
participants interact online. This virtual game platform belongs to a broader category of 
games categorised as MMORPGs (Massive Multiplayer Online Role Playing Games) 
and profits from a turnover of more than 1.5Billion PED, with PED being the virtual 
currency in the online space (standing for Project Entropia Dollars). A virtual exchange 
rate has been introduced for the purpose of converting money back and forth into USD, 
with the virtual exchange rate being 10/1 (that is lOPEDs are worth $1). One can 
transfer money into the virtual space, make virtual investments, potentially engage in 
fraudulent activities online, and even claim more than one identity (virtual!) for 
potentially laundering money through that route. In convenience, the company behind 
this has introduced a real ATM card (pictured below), from which the holder can 
withdraw money from any regular ATM. Meanwhile the money actually resides in the 
virtual space, and the conversion is done automatically through the virtual exchange 
rate. Of course a series of issues arise here, when virtual games act as financial 
institutions and provide banking facilities (e.g. how is inflation introduced virtually by 
algorithms? How is the virtual economy manipulated?). In all certainty, however, such 
evolutions are not to be taken lightly: a breakthrough investment of a real $1 million to 
buy a virtual island took place in Project Entropia, while in the most popular MMORPG 
called ‘Second Life’ more than $1.5million are changing hands every day in a virtual 
world where the government of Sweden recently decided to open a virtual Embassy! 
(Spiegel 2007)
Figure 2.2: A real ATM cardfor withdrawing virtual money
With such evolutions occurring in the handling of money, and leading on to further 
avenues for ML, it is interesting to take a step back and consider the ontological
http://www.entropiauniverse.com
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constructs of criminality, or else to examine what are those offences that are considered 
as criminal and can be associated with the laundering of money they acquire illegally. 
Even though it is beyond the purposes of this dissertation to delve into such an issue, its 
importance cannot be over-emphasized. Because of the differences between nation 
states in their definitions of what criminal offences are, launderers are given an 
advantage. A clear example is in the application of Directive 91/308/EEC in different 
member states of the EU. As the directive gave flexibility on its application to national 
laws, it was inevitable that discrepancies and differences would follow. Launderers 
were thus given the opportunity to shop around for a member state with more lenient 
laws on detection and punishment (Mohamed 2002). Take into account the possibilities 
opened up virtually, and the difficulties become insurmountable. Where has the crime 
taken place? In the user’s home computer, in the server hosting the virtual service, or in 
the myriad different routers that participate in the trafficking of internet protocols, thus 
perplexing the bit-trail?
In any event, once successful, ML gives the opportunity to criminals, besides distancing 
themselves from the crime and the profits, to enjoy their benefits or reinvest them in 
order to conduct legitimate business or fund another criminal activity (McDonell 1998). 
Thus, money-laundering attempts the transformation of the 'assets' into a more usable 
and legitimate form, by trying to store the gained value from the criminal activities, 
which quite often produce large sums of money that must be manipulated10 (Tanzi 
1996).
The laundering process
A fundamental distinction that has to be made while attempting to define money- 
laundering is that between methods and processes. Viewing ML as a set of methods 
creates a variety of inconsistencies due to the ever-increasing ways that are used to 
launder money. Methods of laundering money are also known as typologies. The 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the world’s only group targeting solely ML, 
regularly publishes listings of such typologies.
10 Small sums of criminal money can be easily laundered, especially if they are below the suspicious 
transaction reporting threshold that banks use. This is typically in the range of $10,000.
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Another way of defining ML is by portraying it as a process. The consensus 
surrounding such a definition is somewhat better, and ML is portrayed through the 
typical three-stage model:
i) The Placement Stage where the proceeds from the criminal activity enter the 
financial system.
ii)The Layering Stage where the money launderer creates the complex set of 
financial transactions aimed at separating the illicit proceeds from the source, 
and blurring the audit trail.
iii) The Integration Stage where the laundered proceeds can re-enter the financial 
system, appearing to be from a legitimate source and the result of normal 
business activities (CS 2001).
Even though the above stages are adequate for describing the processes of ‘traditional’ 
money-laundering, cyber-laundering11 has altered even these, and has given them a new 
perspective, worthy of brief mention and analysis. Electronic money, and the 
phenomenon of disintermediation, make it much easier for the criminal to go through 
the placement stage, hitherto the stage where he was most likely to be detected (Gilmore 
1993). Through the use of the Internet, it is possible to create an extremely complex 
audit trail in a very short period o f time, which in a multi-jurisdictional financial 
environment can render the possibility of detection minimal (Philippsohn 2001). That, 
along with the fact that Money Laundering on the Internet has cut out one of the two 
methods for detection (suspicious transaction reporting through face-to-face interaction 
-  with the other method being monitoring transactions that exceed a certain threshold), 
it is no wonder that cyber-laundering has created a 'market' of around $50 billion per 
year12. Money launderers have therefore recently moved into Internet gambling, online 
casinos, and credit card e-transactions. The potential for illegally utilizing these new 
possibilities has increased considerably (Hugel and Kelly 2002).
11 Nothing more than the application of ML in the information age, by the use o f ‘tools’ like the Internet, 
mobile technologies, etc...
12According to a 2001 estimation from the paper of Steven Philippsohn
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Section II: The myths of ML estimation
Estimating the money laundering market
One of the most difficult tasks of analysis is the estimation of the money laundering 
market. There have been several attempts, but before we proceed in describing the 
proxies that have been used for estimation, it is useful first to acknowledge once again 
that what constitutes ML is constantly changing. For instance, when ML was connected 
to drug-trafficking, estimations on the ML market were based upon the drug market. 
Once the norm-producing institutions like the LIN expanded the scope of criminality of 
ML, then it became evident that estimations would increase as more proxies claimed 
their share in contributing to ML. In this section, it will be argued that it is beyond our 
capacity to formulate a clear understanding of how much money is actually being 
laundered, but at the same time, there are several reasons to suggest that money- 
laundering has increased.
It has been claimed that money-laundering is the world’s third largest market (Robinson
1998), after the US domestic bond market, and the Eurobond market (Scholte 1997). 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates the ML market to be 2-5% of the 
world’s Gross Domestic Product, something that brings the estimate up to $600billion ~ 
$1.5 trillion (Lilley 2000). Similar estimates reaching $1.5 trillion come from an Ernst 
& Young report (Price 2002). Using crime and economic statistics from various sources 
like the United Nations Crime and Justice database, Walker develops a model for 
estimating the total global ML to around $2.85 trillion (Walker 1998)13. If we include 
cyber-laundering14, then we can add an additional $50 billion to the total estimates 
(Philippsohn 2001).
13 That being the case, the author wonders why the suspicious transaction reports count for only a tiny 
fragment of the total volume of ML. Moreover, another issue that is posed is not the amount of dirty 
money at a national level but the relevant proportions of clean versus dirty money being transmitted 
through the financial centres, something that is particularly higher offshore.
14 Cyber Laundering is nothing more than ML via the Internet. The problem with cyber-laundering is that 
the detection of the launderers is rendered even more difficult because they have the capability of 
complicating the money trail through various electronic transactions worldwide.
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The deviations in the estimates of the ML market become more evident when we look at 
how many different methodologies exist for this purpose. Furthermore, and as we have 
previously discussed, the dynamics of the definition of ML evident from the evolution 
of legislation151, clearly poses another serious problem in estimation. The issue of 
defining the underground economy is still unsettled, and besides being a semantic issue, 
it remains of fundamental importance (Tanzi 1999). An example that clearly 
demonstrates the aforementioned problematic nature of estimating the ML market is 
that of Australia", where estimates range from 1.4% to 47.1% of the GDP. This wide 
range demonstrates clearly that progress in estimating the size of the underground 
economy has been modest to say the least (ibid).
The above differences, and the fact that the special working team appointed from the
FATF with the task of estimating the money-laundering ‘market’, could not reach a
conclusion and was dismantled one year later, shows how little confidence we should
place in ML estimations. As the former chairman of the working group on statistics and
methods concluded:
“There is not at present any economic dens ex machina that will allow 
the accurate measurement of money laundering world-wide, or even 
within most large nations. The basis for such estimations simply does not 
exist” (Walker 1998)
There are good reasons behind our incapacity to estimate ML. The dubious but obvious 
connection between the underground and the legitimate economies is such that little 
room is left for separating one from the other. Since ML distorts several economic 
statistical indices (Quirk 1996), it is simply pointless to try and uncover the figure 
behind the underground economy. This is because the instruments used for the 
estimations are already distorted and entangled with the underground economy. 
Substantial sums of money from the underground economy have been used for 
‘legitimate businesses’, ranging from the re-election of several US presidents, to the 
constitution of Stanford University (Duyne 1998). It is therefore time to stop seeing 
money laundering and anti-money-laundering as separate entities that are in conflict. 
They are structurally coupled, and formulate an industry that is beyond good and evil111.
15 This will be further analyzed in the following section
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It is therefore a fallacy to consider any estimations of the underground economy as real. 
Rather they are only indicative of scale. The most we can probably do is speculate on 
whether there has been an increase or decrease in the ML market, and there are at least 
two good reasons to suggest that ML has indeed increased. The first is the transition to 
the information age, and the second has to do with the economic aspect of globalization.
► ML in the information age: it might as well be termed cyber-laundering, but it is 
money-laundering nevertheless. Cyber-Laundering (CL hereinafter), concerns the 
passage of ML into the cyber-domain via information technologies and the Internet. 
Moreover, the ongoing evolution of computer systems creates security issues that may 
make these systems prone to exploitation by launderers (Granville 2003). One such 
example comes from China where two hackers were given the death penalty for hacking 
into a bank remotely, stealing ¥720,000, and then trying to transfer the money to sixteen 
accounts they had createdlv (HKVoD 1998). Bothering with offshore financial centres 
could therefore prove pointless, once the PC has become the best washing machine, not 
forgetting that e-mail routing, encryption and anonymizer software can also be used by 
criminals (Lilley 2000). E-banking and e-payment systems are also a fabric of the CL 
that can be exploited by the launderers, something that ultimately renders Know Your 
Customer (KYC) policies, harder to apply (ibid).
CL magnifies the problem because of two interconnected reasons: the first is that the 
laundering phasesv may be carried out more easily, and the second is because 
dematerialized e-cash and its subsequent liquidity provide the opportunity for 
disintermediation, bringing the buyer and the seller in a direct relationship. However, it 
is difficult to say whether such transactions are 'black' or not, and what exactly their 
connection to the underground economy is (Angell 2000). As long as taking middle­
men out of the equation proves more profitable (and it usually is) then there will be an 
inherent systemic trend towards the profitability of disintermediation.
► The Economic Aspect of Globalization: The second element that could be considered 
as a reason for suggesting an increase in the ML-market. According to a research report 
from the IMF, there is a clear sign that countries to have welcomed the economic 
dimension o f globalization by liberalising their markets, and increasing their trading 
with others, have enjoyed dramatic economic benefits (Masson 2001). When examining
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the relationship between the Trade Openness of a country and its Real Per Capita 
Income, it becomes evident that there was a strong positive correlation between the two 
(ibid) in the majority of countries examined. Two particular examples are China and 
Mexico.
There is strong evidence to support the fact that a country's openness to international 
trade is a very important factor for its growth. This makes a clear point that countries 
entering the globalization game (from its economic standpoint), liberalizing their 
markets, will find major economic benefits. Contrariwise, marginalized countries have 
had little or no growth, resulting in increasing poverty and inequality (WorldBank 
2001). In addition to that, the transition from the ‘welfare state’ to the ‘competition 
state’, followed by an intensification of capitalism, meant that state sovereignty was 
compromised and supra-territoriality of capital was unavoidable (Scholte 1997). This 
gave rise to a supra-state-govemance concerning capital matters, including ways to 
combat ML through the FATF’s constitution.
The economic dimension of globalization cannot therefore be ignored, and it is safe to 
assume that it will continue to expand with more countries willing to participate in the 
new global economy. This will subsequently result in a continuously increasing capital 
flow, which in its turn will make it much easier for money-launderers to conceal their 
transactions and carry out successful ML. The bigger the volume and number of 
transactions on a global scale, the easier it will be to launder money under that very 
beneficial globalized economy, as the money stream there is of such astronomical 
magnitude that with a little caution, miscreants won't attract much attention.
Integration and globalization of markets also bring underground markets closer 
together. An example is shell banks that have no physical presence in the country they 
are incorporated and licensed, and are usually a particular feature of some offshore 
centres that also exacerbate ML.
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Section III: Legislation on ML
The International Fight against ML
There have been several initiatives targeting the problem of ML, but it is beyond the 
scope of this dissertation to analyse fully each and every one. Furthermore, an in-depth 
examination of the documents would require a comparative legal analysis, which would 
overshadow the purpose of this section, that being the identification of those initiatives 
that have made a significant contribution at a truly international level.
The purpose of this section is to review the initiatives in a chronological order, 
demonstrating how the definition and scope of ML has expanded, and bringing out the 
instruments that are being used for the prevention of ML, thus constituting the Anti- 
Money-Laundering domain (AML).
The major initiatives regarding AML are presented below in chronological order (where 
specific dates could be retrieved for the initiatives, they are presented):
1) 27 June 1980 -  The Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers -  “Measures 
Against the transfer and safeguarding of funds of criminal origin -  
Recommendation No.R (80)10 adopted by the Committee of Ministers and the 
Council of Europe”.
2) December 1988 -  The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision -  “Statement 
on Prevention of Criminal Use of the Banking System for the Purpose of 
Money-Laundering”.
3) 19 December 1988 -  United Nations -  “United Nations Convention Against 
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances16”.
4) June 1990 -  The Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) -  The 19 
Aruba Recommendations.
16 One of the most important international initiatives and also termed as The Vienna Convention
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5) 8 November 1990 -  Council of Europe Convention on laundering, tracing, 
seizure and confiscation of proceeds of crime (The Strasbourg Convention).
6) 1991 -  The European Economic Commission -  “Council Directive on 
Prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money- 
laundering” Directive 91/308/EEC.
7) 5-6 November 1992 -  The Kingston Declaration on Money-Laundering.
8) 18-20 June 1994 -  “International Conference on Preventing and Controlling 
Money-Laundering and the use of the proceeds of Crime: A global approach”.
9) 21-23 November 1994 -  United Nations -  “Naples Declaration and Global 
Action Plan against Organized Transnational Crime, adopted at the World 
Ministerial Conference on OTC at Naples from the United Nations General 
Assembly” Resolution GA/49/159.
10) 1996 -  Financial Action Task Force -  “The Forty Recommendations”.
11)14 November 1996 -  “The Riga Declaration on the fight against money- 
laundering”.
12)10 June 1998 -  United Nations -  “United Nations on attacking the profits of 
crime: Drugs, money and laundering”. A panel Discussion at the Twentieth 
Special Session of the General Assembly.
13)1999 -  United Nations -  “International Convention for the Suppression of the 
financing of Terrorism”.
14)30-31 March 2000 -  United Nations -  “The United Nations Offshore Forum” 
Cayman Islands.
15)15 November 2000 -  United Nations -  “The United Nations Convention 
Against Transnational Organized Crime”.
16) October 2001 -  The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision -  “Customer 
Due Diligence for Banks”.
17)31 October 2001 -  FATF -  “The Financial Action Task Force Special 
Recommendations on Terrorist Financing”.
18)4 December 2001 -  European Community -  “Directive 2001/97/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on 4 December 2001, amending 
Council Directive 91/308/EEC on prevention of the use of the financial system 
for the purpose of money-laundering”.
19) 20 June 2003 -  FATF -  “The Forty Recommendations” Revised.
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20)26 October 2005 -  European Commission -  ‘Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the prevention of the use of the financial 
system for the purpose of money laundering, including terrorist financing’ 
2005/60/EC.
From all of the above initiatives, it would be useful to analyse briefly those that have 
made a considerable impact on the Anti-Money-Laundering arena. These are chosen in 
terms of their scope, and therefore their attempt to encompass several areas of the 
problem domain at a truly international level. Even though there has been attempts from 
the early 80s to address the problem (e.g. Council of Europe), it must be recognized that 
the first truly international initiative was that of the United Nations in the Convention 
titled “United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances”. This convention is also known as the Vienna Convention, 
and it is this term that will be used henceforth in this dissertation.
► The Vienna Convention: The major contribution, and something that was done for 
the very first time at this UN gathering was the requirement that all States should 
establish money laundering as a criminal offence. Even though the convention was 
focused on the proceeds of drug17 trafficking crimes (thus money-laundering didn’t 
include reference to other types of crime), there was participation from many states 
including major drug producers who faced the problem at a greater scale (Gilmore
1999). ML became an extraditable offence, and the confiscation of the proceeds was 
also addressedvl. The convention’s breakthrough in criminalizing money laundering is 
clearly stated in Article 3:
“Each party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish 
as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally: ... 
conversion or transfer of property knowing that such property is derived from 
any [drug trafficking] offence, or from an act of participation in such offence ... 
the concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, 
movement, rights with respect to, or ownership of property, knowing that such 
property is derived from an offence or offences established in accordance with 
subparagraph (a)...” (UN 1988) -Article 3.
17 Not surprising for a first attempt to tackle the problem internationally, as drug trafficking produces 
large sums of money that need laundering. Targeting the proceeds of crime also targets crime itself.
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Focusing on drug trafficking, the Vienna convention recognizes that such activities pose 
a serious threat to the welfare of human beings. Moreover, drug trafficking and 
laundering the proceeds of crime can also ‘adversely affect the economicv" cultural, and 
political foundations o f society
According to the Vienna convention, each party should adopt measures that would 
enable its competent authorities to identify, trace, and freeze or seize proceeds. Bilateral 
and multilateral treaties were also encouraged to increase effectiveness. Banking 
secrecy was also addressed, in order to ensure that it would not prevent any 
investigations. Further, provisions were made in the convention to confiscate the 
proceeds of crime, even if their form has been altered or commingled with other 
property.
Article 7 provided for mutual legal and other assistance between countries as obtaining 
evidence from abroad is critical for any ML investigation. Bilateral or multilateral 
agreements between countries could enhance that cooperation.
The UNDCP (Drug Control Programme) added an additional step, providing help in 
legislation and drafting a Model Law in ML, in 1993. Law enforcement agencies, which 
played a major role in that initiative, included the ICPO/Interpol. Even though Interpol 
does not have an operational policing mandate, its infrastructure helps the overall effort. 
Interpol connects the National Central Bureau (NCB) of the participating countries 
through an Automated Message Switching System. Nearly 50% of the messages being 
exchanged through that system are drug-related and of immediate interest for the fight 
against money-laundering (Gilmore 1999).
► The Financial Action Task Force is a single group that targets the ML domain. The 
group was constituted by the G7 in July 1989, and produced the famous 40 
recommendations, which have received broad recognition as the world’s standard for 
countering ML.
Three important landmarks in the work of the FATF are:
a) The Forty Recommendations in 1990.
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b) The Revised Forty Recommendations in 2003.
c) Eight special recommendations on Terrorist Financing in 2001.
Even though the FATF cannot pass laws, it only makes recommendations, however, 
these are received with widespread trust and so the FATF has been recognized as the 
major contributor in the global fight against ML. Interestingly enough, the first version 
of the forty recommendations in 1990 called countries to ratify the UN Vienna 
Convention amongst other recommendations, and embarrassingly claimed that “Each 
country should, without further delay, take steps to fully implement the Vienna 
Convention, and proceed to ratify it” (FATF 1990). Following that initiative, the UN 
asserted that the FATF recommendations should be recognized as the international
1 ftstandard against ML . The support of the United Nations to the FATF was re-affirmed 
in the Political Declaration and Action Plan against Money Laundering, which was 
adopted at the Twentieth Special Session of the UN General Assembly. Most notably:
“ ... the Commission noted that the forty recommendations of the Financial 
Action Task Force established by the heads of State or Government of the seven 
major industrialized countries and the President of the European Commission 
remained the standard by which the measures against money-laundering 
adopted by concerned States should be judged ...” (UN 1998) -  emphasis 
added.
The Financial Action Task Force appraises its members annually. Recommendations 21 
and 22 of the FATF, give the option to FATF-member countries to impose financial 
sanctions and adopt countermeasures against those that do not have sound AML 
policies. The group also produces a list of non-cooperative countries, a process termed 
as ‘black-listing’. Typically, the countries that do not have sound AML policies are 
those that are black-listed. No G7 country has ever been blacklisted, for whatever 
reason, despite the fact that a large amount of laundered money goes through the US 
and the UK. Despite its attempts to combat ML, the United Kingdom has failed to 
provide a satisfactory answer to why there are not stringent measures on its 
protectorates. The thorny issue of why the UK has not promptly dismantled the legal 
and banking havens of the Crown Dependencies remains unsettled. One might say that 
political will is inversely related to the amount of money surrounding the country. The 
fact remains that this connection between the UK and its protectorates has crowned
18 Commission on Narcotic Drugs resolution 5 (XXXIX) of 24 April 1996.
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London as one of the major ML capitals of the world (Mohamed 2002). A case of ML 
in the Cayman Islands shows how contradictory forces work within the same systems. 
Four people charged for money-laundering offences in the Cayman Islands were cleared 
due to lack of evidence. The investigation uncovered the fact that the Director of the 
Financial Intelligence Unit of the Cayman Islands (CAYFIN), Mr. Brian Gibbs, had 
destroyed critical financial evidence on the case. For a long period of time he acted as a 
paid informer of the MI6, and was desperately trying to keep his role secret (Rider 
2003).
Nauru19 may be a country that is a long way away from the Paris-based FATF, but it is 
still under considerable pressure from the threat of financial countermeasures (Johnson 
2003; Roule and Salak 2003), and so the country has attempted to take significant steps 
towards inclusion. These countermeasures applied by FATF members create a 
substantial financial burden on the business transactions of a country, which 
subsequently presents economic and credibility problems. Under such circumstances, 
most countries find it ‘appropriate’ to comply.
There is a general consensus among observers that the FATF is US-dominated, and that 
US interests support the expansion of the group’s sphere of influence. This comes as no 
surprise. Naylor (1994) gives a compelling account of US-domination of the financial 
world post-World-War II, including the role of the IMF, the capital flight problem (from 
developing countries to the US), and so-called ‘Pentagon Capitalism’ (Naylor 1994). 
The evolution of FATF’s working agenda speaks for itself.
The reality is that the FATF has expanded, and it has become extremely powerful. This 
is due, in no small part, to the fact that the FATF has made a big difference in 
combating ML, in that many countries have been influenced to improve and strengthen 
their AML efforts (Johnson and Lim 2002). Non-compliance now means financial 
sanctions as well as severe difficulties when transacting with the world’s biggest 
markets, which would suggest that the pressure imposed by the ‘blame-and-shame’ 
approach actually works. In fact, most of the countries black-listed initially responded 
negatively, but soon recognized that improving their procedures would get them
19 With a total land area of 21 sq km, Nauru is the smallest republic in the world. But in ML, even the 
smallest republic can ‘contribute’ significantly.
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accepted. Subsequently the vast majority wholeheartedly joined in with the international 
AML effort (Johnson 2001).
However, after the terrorist attacks on US soil on September 11 2001, it was inevitable 
that changes in policy would rapidly follow. Expansion of the working agenda of the 
FATF to cover terrorist financing was something that has caused considerable problems 
in several ways. The original problem of defining ML was, and still is a nebulous issue 
(Tanzi 1999), with the Financial Action Task Force claiming that ML was the 
processing of criminal proceeds in order to disguise their illegal origin (FATF 2003). 
However, with terrorist financing, even that problematic definition of money laundering 
was twisted and distorted in a most profound way. The problems are many. Firstly, 
terrorist activities are often funded by legal money. Secondly, banks now face 
considerable amounts of stress, pressure and compliance fear because they have to 
check (besides the origin of money) the purpose of the transaction, and its use by the 
end customer. Thirdly, Know Your Customer (KYC) principles can be seen as 
expanding to KYEC principles (Know Your End Customer), something that raises 
serious questions about civil liberties (Mohamed 2002). This all points to the 
problematic nature of terrorist financing and its link to money laundering. Banks are 
being forced into policing legitimate transactions that could potentially be used for 
terrorist purposes (ibid). Furthermore, it is evident that the hopeful pre-emptive strike 
against ML and terrorist financing may cause more problems than it actually solves. Let 
us not forget that as the totality of the global financial system is being affected by these 
changes, only a very tiny fraction of the money being exchanged will be used for 
terrorist financing.
► The Political Declaration in 1998 by the UN General Assembly at the Twentieth 
Special Session, upgraded and updated the Vienna Convention through the ‘Countering 
Money Laundering’ Plan of Action.
In this UN General Assembly, members reinstated their determination to combat the 
narcotics problem. They also encouraged all nations to adopt national ML legislation by 
the year 2003, adopting a new section for measures against ML (UN 1998).
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Among the several aspects that were examined in this UN Assembly, particular 
emphasis was given to the issue of globalisation and how international cooperation must 
be fostered and strengthened in order to deal with the phenomenon in a globalized 
world. As the Executive Director of the Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, 
Professor Arlacchi, stated20:
“Globalisation has turned the international financial system into a money 
launderer’s dream, and this criminal process siphons away billions of 
dollars per year from economic growth at a time when the financial 
health of every country affects the stability of the global marketplace” 
(UN 1998).
Several ways were discussed in this UN Assembly on how international cooperation 
could be enhanced for combating the problem of ML more effectively in a globalized 
world. Multilateral information networks were brought up as networks of vital 
importance, and a specific example is that of the Egmont Group linking different 
Financial Intelligence Units. There was also an expansion in offence of laundering 
money, which is termed ‘money derived from serious crimes’.
► The UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime in 200021. Once 
again, the scope of this convention was very important as it was under the auspices of 
the United Nations. The major contribution of the convention was the adoption of a 
broader definition of money laundering, which would include not only drugs but also a 
wide range of other criminal activity.
The intention therefore of Article 6 of this convention was to expand the definition of 
money laundering by including all serious crimes on top of the pre-existing drug 
offences.
20 A Panel Discussion held at the United Nations, New York, on 10 June 1998, titled: “Attacking the 
Profits of Crime: Drugs, Money and Laundering”. The title of Professor Arlacchi’s speech was “The 
Need for a Global Attack on Money Laundering”.
21 By its resolution 55/25 of 15 November 2000, the General Assembly adopted the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. In accordance with Article 38, Annex 1 of the 
aforementioned resolution, the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 
entered into force on 29 September 2003.
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Article 6, the ‘Criminalisation of the laundering of proceeds of crime’, mentions that the 
application of laws must be done ‘to the widest range of predicate offences’ for ‘serious 
crime’. This is clearly defined in Article 2(b) as follows: ‘Serious crime shall mean 
conduct constituting an offence punishable by a maximum deprivation of liberty of at 
least four years or a more serious penalty’ (UN 2000).
Moreover, Article 7 of the convention expanded the supervisory regime to non-bank 
financial institutions. This was another major contribution of the convention as it 
recognized there are many avenues for money-laundering that go beyond the traditional 
route through the banking institutions. According to Article 7:
“Each State Party shall ‘institute a comprehensive domestic regulatory and 
supervisory regime for banks and non-bank financial institutions and, where 
appropriate, other bodies particularly susceptible to money-laundering... 
customer identification, record-keeping and the reporting of suspicious 
transactions are emphasized.” Article 7 (UN 2000) -  emphasis added.
► The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Initiatives.
As the Basel Committee is responsible for the supervision of the banking sector, it has 
contributed to the AML domain through a series of initiatives.
The Basel Committee became involved in AML as early as 1988 when it issued a 
statement on ‘Prevention of Criminal Use of the Banking System for the purpose of 
Money-Laundering’ (Basel 1988). In that statement, the Basel Committee sought to 
alert the banking sector of the dangers that money-laundering could present, and also set 
out some guiding principles that banks would have to employ (ibid).
•  In the work undertaken by the Basel Committee on ‘Customer Due Diligence for 
Banks’, important provisions were taken for outlining Know Your Customer principles 
(known as KYC principles). The Basel committee asked the working group on cross- 
border banking to examine the KYC procedures in place and to draw up recommended 
standards that will be applicable to banks in all countries. The working group on cross­
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border banking is a joint group consisting of members of the Basel Committee and the 
Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors.
It is worth noting that the Basel Committee portrayed sound KYC procedures as a 
critical component in the overall effective management of banking risks and not just 
anti-money-laundering. According to the Basel Committee, there was no need to 
duplicate the work of the FATFvm (Basel 2001).
•  When the expansion of Anti-Money-Laundering saw terrorist financing being 
incorporated into the concerns of the various surrounding institutions, it became evident 
that the Basel Committee would also participate in the effort. In their paper on ‘Sharing 
of financial records between jurisdictions in connection with the fight against terrorist 
financing’, the Basel Committee stood firmly with the United Nations and the FATF. 
The focus of Basel’s work in respect of terrorist financing was to improve Know Your 
Customer and Customer Due Diligence standards for all categories o f institutions that 
provided financial services (Basel 2002).
Particular attention was also given to how information exchange can be enhanced 
between a government body in one country to another, and from a financial entity in one 
country to its parent institution in a different country. In this work, the major ways of 
exchanging information are analyzed. These are: Mutual Legal Assistance (MLAT), 
communication between Financial Intelligence Units (FIU), which are based on 
Memoranda o f Understanding (MOU), and supervisory channelsIx.
As communication received special attention in this paper of the Basel Committee, there 
was also an identification of several areas of future work. These would be the sharing of 
information cross-border between host and home supervisors, practices for collecting 
and sharing information in the absence of an FIU, and treating financial groups as single 
entities for the purpose of enhancing the sharing information within the same group 
(ibid).
• In ‘Shell banks and Booking Offices’, the Basel Committee aims to clarify what 
should be the stance of the supervisory authorities when it comes to shell banks. Shell 
banks in the Basel document are defined as:
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banks that have no physical presence (meaningful mind and 
management) in the country where they are incorporated and licensed, 
and are not affiliated to any financial services groups that is subject to 
effective consolidated supervision” (Basel 2003)
Thus, a shell bank would have a registered agent operating in the country of 
incorporation, but one who would not be necessarily familiar with the operations of the 
bank . This creates several problems for the supervision of such structures because the 
supervisory authority in the country from which the bank is run may not be aware of the 
bank’s existence.
Similarly, the term ‘booking branch’ is analyzed as one where the branch is not 
managed in the jurisdiction in which it is licensed. According to the Basel Committee, 
in such cases the home country supervisor should demand that the books and records of 
the branches be available. Risk management and supervision also lies with the head 
office (ibid).
•  Besides contributing to a bank’s safety and soundness, KYC policies play an integral 
role in protecting the integrity of the banking system and reducing the likelihood of 
banks becoming vehicles for ML, terrorist financing, and other illegal activities. In 
‘Consolidated KYC Risk Management’, the Basel Committee seeks to guide banks 
towards a global application of the areas outlined in Customer Due Diligence. These 
are: customer acceptance policy, customer identification, on-going monitoring of higher 
risk accounts, and risk management (Basel 2001).
The incorporation of a consistent identification and monitoring programme of customer 
accounts globally is therefore vital. Customer accounts should be monitored globally, 
across business lines and across geographical locations (Basel 2003).
22 Such structures are can often be found in offshore centres.
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The Basel Committee proposes two ways that such monitoring can be accomplished. 
The first is the use of a centralised database, and the second is decentralised databases 
with robust information sharing between the head office and its branches and 
subsidiaries (ibid).
As many banking groups engage in businesses that involve securities and insurance, 
sound risk management becomes more essential. This makes efficient supervision 
critical and the Basel Committee urges supervisors to review -  besides policies and 
procedures -  customer files, and to proceed in sampling of some accounts. Importance 
is also given to internal audits whereby supervisors should seek to have access to the 
results of these audits (ibid).
► Council Directive 91/308/EEC on prevention of the use of the financial system 
for the purpose of money-laundering (amended by Directive 2001/97/EC)
The first European Initiative was much earlier than this Directive, with the Council of 
Europe Convention on ‘Measures against the Transfer and Safekeeping of Funds of 
Criminal Origin23’. The 1980 convention focused on KYC principles, training and other 
aspects, but it was the 1990 Council of Europe Convention on ‘Laundering, search, 
seizure and confiscation of the proceeds of Crime’ that extended the scope to other 
predicated offences -  besides drug trafficking -  and kept a balance between criminal 
law and human rights.
Directive 91/308/EEC was complementary to the aforementioned initiatives in the EU 
and was influenced by the Forty Recommendations. The Directive obviously had an 
immediate effect on EC countries, but it also sought to extend its application to several 
European Free Trade Association countries (Gilmore 1999). Member States were 
encouraged to extend the list of criminal activities that were associated with ML and 
more importantly, the directive emphasized that not only credit and financial institutions 
are avenues for ML, but also other professions. Member states were thus encouraged to 
“include those professions and undertakings whose activities are particularly likely to be 
used for money-laundering purposes” (EU 1991)x.
23 That was the very first focus on ML from an international organization
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Directive 2001/97/EC amended the directive of 1991. Here, EU legislation is extended 
to cover all organised crime besides drug trafficking, and the EU budget is additionally 
shielded from fraud or corruption (EU 2001). Another item of focus in this directive is 
professional secrecy in conjunction with money-laundering. For example, legal advice 
is left intact under the condition that the lawyer does not himself participate in ML, or 
the client does not ask for expert advice in order to carry out ML (ibid).
► Directive on prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of 
money-laundering, including terrorist financing
There is no doubt that the major shift of emphasis in the latest proposed Directive of the 
European Commission (also known as the 3rd Directive) involves what is termed the 
risk-based approach. Dominance of the term ‘risk-based approach’, which includes a 
tremendous number of ambiguities, will be analysed in the final chapter of this 
dissertation after both the theoretical treatise on Systems Theory is presented and the 
findings from the research outlined.
What follows is a table summarizing the major initiatives and their contributions.
Table showing the major contributions of the international initiatives {Table 2.1)
Year
Name o f Initiative Major contribution24
1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances (the Vienna 
Convention)
Required that all States recognize money-laundering as a 
criminal offence, which also becomes extraditable.
It is however, drug offence oriented.
1990 Council o f Europe on:‘Laundering, search, seizure and 
confiscation of the proceeds of 
Crime’.
Extended ML to other predicate offences.
A state could prosecute even if the offence took place 
elsewhere and there was a careful consideration of third 
party involvement. Thus, the convention tried to strike a 
balance between criminal law and human rights.
24 No value-judgment is being made by the use of the word contribution. Some initiatives may have had 
or may have results adverse to those they try to achieve. Terrorist Financing is a potential candidate.
39
1990 Financial Action Task Force 
The Forty Recommendations
FATF became the first group to focus solely on ML, and 
even though lacking in legal power, it set the 40 
recommendations as a standard
1991 European Economic Commission 
- Directive 91/308/EEC
Not only credit and financial institutions, but also other 
professions and categories of undertakings that may 
engage in activities likely to be used for ML, are taken into 
consideration. Thus, the scope broadens even more.
2000 United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized 
Crime
ML is expanded to include all serious crimes besides drug- 
offences.
The convention also expands the supervision to non-bank 
financial institutions
2001 European Community - Directive 2001/97/EC
EU legislation embraces all organised crime under ML and 
not just drug-trafficking. Professional secrecy is also a 
focus and legal advice is left intact (unless the lawyer 
knows that ML takes place, or takes part).
2001 Financial Action Task Force
- Special Recommendations on 
Terrorist Financing
Trying to frame terrorist financing as money laundering. 
Many however have objected to these recommendations as 
they argue that it is not ML but something that should be 
treated separately.
2003 Financial Action Task Force 
- Revised Forty Recommendations
Various updates on recommendations and particularly a 
more abstract handling of typologies-based handling of 
AML
2005 European Commission
- Proposed Directive 
COM(2004)448
Considerable shift of emphasis affecting all stakeholders 
involved in AML by the introduction of a risk-based 
approach in treating the problem domain and mostly in 
prioritising over the submission of filing STRs to FIUs by 
considering the risk-based approach (e.g. as in the case of 
high-risk customers)
Table 2a: Summary o f major legislative initiatives
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Section IV: Chapter Epilogue -  Overview
An overview of some ‘global’ AML features
It is useful here, in closing the literature review and the broader review of the AML 
domain, to refer to some interesting facts that surround the global AML perspective. 
Some of these are of particular interest as they invoke the flavour o f ML and the 
networks that operate globally. Perhaps more importantly, they invoke the challenges 
that the AML community is facing. The purpose of this section is not to draw a map of 
the ML network, as this can only be done in approximation, but to provide the reader 
with a sense of what the global ML and AML community looks like.
A sam ple of the global money-laundering network connections
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Figure 2.3: A(ML?) networks
In Figure 2.3 above, there are three types of connections. The blue dots represent those 
jurisdictions that have been -  at some point -  featured in the famous FATF black-list. 
The red dots represent countries that are not IMF members, and finally, the yellow ones 
represent the G7.
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Let us start by the non-surprising observation that no member of the G7 has ever been 
blacklisted for whatever reason. This comes as no surprise as politics interfere with 
most groups, and the FATF has been no exception. Obviously, this does not mean that 
London, New York, or any other major city of a G7 member country are not heavily 
involved in money-laundering. Most of the money being transmitted from major cities 
is tainted with cocaine (Lilley 2000).
What is so special then about black-listed countries? The Financial Action Task Force 
would probably respond by saying that the jurisdictions that are black-listed are those 
that have failed to put in place measures for carrying out AML effectively. But if that is 
the case, what could one make for the MI6 agent who literally destroyed a vital ML 
investigation (Rider 2003), the affairs between the UK and its protectorates (Mohamed 
2002), or the fact that the Pentagon was actually selling bio-chemical equipment (via the 
Internet) that ended up mostly in the middle-east, all through a shell company and on a 
discount reaching 80% of the purchased price (Demetis 2004)xl?
Such inconsistencies become more evident in particular examples within the AML 
community. Nauru, the smallest republic in the world, has refused cooperation after 
being black-listed, and has also managed to launder around $70 billion in 1998 (Lilley
2000). Nauru demonstrated to the world that geographical isolation25 has nothing to do 
with ML, especially when it is supported by a full Commonwealth membership . 
Black-listing from the FATF would soon follow (with a 2 year lag!) and even though it 
is generally perceived that black-listing causes trouble for business (as countries face 
barriers whilst transacting with the world’s largest economies and other AML 
community members), it seems that there are several jurisdictions that don’t mind 
black-listing. Because of the nature of the money-laundering phenomenon, money can 
be channelled and laundered in various ways.
Nauru was placed on the FATF black-list in 2000, and in 2001 passed its AML Act. 
With a change of government in Nauru, 139 offshore banking licences were revoked
25 Closest neighbour to the island is Ocean Island, located 305 Km to the East.
26 There are of course quite a few Commonwealth members that have been on the FATF black-list like 
Barbados, Tuvalu, etc.
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(Johnson 2003). However the AML Act failed to meet the obligations (according to the 
FATF) and then the OECD declared probable sanctions against Nauru, something that 
was followed by 18 countries requiring increased scrutiny in all transactions involving 
Nauru (Roule and Salak 2003). The US Department of Treasury also published 
proposed regulations to impose ‘special measures against Nauru under section 311 of 
the USA Patriot Act (ibid).
The example of Nauru provides a good opportunity for discussing several issues. First 
of all, even if Nauru’s AML Act met the obligations, it would be highly unlikely that 
ML would cease to exist. Changes in legislation that target ML are always welcome (by 
the FATF), but even if they are in place, they may be introduced just for the sake of 
complying with the international community. If we consider the number of countries 
that requested increased scrutiny in transactions involving Nauru and put this number in 
a global perspective (18 countries out of 193), then that did not even come close to the 
membership size of the FATF, let alone the international community. It therefore 
becomes evident that even if black-listed, Nauru did not face particular difficulties in 
transacting with other markets. This is why three years after the problems were 
identified, the country was still holding a place in the current black-list27. Furthermore, 
in their effort to impose sanctions to Nauru, the United States tried to make use of the 
Patriot Act whereby financial institutions would be required to terminate the 
correspondent accounts with Nauruan financial institutions (ibid). But that (according to 
the Act) would include correspondent accounts maintained for other foreign banks that 
are used to provide banking services indirectly to Nauruan financial institutions. The 
feasibility of such impositions remains to be seen, but such sanctions imply that 
international cooperation on AML has reached a high level of information sharing that 
even indirect transactions can be monitored.
This is, however, far from reality. There are 191 members of the United Nations, 184 
members of the International Monetary Fund, and 100 members28 of the Egmont Group 
(thus only 100 countries have recognised Financial Intelligence Units). This poses a 
serious problem as the sharing of information is limited between countries that have an
27 FATF decides to impose counter-measures on Nauru on December 5, 2001. The country is still black­
listed (as o f July 12,2004)
2816 of which joined the Egmont Group in 2003.
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FIU and those that don’t. Things became even more problematic as there are no formal 
mechanisms to request information from countries that do not have an FIU, thus 
coordination is gravely jeopardised. As for the Financial Action Task Force, it numbers 
33 members, and does not wish to expand its membership. There are of course other 
FATF style groups, like the Caribbean FATF, and other organizations, like the Basel 
Committee, the World Bank, the IMF, etc that target ML. Far from providing help, 
organizational opportunism on a domain like AML can dramatically increase the 
complexity and render coordination and cooperation dysfunctional.
This may considerably put into question the very function of organisations like the 
FATF. Severe criticism has been levelled at how the FATF deals with countries that 
become black-listed, and it is not clear with what criteria countries are being chosen for 
review, or what the audit procedures are. A well-respected expert in the field of AML, 
Peter Lilley, makes the following remarks:
“After February 2005 the blacklist was down to three countries, as the FATF 
removed the Cook Islands, Indonesia and the Philippines as each of these 
countries were “implementing AML measures to remedy deficiencies that were 
identified by the FATF”. In October 2005 the list was reduced to its current 
“rump” when Nauru got the green light to become respectable and was removed 
from the list after it had abolished its 400 shell banks which, in the words of the 
FATF “removed the major money laundering risk”. Thus as at February 2006, 
only two countries -  Myanmar and Nigeria -  remain “blacklisted”. Yet frequent 
references are made to other countries where weak or nonexistent AML controls 
exist. Whilst the FATF exercise has clearly improved AML regulation in 
numerous countries has this process simultaneously (for whatever reason) 
allowed other jurisdictions to pass under the radar screen and carry on 
facilitating the washing o f dirty money? ”29
One might perhaps offer a series of criticisms in these assertions, including the 
impossibility of effectively scrutinising and reviewing every country globally, however, 
Lilley’s point cannot go unnoticed: how much of the ML reality is being constructed by 
the agendas initiated by the FATF (and to a large degree -  unavoidable perhaps -  being 
politically dictated) and how much of this FATF exercise allows other jurisdictions to 
go unnoticed? Even worse, how are financial institutions to tell what jurisdictions
29 Taken from http://www.dirtvdealing.net, Peter Lilley, 2006 -  emphasis added
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should be considered more ‘risky’ in ML and TF, if the FATF offers no mechanism to 
help other than naming a limited number of countries?
In addition to this, it is interesting to note that -  at the time of writing of this dissertation 
in April, 2007 -  no countries whatsoever are currently being featured in FATF’s 
infamous list. That being the case, there is a pressing need to consider different 
approaches in dealing with this extremely important phenomenon within the realm of 
ML and TF, and always in conjunction with the risk-based approach. Also, the analysis 
for such an endeavour would need to take into account not only the financial aspects of 
a region and the risks involved, but also political aspects and instability that may 
generate corruption and threaten the regional socio-political structures of a society and 
cultivate potential avenues for ML and TF (given that corruption, turmoil and socio­
political risk create a perfect setting for such activities), and economic aspects beyond 
financial issues that are also deemed to be of importance.
It is however inevitable that some institutions will see AML as an opportunity for 
expansion rather than a problem that needs to be solved. An example comes from the 
involvement of the IMF and World Bank. Interestingly enough, their respective 
executive boards, which wanted to proceed to a unified methodology (with the FATF), 
wondered what their ongoing relationship with the FATF should be, and further 
suggested that the latter should refrain from black-listing until a consensus was reached 
(Holder 2003). Of course, and despite considerable IMF efforts for expansion to the 
AML domain, the FATF black-listing process will not just cease to exist. It incorporates 
and personalizes both the role and the institutionalization of the FATF. It is one of its 
ontological constructs.
The UN counts 193 countries on the globe. As previously mentioned, there are 191 
countries that are members to the UN. The only two territories recognized as countries 
that are not members of the UN are The Vatican City and Taiwan. Both have been 
heavily involved in money-laundering, but the Holy City provides a magnificent 
example. When the Vatican got its opportunity to be recognised as a sovereign state, 
capital flight was strongly encouraged, Mafia money washed through, and there were 
opportunities aplenty. The Vatican invested in gold, Swiss holdings, etc, and it is 
estimated that the Vatican’s investments around the world are worth an approximate
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$15billion, making it the single most important owner of equities (Naylor 1994). One of 
the sources of the invested money has potentially come from the Nazi Croatian Treasury 
that was illicitly transferred to the Vatican Bank5011 - via banks in the United States (ibid). 
Such are some of the complexities and ironies of the (A)ML community.
The functionalistic and hence prescriptive logic that is followed by the international 
community projects an overly simplistic picture of a very complex system, one that can 
supposedly be controlled by just forty recommendations. This clearly demonstrates that 
despite the clear progress that has been made throughout the last years in strengthening 
efforts and the myriad of legislative initiatives, a truly international flavour against ML 
is still missing. It also demonstrates that what has been often termed as a ‘holistic’ 
approach for tackling AML is not only missing, but also has been barely researched. 
Even though the term ‘holistic’ induces grave observational misunderstandings (as we 
shall see), it does however hint towards treating the AML domain as a whole, or even 
better as a system in its own right. If there is one major contribution that this dissertation 
is claiming, it is that of dealing with AML through Systems Theory. It aims at providing 
truly systemic considerations and insights that surpass by far the purely experimental 
and descriptive levels that seem to have exhausted their possibilities, and rarely go 
beyond a mere pragmatic-typological based treatise.
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Chapter IIIResearch Methodology 
Chapter Structure
This chapter is structured as follows: first, some introductory comments are offered 
regarding methodology that attempt to clarify the foundational circumstances under 
which any research methodology should be based. Following such an introduction and 
subsequent analysis, a broader framework for methodology is developed that covers all 
the stages of the research process. This is separated into three distinct stages: Stage 1 
involves the determination of the philosophical presuppositions that guide any research, 
Stage 2 determines the research design and collection of data techniques, and finally, 
Stage 3 reflects on the way that data can be coded, a theoretical framework applied, and 
conclusions reached. The synthesis of these three stages constitutes the broader structure 
for methodology that is applied in this dissertation. Following the presentation of such a 
broader methodology, each individual stage is then applied for the purposes of the 
specific techniques used in this dissertation, so that the reader gains an insight into the 
clear methodological path that has been chosen.
Introduction
Having taught the subject of research methodology for three consecutive years to the 
Masters students of the Information Systems Group at the London School of 
Economics, I feel indebted to start the exploration behind this chapter by thanking all of 
my students. With their persistence and insightful questions on what constitutes 
legitimate research, they have provided me with many reflections on methodology. 
These reflections have considerably expanded my own understanding of the critical 
issue of methodology, and for that I am sincerely grateful to them. They have helped me
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greatly in elevating methodological issues that are considered by many to be a 
somewhat boring -  yet necessary -  subject-matter, to one of the most interesting aspects 
for consideration in research.
Before engaging in the task of differentiating between the different theoretical 
perspectives, and clarifying what is the research methodology behind this dissertation 
(in its scope, philosophical underpinnings, data collection and analysis methods), it 
would be prudent to acknowledge that any research stems from certain epistemological 
and ontological positions. These positions are predominantly philosophical, and hence 
must be treated as a matter of belief -  a starting viewpoint on how the world can be 
described, and ultimately, how research can commence. Following this assertion, all 
legitimacy and rigour that the author of a research dissertation tries to claim can only be 
criticized on the grounds of its consistency to the predominant methods of the paradigm 
to which he subscribes. Displaying this consistency is perhaps the most crucial issue, 
and one has to delve into the criticisms of his own research approach only to confront 
them constructively and innovatively.
In the first part of this chapter I will delineate between four widely discussed categories 
that are encompassed in the framework of Burrell & Morgan. These categories are often 
utilized in research in information systems, and have become one of the many -  yet 
predominant -  classifications and schemas upon which worldviews are expressed (Klein 
and Hirschheim 1987; Angell and Smithson 1991).
After a brief examination of each of the paradigms, I will attempt to provide a clear 
account of what the underlying methodological foundations of this research are, and 
subsequently position this dissertation using the paradigm that is more appropriate in 
this context. This methodological overview will be carried out by utilizing a range of 
resources, and aims at providing a high-level theoretical conceptual map of 
methodology; this higher-level structure will be applied for the purposes of this 
dissertation so that the choice of steps throughout the methodological structure become 
evident.
According to Burrell and Morgan there are four basic paradigms: The Functionalists, 
the Interpretivists, the Radical Structuralists and the Radical Humanists (Burrell and
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Morgan 1979). As outlined in Table 3a below, these are separated into two basic 
dimensions. The first dimension refers to epistemological beliefs, and the second 
dimension delineates between the sociology of regulation and the sociology of radical 
change.
Objective Subjective
regulation FUNCTIONALIST INTERPRETIVIST
radical
change
RADICAL
STRUCTURALIST
RADICAL
HUMANIST
Table 3a: The Matrix o f Burrell & Morgan
In order to avoid confusion, there first has to be a clear account of what constitutes a 
paradigm as the categories within the B&M matrix are usually referred to as paradigms. 
Much of the conceptual constructs for defining the idea that we have come to term as 
‘paradigm’, source from the pioneering work of Thomas Kuhn in his ‘Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions’. For the purposes of the analysis that follows, a paradigm is 
considered to be a unitary package of beliefs about science and scientific knowledge 
(Kuhn 1970). Even though there is always some ambiguity about what constitutes a 
paradigm, the ontology of the paradigm (its very existence) serves a specific purpose; 
that is, to set boundaries so that research can proceed whilst the ‘unnecessary’ 
complexity is cut down. Reduction of world-complexity therefore becomes an 
ontological presupposition for the construction and utilization of a paradigm. Behind 
this assertion lies a fundamental reasoning that delimits our viewpoint on the research 
process. It is this delimitation that allows research to proceed. But at the same time such 
delimitation renders the application of theories imperfect. This is precisely why ‘theory 
is both a way of seeing and not seeing’ (Walsham 1993). A specific theory may be 
‘working’ correctly under certain assumptions, but it may be completely incompatible at 
a different context. Thus, complexity is cut down through paradigm delimitation, an act 
of choice that restricts the examination of a research area.
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It comes as no surprise then that Burrell & Morgan (B&M hereinafter) assert that the 
four outlined paradigms should be considered as mutually incompatible. Of course, the 
problem is that category is not truth, but merely cognitive fiction, an act of choice 
(Angell 2000).
Methodology
The etymological foundation of the word ‘Methodology* comes from the combination 
of two Greek words: ‘method’30 and ‘logos’31, which can, once considered together, 
translate as ‘to speak about method’. Within a scientific context, methodology implies 
the outline of a foundational platform upon which a particular research project can be 
delineated. The outline in itself highlights the tools o f scientific investigation, and these 
tools are selectively chosen by researchers, all the while they constitute a body of 
practices, procedures and rules used by those who work in a discipline. Of course, there 
is no doubt that any methodology is by definition flawed, as it contains a necessary 
reduction of complexity, and therefore one is forced to choose from a vast multiplicity 
of scenarios in order to address a supposedly well-defined problem. Godel summarised 
this assertion in his incompleteness theorem, stating that all theoretical formulations are 
necessarily incomplete. When one chooses a research strategy one determines both how 
the phenomenon being studied will be revealed, and indirectly, the consequences of the 
knowledge thus generated (Godel 1986). This is of course a clear epistemological 
position that is being put forward by Godel, one that I fully subscribe to for the purposes 
of this dissertation, and one that is fully compatible with the epistemological 
assumptions followed here, and elaborated in this chapter.
Method however often surpasses the Godelian incompleteness, and when appropriated it 
often gives the delusion of coherence. This has been amply demonstrated by the seminal 
works of Paul Feyerabend, where method becomes either too restrictive or the 
background against which ideological battles take place fuelled by varied 
epistemological and ontological grounds (Feyerabend 1975; Feyerabend 1987). The
30 M£0oSo<;
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problem therefore is method itself; and such a problem is a truly foundational one that 
affects not only the field of Information Systems that has been through a series of 
identity-crises as a discipline (Avgerou 2000; Avgerou and Madon 2002), but also and 
equally, disciplines like mathematics that seemingly enjoy ‘more coherence’ in their 
internal structures, while social sciences appear to be degraded to a somewhat inferior 
set of concepts with purely descriptive capacity.
But such has been the plague of functionalism or positivism throughout society, that the 
fundamental problem of method has become somewhat distorted, and a belief that 
numerical manipulation is somehow superior to other forms of scientific investigation is 
now dominant. This belief has since become a transcendental property that has infected 
nearly all disciplines, even those that fall outside the scope of positivism and are 
methodologically based on a different set of tools for scientific investigation. Since this 
is an ongoing debate within the field of Information Systems, and one that has lasted 
many years (Lee 1999), I feel I have to address this methodological (and mostly 
epistemological) issue from a basic standpoint and through a simple example by 
providing a few reflections.
What is the need or the driving force behind all these operations, which leads them to 
acquire a mathematical description? Why should an observation acquire functional (i.e. 
mathematical) notations, and succumb to positivism? Are there any alternatives? Did 
this problem always pose itself like that?
The answer to the latter question is no; the problem has manifested itself in many 
different ways, and has fabricated and replicated itself in a self-referential manner 
throughout all scientific disciplines. There is nothing inherently mathematical in either 
the physical or the social world; and nothing inherently mathematical (and even worse 
linear) in observation, which is the means by which we acquire knowledge. It has to he 
made clear that mathematics (the main pillar o f positivism) is merely one notational 
schema amongst others, and that there is simply no way that any notational schema 
can describe itself without reference to another notational schema (e.g language). 
Mathematics can certainly develop self-referentially (i.e. theoretical mathematics), but 
the moment it seeks to describe something (or be described), it has to attach itself, or 
allow itself to be attached, to another notational schema. Systemically, this constitutes
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notational interpenetration, as nothing can exist in splendid isolation, not even 
notational schemas. They too are nodes in a network with no focal point whereby, in the 
simplest of all scenarios, they refer to an external reality that they are seeking to 
describe.
There was a point in time that this problem was exposed to a different degree of 
granularity than now; an example comes from the school of Pythagoras, and the famous 
example of the Pythagorean Theorem. The degree of the problem was ameliorated by 
the fact that Pythagoras and his school tried to provide combinations o f notational 
schemas despite the geometric/mathematical treatise of their subjects, as they also 
sought to provide a qualitative explanation for the quantitative results; that was a 
requirement essentially deriving from the projected philosophical and qualitative 
rationality that was imposed on numbers. Anything ‘irrational’ was an abomination.
The Pythagorean Theorem
a
+ = f
Figure 3.1: The Pythagorean Theorem
Rumour has it that when an abomination was uncovered by Hippasus, a disciple of 
Pythagoras, a few Pythagorean students drowned him at sea . Apparently, 
Pythagoreans were very sensitive towards ‘rationality’, whereby everything could be 
expressed through integers or as ratios of integers; in that way, they could interpret it in
32 Heath, pp. 65, 154, vol. 1, as cited by Stillwell.
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the qualitative sense. But when Hippasus applied the Theorem to the scenario whereby 
both a and p equalled to 1, he came up with something that looked like y2=2. The 
conclusion followed that y equalled the square root of the number two (of course the 
concept of the square root had to be constructed before this previous statement may 
even be made); an entity that was not only irrational but also infinite in its mathematical 
expression, the first thirty digits of which could be estimated as follows: 
1.41421356237309504880168872421.... Multiply that number by itself (another self­
reference33! Whereby the operation forces the number to refer to itself) and you 
would approximately get the number two. One of the first schisms between quantitative 
and qualitative descriptions had forcefully presented itself, and left the Pythagoreans 
wondering at the paradoxical implications. How could it be that a side o f a triangle (the 
hypotenuse), which can qualitatively be described as a fixed length, have a quantitative 
expression that is denoted by a number that is represented by an infinite sequence o f 
non-zero digits, particularly when that number emerges from two simple ‘rational’ 
numbers?
The point made by using this example is simple: for any scientific discipline, 
asymmetry becomes a foundational platform for the self-reference of the discipline 
itself, and its evolution. Without asymmetry, knowledge becomes impossible as it 
collapses into tautological structures. With asymmetry, knowledge becomes possible as 
variability in choosing the generation of knowledge becomes equally possible: such is 
the endeavour we call method.
How the Information Systems field has ended up being generally underpinned by a 
positivist epistemology is therefore an issue of convention, power, and paradox. For 
what can be made of the fact that more legitimacy is perceived in studies that utilize 
hypothesis-testing by attributing numerical values to highly interconnected parameters 
than by taking extremely contextual issues into account, leaving them suffocating in the 
background?
This attack on positivism is not intended to isolate it conceptually as an illegitimate 
form of research; however, it does attempt to demonstrate that validity is based upon
33 What is described here as self-referential is in a sense all the higher-powers of numbers as the result of 
a multiplication of a number with itself, again, and again, and again ...
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epistemological assumptions that cannot -  and must not -  be taken as universal truths, 
or seen as the one and only way for undertaking research. This of course does not 
exclude the possibility of using the outcomes of positivist-based research within the 
context of interpretivism, and as this is the case with this dissertation, an attempt to 
make such a structure more explicit is made here by providing the methodological 
outline.
A broader structure for methodology
In what follows, a broader structure is provided that penetrates all aspects of 
methodology, from the very beginning, right up to the very end of the research process. 
This high-level structure will be applied to this dissertation so that the research 
methodology -  and ultimately the ‘reduced-in-complexity’ path that has been chosen -  
becomes clear. Part of the conceptualization behind this structure is based on the Burrell 
and Morgan framework (Burrell and Morgan 1979), on John Dewey’s analysis of the 
double movement o f reflection that will be utilized at the very end of this structure 
(Dewey 1933), on various other resources that critically examine methodological issues 
(Yin 1984; Chua 1986; Kaplan and Duchon 1988; Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991; Searle 
1995; Myers 1997; Baskerville 1999), and finally on personal methodological 
reflections that were derived from teaching the subject matter for a period of three 
years.
Figure 3.2 below attempts to synthesize the broader methodological structure on the 
basis of the resources referenced above and to delineate the process into three distinct 
stages.
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Figure 3.2: A broader structure for methodology
In the first stage of the methodological outline, the philosophical presuppositions that 
guide the research process must be determined. In the second, reflections are necessary 
for determining the research design and the process of data collection. Finally, in the 
third stage of methodology, data-coding and selectivity of various types of evidence 
needs to be justified; in this latter stage, the applying of theory and the reaching of 
conclusions takes the form of a ‘double movement’ of reflection (see Dewey below). 
These stages are described in turn in order to provide the broader coherent 
methodological structure upon which this dissertation rests.
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Stage 1: Determining the philosophical presuppositions that guide the 
research
The starting point for any research orientation in any discipline constitutes the 
realization that there is a vast array of possibilities in representing reality (and 
perceptions about reality). The quest therefore for any research project starts from 
fundamental epistemological and ontological positions. Ontology relates to perceptions 
about reality or ‘Being’ in the world. Philosophical treatises, such as that of Searle on 
‘Does the real world exist’ (Searle 1995), deal with primary ontological positions. 
Mundane as such questions may appear to some, they do play a critical role, knowingly 
or unknowingly, in how research is directed towards epistemological matters (how we 
know what we know). If for instance one believes that the ‘world’ exists independently 
of any human interference (e.g. cognition) and that ‘Being’ is real and external, one 
would believe that there is an objective reality (a reality ‘out there’) that is independent 
of any observation, and one could attempt to extract the laws of that reality accordingly. 
In such a scenario, one possibility is to assume cause-and-effect relationships within 
that objective reality, and to attempt to extract these by deduction. This outlook is 
referred to as the philosophical standpoint of positivism (functionalism and positivism 
are used interchangeably here in the context of the Burrell and Morgan matrix -  B&M 
hereinafter).
The identified variations of philosophical standpoints are so many in number that a 
review of all would require volumes of dissertations (in pure philosophy alone!). As this 
dissertation does not share that goal, it attempts instead to provide a few comments to 
demonstrate the complexity behind isolating different epistemological perspectives 
before collapsing them into the simplified form of the B&M matrix. Positivism for 
example (it owes its name in the belief that knowledge is firmly grounded in something 
that is posited -  or given) claims to grasp objective meaning, however, even in doing so, 
researchers are able to differentiate between twelve (!) or more variations of positivism 
(Crotty 1998). As Crotty remarks on positivism:
“If we were to say that the world of a positivist is a 'mathematical’ world we 
would probably be in! A world which is quantifiable. However, the scientific 
world is an abstraction from the world we live. The world perceived through the 
scientific grid is highly systematic and organized, full of regularities,
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constancies, uniformities. It is in high contrast with the ambiguous and uncertain 
world we experience every day... Arguing with positivism must not be done with 
what positivism does but to the status it ascribes to scientific findings. However, 
at the 20th century, more scientists have challenged the claims about objectivity 
leading to a less arrogant form of positivism. Probability is in, certainty is out. 
No absolute objectivity but a certain level of objectivity. This is known as 'post- 
positivism ’ ” (ibid).
From the Vienna Circle to Kant and Comte, positivism has gone through a series of 
mutations, while even Physics with the advances of Heisenberg and Bohr in Quantum 
Theory have sent shockwaves of uncertainty through it with the famous uncertainty 
principle. In creating disbelief in absolute objectivity, the two helped create a post­
positivist philosophical standpoint in the most unlikely of all disciplines: Physics itself. 
The impact of such an evolution is not to be taken lightly, for it has profoundly shaken 
the foundations of positivism.
It is clear that the multitude of epistemological consequences of so many variations has 
given way to a multitude of representational schemas that attempt to classify, simplify 
and collapse the complexity of the underlying problem domain. The B&M matrix is 
used here as a simple classification schema, as it has been broadly used within 
information systems research (Angell and Smithson 1991) (Klein and Hirschheim 
1987). In the B&M matrix the two basic dimensions refer to epistemological beliefs 
(objective and subjective), and to perceptions of social reality (sociology of regulation 
and sociology of radical change). Positivism (or functionalism) in the context of B&M 
represents the belief that society is governed by laws of causality, and that it can be 
studied just as Physics studies nature. To positivists, even uncertainty can be causally 
dissected.
Instead of an objective world that is posited, the advocates of Interpretivism see a 
shared social reality. They break the strong link between cause and effect, and adopt a 
nondeterministic view of the world. They believe that people create their own subjective 
and inter-subjective meanings as they interact with the world. Deterministic assertions 
are hard to make because reality is seen as social construction and interpretation by 
actors who are trying to engage with their understanding.
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A commonly held misconception, that interpretivists use only qualitative methods since 
such methods offer interpretation of the examined phenomena, will be resolved here. 
Indeed, in Chapter V where the narrative of the case study is outlined, the reader will 
observe that quantitative methods are often used in order to corroborate data that has 
been collected from interviews. In doing so, this dissertation submits to a combination 
of data types that are both quantitative and qualitative. That however must not be taken 
as an underlying epistemological ambiguity; quite the contrary. There is nothing 
contradictory in utilising both quantitative and qualitative data within the scope of a 
particular research design that is informed by a specific epistemological stance. 
Resolution of such an ambiguity, often the target of many researchers (Miles 1979), can 
be achieved only when differentiating between two distinct aspects of the research 
process; that is, differentiating between a research design (also known as a research 
strategy) and data collection methods (Yin 1981; Yin 1984). In this manner, it needs to 
be made clear that one is able to choose a particular research design (such as a case 
study) that is informed by certain epistemological beliefs, and subsequently proceed 
into data collection methods that can be both quantitative and qualitative. This then 
becomes a matter of emphasis, and determines whether qualitative data become the 
primary focus, data that are subsequently corroborated with quantitative data or vice- 
versa.
Stage 2: Determining Research Design and Collecting Data
Following on from particular philosophical presuppositions that guide the research and 
constitute a particular epistemological and ontological position, one subsequently 
decides upon a particular research design or research strategy. Examples of such 
research designs are portrayed in Figure 3.2, such as action research, survey, case study, 
etc. Following the decision of a research strategy, one moves on to data collection so 
that primary data can be differentiated from secondary data.
Primary data collection methods can be interviews (unstructured, semi-structured, or 
structured), questionnaire administration, observations that can be either direct or
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indirect, meetings, informal discussions, etc. These can be supplemented by secondary 
data, such as government or industry reports, newsletters, newspaper articles, website 
material, etc. The totality of both primary and secondary data gives rise to a collection 
of disparate data that can be both quantitative and qualitative. In Figure 3.2 that depicts 
the evolution of the entire methodological approach, these are portrayed as 
‘informational elements’ whereby the types of evidence are classified into two distinct 
categories (quantitative and qualitative).
As the data collection process commences and continues, it becomes clear that 
selectivity of various types of evidence (whether qualitative or quantitative) gives rise to 
arguments and viewpoints in respect of the research being undertaken. Arguments are 
constructed on the basis of the data collected, but soon enough the entire process repeats 
itself as arguments will often require corroboration, further insights, and more in-depth 
data collection (i.e. additional interviews on specific topics). These in their own turn 
generate yet more data, and the process continues until the researcher is satisfied with 
the corroboration of several subjectively -  in their scale of importance -  identified 
streams of arguments. This oscillatory process between data already collected that are 
used to begin the construction of arguments, and the collection of yet more data that 
corroborate the arguments already selected for a more in-depth analysis and in doing so 
generate more data that could proven irrelevant for the purposes of the researcher, is 
what John Dewey terms as the double movement of reflection (Dewey 1933). 
Selectivity of data following the completion of this process leads on to the final stage of 
the research process.
In that process, it is very important to note that the combination between quantitative 
data and qualitative data is not only possible, but also contains no epistemological 
paradoxes. The close coupling between quantitative data with research identified as 
positivist is merely a convention that does not prevent incorporation of quantitative data 
within interpretivist research.
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Stage 3: Coding the Data, Applying the Theory and Reaching 
Conclusions
Coding the data then implies that specific streams of evidence are put together for the 
presentation of particular arguments. This is typically done when the research findings 
are being presented (in this dissertation this refers to Chapter V). Prior to the 
presentation of the research findings, the theoretical framework is presented (Chapter IV 
here). Finally this culminates in both the broader analysis of the research findings -  with 
the help of the theory -  and the provision of conclusions and insights (in this final 
chapter).
In applying the general structure for methodology outlined above to this dissertation, the 
following considerations are presented:
Applying Stage 1: Determining the philosophical presuppositions that 
guide the research
a. On Epistemology
This research is informed by the epistemology of subjectivism. Subjectivism (as 
opposed to objectivism) maintains that there can be no objective meaning in the object 
of study. Those informed by an objective epistemology claim that things exist as 
meaningful entities independently of consciousness and experience, in a fashion that 
objects have truth and meaning residing in them (Crotty 1998). As this research is 
informed by a subjectivist epistemology, it is believed that meaning is constructed and 
does not reside in the object of study. The idea that meaning is constructed from the 
interaction between the subject (i.e. researcher) and the object, in a way that reality is 
shared is also referred to as constructionism, an ‘ism’ that corresponds closely to 
interpretivism within the B&M matrix. According to Crotty,
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“Constructionism takes the view that all knowledge and therefore all 
meaningful reality as such, is contingent upon human practices, being 
constructed in and out of interaction between human beings and their 
world, and developed and transmitted within an essentially social 
context.” (ibid)
The appropriateness of the foundation of a constructionist epistemology for this 
research becomes obvious when one considers the myriad of factors that influence the 
domain of Anti-Money Laundering. Firstly, the very idea of what constitutes money 
laundering is socially constructed and depicted in legislation, as has already been 
discussed in the introductory chapter. Secondly, because of the nature of the problem 
domain and the inherent ambiguity in several crucial factors (i.e. suspicious transactions 
thresholds, the very concept of suspicion, etc), even the ideals that are ‘narrowed down’ 
in legislation are open to multiple interpretations, and sensitive to multiple operational 
subtleties and contextual differentiations. Thirdly, as it has been analyzed in Chapter II, 
money-laundering unavoidably rests upon a pre-existing fabricated and socially 
constructed ideal, that of money.
On different grounds, the internationalization of natural sciences and their wide 
acceptance of objectivism (before chaos theory and uncertainty via quantum mechanics 
confused the issue) is the result of a strictly formulated culture, one that is based upon 
the principles of a ‘rigid’ mathematical construct, whereby its proponents consciously 
and deliberately try to ignore the social. However, such uniformity in scientific culture 
and theoretical constructs are impossible to uphold when there are social, economic and 
political factors that are perceived differently. Any imposition of an objectivistic- 
informed framework to map out the socio-political context would restrict the plurality 
and heterogeneity inherent in the social sphere. Hence, even with methodologies that are 
employed in AML under an objectivistic informed epistemology (e.g. for estimating the 
volume of the ML market), their inadequacy is quickly exposed when the problem 
remains that, from a semantic point of view, there is hardly any consensus on what 
constitutes money-laundering. This is of course intrinsically related to the issue 
highlighted throughout the AML domain: the difficulty in defining what it is to be 
regarded as suspicious. The problem is without a solution; any attempt to objectify 
epistemologically the domain of ML will automatically be undermined by its subjective 
ontological ambiguity. Money is a socially constructed ideal, and therefore its ontology
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\is socially set. Consensus and static definitions on socially constructed ideals are far 
from reality. The same goes for money-laundering, which has to rest on suspicion 
(recently confused even more by the even more elusive concept of risk) and the use of 
STRs as the mechanism that sustains this process.
b. On Ontology
Beliefs about ontology are equally important, and probably emerge with epistemologies 
as the two are intertwined. This research follows the ontological stance of realism, 
which suggests that there is actually a reality in existence and outside of the human 
mind. The only fundamental and crucial distinction that must be made at this point is 
between the concept of existence and that of meaning. The fact that there is an array of 
realities out there has nothing to do with our interaction with them; it is only the 
interaction that can give rise to a meaning. Adhering therefore to a realist ontological 
position implies nothing about how that (perceived) reality is being constructed and 
interpreted, and therefore the two positions adopted here, those of a subjective 
epistemology and a realist ontology, are theoretically compatible.
Applying Stage 2: Determining Research Design and Collecting Data
a. On Research Design
Before getting into the details of the research design, it would be useful to ponder the 
problem of the duality of research questions. One refers to the descriptive research type, 
and the other to the explanatory research. The first examines or describes what is going 
on, while the latter examines the underlying reasons or the why. The first presents 
considerable weaknesses, as descriptions34 can be endless. However, the proponents that 
dismiss this type of research fail to acknowledge that a good description of a problem 
area can be very important for our understanding of it. Furthermore, a rigorous
34 However, there are no absolute facts or absolute truths in systems as complex as society, only mere 
descriptions. A convincing description can therefore prove invaluable in shedding light on subtle 
problems
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description is a considerable step for the passing to the explanatory stage. Without a 
sufficient description of what is going on, there is absolutely no point in explaining the 
why. In other words, if the basic premises are problematic, then proceeding in 
examining the underlying reasons becomes twice as problematic. Thus, additional 
emphasis must be given whilst trying to describe the phenomenon that is being 
examined.
It is equally important to take into consideration that a research design must be 
distinguished from the research method (research method here is equivalent to data 
collection methods as outlined in Figure 3.2). Choosing a research design does not 
imply or determine that a particular method of data collection will be adopted. 
Examples of research design include experiments, case studies, longitudinal designs, 
cross-sectional analysis, etc. Furthermore, by choosing a specific research design, one 
aims at reducing the complexity and ambiguity of collecting too much data, or data that 
do not closely match the research questions. In addition to the latter, the most important 
thing while developing a research design is demonstrating both internal and external 
validity.
Internal validity refers to the extent to which the structure of a research design helps in 
the drawing of ‘solid’ conclusions from the results. In other words, we must always 
strive for clarity, demonstrating why alternative descriptions from our findings might be 
less trustworthy and inconsistent.
External validity refers to the extent to which results from a specific study can be 
generalized. This is probably one of the most challenging areas while carrying out 
research, and it must be handled with caution. A typical threat in generalizing from the 
findings is the use of unrepresentative samples and issues of categorization. Producing 
generalizations must therefore take into consideration sampling issues, and be consistent 
within the ‘category’ of the specific case. Cross-context generalizations inherit further 
difficulties, and they tend to be more abstract (and sometimes less useful). At the 
conclusion of this dissertation, where the practical and theoretical contributions are 
described, the issue of generalisation for the broader AML system is considered.
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This study focuses by using a case study research design. Case studies have in the past 
been perceived as constituting some inferior form of research for all the wrong 
epistemological reasons (Yin 1981), and mostly because of a widespread support for 
positivism (ibid), which was then at its peak, implying that unless equations can model 
the problem domain, then no serious attempt could be considered plausible. Because of 
such skewed epistemological positions, it took some time before case study research 
was considered to be a legitimate form, and studied carefully as such. Case studies are 
often seen as examples of qualitative research, and closely connected to Interpretivism 
(Yin 1984). The case study is a research strategy, which focuses on understanding the 
dynamics present within single settings. Case studies can involve either single or 
multiple cases, and numerous levels of analysis (Eisenhardt 1989). Case studies 
typically combine data collection methods such as archives, interviews, questionnaires, 
and observations. There can be several combinations. One is combining quantitative 
data from questionnaires with qualitative evidence from interviews and observations 
(ibid).
Due to the nature of the phenomenon being studied, and the confidentiality agreements 
agreed with the institution where the research was carried out, the name of the financial 
institution that has been studied cannot be revealed. For these reasons, the financial 
institution studied in this dissertation is referred to as ‘Drosia Bank’, details for which 
are analysed in Chapter V.
b. On Data Collection
A considerable volume of findings in this research are derived from interviews, the 
majority of which were unstructured. It would be fair to say that interviews constituted 
the predominant method of collecting data, supplemented occasionally by documents 
regarding AML, and computer-based data in respect of AML cases. The use of 
unstructured interviews has proved highly fruitful in gaining considerable insights from 
the financial institution where the research was carried out. It has provided interviewees 
with both the necessary flexibility to reply to high-level themes around the difficulties 
they face within the domain of AML, and time to reflect on the complex nature of 
problems that arise when Information Systems are used for AML purposes.
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Once specific themes of interest, which had direct implications on how AML was 
managerially handled by Drosia Bank, and which involved complexities that emerged 
from large-scale Information Systems, had been decided, then follow-up interviews 
were carried out that provided additional material. Such follow-up interviews on 
particular themes that had been chosen have been instrumental in uncovering insights 
that are elaborated further in Chapter V where the findings from the case study are 
discussed. All data collection activities took place within a 2 V2 year period, and hence 
the case study can be regarded as longitudinal. Beyond that period of time where the 
predominant data collection activities took place, there were a few occasions at the time 
of the writing the dissertation that a few clarifications were required (and indeed 
additional information), and to which the staff members of Drosia Bank kindly 
responded. Due to the confidentiality agreement agreed with Drosia Bank, it is 
imperative to stress that -  during data collection - 1 was made aware of a multitude of 
high-profile and sensitive cases, along with the way they were managed by the Bank. 
Even though no such cases can be disclosed, the fact that the bank’s staff were willing 
to discuss important details has greatly enhanced the researcher’s understanding, and 
allowed him to reflect further on a multitude of aspects that touch on AML (ranging 
from collection and analysis of reports, communication aspects, training, determining 
suspicion, etc).
Indeed, besides being granted the opportunity to question personnel throughout the 
financial institution (and mostly within the ML-analysis team and the Compliance team) 
throughout the period of 2 XA years, there has been a series of occasions when the 
researcher was given an office at the heart of operations of the ML-analysis team. From 
there he had the opportunity of direct access to the intranet of the financial institution (a 
computer was provided for that purpose), access to the special case management system 
software where all ML cases were recorded, access to a variety of other information 
systems, and perhaps most of all, the ability to observe day-to-day operations of the 
ML-analysis team with the possibility of interrupting and asking questions about 
particular items of interest. On some occasions documents were requested to 
supplement specific lines of investigation; on a multitude of occasions, staff members 
proactively suggested articles and publications of interest or internal documents and
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guidelines that would shed light on some operational perspectives that were required to 
resolve issues surrounding data collection.
In the following table 3b, the reader can find a summary of both primary and secondary 
methods that were used in the process of collecting data for this dissertation. These are 
classified according to a qualitative/quantitative differentiation even though the line 
between the two is sometimes considerably opaque (there are occasions for instance 
when a single piece of evidence -  such as an internal report -  may include both):
Data collection methods Qualitative Q uantitative
Primary Data collection Unstructured Interviews, 
semi-structured interviews, 
direct observations, 
informal meetings
Statistics calculated with 
raw data from Case 
Management System (STRs 
analysis, branch reporting 
indexing)
Secondary Data collection Internal reports, 
government and industry 
reports
Statistics sourcing from 
complementary evidence 
and secondary interviews35
Table 3b: Data collection methods used in this dissertation
35 When an interviewee would for instance allude to a statistic that was neither part o f  a report or was not 
the result o f  scientific statistical analysis on the basis o f  raw data where access was provided
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Applying Stage 3: Coding the Data, Applying the Theory, and 
Reaching Conclusions
a. Coding the data
In analysing mostly qualitative data there is an unavoidable process of categorisation 
that takes place where disparate ‘data elements’ are grouped together for the 
construction of arguments. This is known as ‘coding the data’. As previously noted, this 
is done in distinct stages. Various researchers (Cooper and Hedges 1994; Coffey and 
Atkinson 1996; Berg 2001; Auerbach and Silverstein 2003; Richards 2005) mostly 
recognise this to be a 3-stage process (even though such a neatly defined delineation 
implies that interpretation and innovation in research can be clearly programmed, but 
this is a vast oversimplification):
i) Open coding: where the researcher starts with a broader research domain 
and a set of research questions. Open coding constitutes a first pass 
through the data elements that have been collected
ii) Axial coding: where categories have been defined within the coding 
process, and where the determination of these categories proceeds into 
elaborating the arguments that respective categories would support 
(while reflecting in their interconnections), and finally,
iii) Selective coding: where a last pass of incorporating further data elements 
takes place to corroborate the arguments.
In considering the aforementioned coding stages in the context of this dissertation, the 
following stages can be delineated:
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•Review of the AML environment of the financial institution 
•General Observations in AML work within the Bank
•Pursuit of Information Systems related AML-influences (systems Poseidon, 
CMS, the Chimera system, the Electronic Updates System)
•Scenarios of internal reporting and influences in the financial institution 
•Analysis of the extent of asymmetry within the internal reporting system
Figure 3.3: Coding stages
b. Applying the theory
According to Walsham, theory is both a way of seeing and not-seeing (Walsham 1995). 
Theory is simply a tool that mediates the interaction between the observer and the 
observed. Once the tool for mediation changes, so does the description of whatever is 
observed. It therefore becomes a question of appropriateness as to whether a theory used 
to study a context fits closely the observed phenomena. The theory applied in this 
dissertation is Systems Theory, in particular drawing on the works of Professor Niklas 
Luhmann (Luhmann 1990; Luhmann 1993; Luhmann 1995; Luhmann 1998; Luhmann 
2000; Luhmann 2000; Luhmann 2002; Luhmann 2004; Luhmann 2005). Even though 
possibilities often arise in research for the application of more than one theoretical 
framework, the application of more than one theory does create confusion as there is 
always the additional problems of how well the theories match together, and the 
conflicts that may arise. While other theories have been considered in the context of 
AML, despite a somewhat theoretical immaturity of handling the topic, and because 
most research around AML revolves in the purely descriptive level, these theories are 
considered not to have the theoretical rigour of Systems Theory (Angell and Demetis
2005). While neo-institutionalism (Dimaggio and Powell 1991; Scott 1991; Scott and 
Meyer 1991; Zucker 1991; Scott 1994; Selznick 1996; Hasselbladh and Kallinikos
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2000) was initially considered for the purposes of this dissertation, it was deemed 
insufficient to provide systemic insights for a holistic treatise of the AML domain. 
Indeed, a number of subtleties that surpass the purely institutional and embedded order 
of social and economic reality cannot easily be examined devoid of their systemic 
provenances or the systemic implications they give rise to. Considerations regarding the 
applicability of the theory chosen are further elaborated in the chapter dealing with 
Systems Theory.
Regarding the implementation and incorporation of systems theoretical ideas within the 
domain of AML, the researcher has previously published three theoretical papers 
informed by research that seek to combine Systems Theory with AML. In chronological 
order these have attempted to:
i) Provide the foundations of AML research on the basis of key systems 
theoretical ideas (Angell and Demetis 2005)
ii) Consider the systemic role of AML-related technologies, and how they 
have had an impact in the broader AML system (Demetis and Angell 
2006)
iii) Reflect and deconstruct the risk-based approach for Anti-Money 
Laundering that has been introduced by the 3 rd Directive, and inform the 
deconstruction by using various systems theoretical ideas on risk, and in 
particular those of representation, distinction and paradox (Demetis and 
Angell 2007)
Following a more elaborate treatise on systems theory, this dissertation intends -  as 
noted in the research questions -  to outline the core systemic differentiation of Anti- 
Money Laundering, to examine how technological consequences come to impact the 
domain of AML itself, and to investigate how AML can be viewed as a distinct system 
if it is to be studied properly in the systems theoretical sense. The interaction between 
these aspects is further informed by data collected mainly through the case study, and 
supplemented by various other resources.
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c. Reaching conclusions
Based on the documents that have been collected and enriched by the data from the 
interviews, conclusions are subsequently drawn. That is, the analysis of the data 
proceeds through the lens of systems theory. It is important to realize that this is one of 
the most crucial sections, as the interplay between analysing the data through the theory 
and describing the subtleties in the domain through the research questions, must be 
balanced and carefully justified. It is also useful to reflect on the question of whether 
one really collects the data and then analyses. Sometimes, this process is reciprocal, 
meaning that the researcher asks his questions and formulates his hypotheses and 
descriptions, based on his theoretical framework. In that way, it is useful to consider if 
the analysis is actually also a part of the data collection through the interviews, and how 
that may restrict or enhance the further analysis of the data (and to what extent).
An equally important aspect that must be carefully thought through is that the very fact 
that the analysis takes place through the use of a specific framework; it is unavoidable 
that many factors that influence the phenomenon being examined are not considered. 
This is because the framework focuses the study on a specific array of factors that are 
subsequently examined. Therefore, to realize what factors remain out of the research 
process, and to describe them briefly without affecting the core of the analysis are also 
important. Not everything can be included through the interplay of analyzing data and 
theory, but after all, the point is to focus on these factors invoked by the data, and that 
the theory most closely describes. A convincing account of what must be given 
additional attention and emphasis in the research is what feeds back into potential 
theoretical and practical contributions.
In the chapter that follows, the theoretical framework to be applied is presented and the 
key concepts around it are analysed.
70
cy%e trAoJe i f  more tAan trfe 
sum  ofz'tsjtu rrts
& % ristot/e
Chapter IV: On Systems Theory 
Chapter Structure
This chapter describes the key theoretical ideas around systems theory that will enhance 
the empirical data collected and presented in the case study in chapter V. The present 
chapter deals first with an introduction of systems theory and its importance within the 
broader theoretical domain (as well as its descriptive power). The concepts of difference 
and distinction are subsequently presented, followed by the key concepts of system, 
boundary and environment. There follow sections that deal first with the concept of 
complexity, and then with self-reference, the latter being the key concept within the 
latest stage in the evolution of systems theory.
Introduction
Systems Theory should be thought of as a collection of highly abstract concepts that can 
be applied to a series of problem domains. It should not be thought of as a single entity, 
a unity of a theoretical framework that is universally applicable. No previous theory has 
achieved such a feat, not that it would be possible to tell, as no system (not even 
Systems Theory) can accurately and fully describe itself, because the whole process 
would collapse to a form of paradox that would entail a tautology. The reason that no 
system can accurately describe itself is because asymmetry must be seen as a 
fundamental prerequisite for the construction of any system. Furthermore, every 
theoretical formulation, every theoretical construct and application, becomes 
inextricably bound up with an observer (say a researcher) that is employing the concepts 
of the theory for her/his own purposes. Hence, theory construction, deconstruction, re­
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construction, and application become severely dependent on the observers that employ 
the operations and conceptual schemas, which the observers themselves develop within 
particular circumstances and contexts.
Even though Systems Theory (ST hereinafter) has been in existence for decades, a 
series of paradigm36xul shifts have occurred within the theory, which have influenced the 
theoretical concepts themselves. A detailed examination of such evolution is an 
elaborate task and well outside of the scope of this dissertation, as one has to go back 
almost 400 years in the history of the influences behind ST, and differentiate between
35 major figures in the construction of the theory that has progressed from a mere 
mechanical model, to a biological model, to a process model, and then on to a different 
sphere that includes concepts like chaos, complexity, evolution (or rather co-evolution) 
and other important ideas (Bausch 2002). These changes have contributed considerably 
to increasing the descriptive capacity of the theoretical constructs involved, something 
that has created the aura of attributing the status of super-theory to ST, and even more 
so, to characterize it as a particularly impressive one . One might initially be 
problematised with the attribution of a ‘supertheory’ status to any one theoretical 
construct; however, this is done in order to differentiate amongst several types of 
theories that can unavoidably be juxtaposed with ST. Whereas ‘grand theories’ appear 
to achieve the formulation of an all encompassing framework, and to seek to explain a 
range of related phenomena with conceptual links between the constructs of the 
framework, ‘little theories’ provide a conceptual lens to view a particular set of 
situations without necessarily conceptually enriching links between concepts (Whitley
2006).
For if there is one thing that cannot be denied of ST, it is that it has achieved a 
considerable degree of maturity, and its concepts have considerably evolved to allow for 
the theory’s implementation in a wide range of domains. But just what kind of systems 
can be studied with the help of Systems Theory? Answers present considerable variety 
as Physical, Biological, Political, Legal, Economic, and even Social Systems (with the 
latter considered to be the latest step in the ladder of systemic evolution) have all been
36 The paradigm shift concept is found in Kuhn, T. S. (1970). The structure of scientific revolutions. 
Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
37 This comment is attributed to Professor Niklas Luhmann in his work, ‘Social Systems’
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described through the use of the lexicon of ST, and the term supertheory therefore 
implies just that. Instead of ad hoc applications to a limited number of fields or 
frameworks that become applicable only within particular settings, ST is highly abstract 
and can be applied to domains that differ considerably. This is particularly the case for 
financial systems and the economic functions that they seek to fulfill. Many have 
suggested that the general conceptual framework of systems theory is clearly the 
strength behind the variety of implementations (Christin 1983), and that extending 
systems theoretical concepts to practice is very important. There are also reasons that 
support the systemic approach towards managing organisations (e.g. financial 
institutions), as the assumptions that organisations are simple and ‘closed’ systems (and 
that the environment within which they operate is stable) no longer holds true ... 
organisations are ‘complex open systems that are deeply influenced by and influencing 
their environments where ... actions can give outcomes, which are unexpected and 
opposite to those intended’ (Glass 1996).
ST therefore studies systems of many kinds, and such a diaspora into different 
disciplines means that systems theory is fulfilling its initial promise (Bausch 2002). This 
means that there exists a portfolio of multi-disciplinary applications of the theory, and 
so ST would seem ideal for adoption in the field of Information Systems, which is 
multi-disciplinary in itself. Perhaps this could also help find an identity for the field of 
Information Systems, which has faced considerable crisis as to whether it even 
constitutes a distinct discipline (Avgerou 2000). Indeed, prominent scholars in the field 
have not refrained from suggesting that Systems Theory could bring out the full 
potential in Information Systems research by providing rigour and relevance, and that IS 
may even gain considerable new insights in the socio-technical sphere and within 
interpretivist research (Lee 2003), while at the same time recognizing that ST has 
already contributed considerably to the field of Information Systems (Xu 2000). In an 
era of increasing complexity in the implementation and implications of Information 
Systems, the systems approach has even more to offer in the conceptualization of any 
problem domain, and the extent to which that domain is influenced by technology 
(ibid). It must be stressed, however, that as far as this dissertation is concerned, 
simplifications of the theory are not within its interests, and as such, Soft Systems 
Methodology (SSM) (Checkland 1985), which includes concepts from ST for systems 
analysis and requirements simplifications, is outside of the scope of this research, as the
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concept of the system in SSM becomes considerably restricted (and rather confined to 
the technical realm).
ST must be seen as a set of highly abstract concept-tools that, if used appropriately, can 
potentially give considerable insights into the complexities of a system that is to be 
examined (like Anti-Money Laundering). The fact that there are many who argue that 
the lack of success of ST is its very generality and that it does not allow for the 
development of methodological solutions (Lin 1988), does not appear to be convincing 
to those who genuinely lack a belief that there can be a solution to a problem domain. In 
fact, viewed systemically this would be a contradiction within systems theory which 
dismisses cause-and-effect relations. A decision to act on a problem domain can only 
trigger changes with undetermined consequences, and these in their own turn can 
become the basis for even more decisions, and so on. Solutions always ‘multiply, 
proliferate, disperse, circulate, diversify, diffuse the original problem’ (Rossbach 1993). 
This is true for the system of society itself, which within the scope of its own self­
observation is able to stimulate itself; it generates ‘problems’, which require ‘solutions’, 
which generate ‘problems’ which require ‘solutions’ (Luhmann 2000). Cause-and-effect 
merely implies a focal point, and that can only exist within the scope of either a single 
observer prescribing a solitary function for a system (that if fulfilled will give the 
appearance that the duality between cause-and-effect is closely intertwined), or many 
observers with predetermined shared beliefs in cause-and-effect. But it is not only the 
belief that solutions cannot be attained with ST that appears to be troubling as a 
criticism. Far more disturbing is the underlying epistemic chimera behind cause-and- 
effect that is widely neglected and rarely confronted.
This major criticism against ST is therefore one that is inconsistent even within the 
logic of those who prescribe the lack o f a suggested solution to be problematic. For if 
they criticize ST by employing a rational-logical mindset38 they neglect the fact (in their 
own logic) that if a problem uniquely prescribed its solution, it would cease to be a 
problem as it would immediately evoke its one and only (dis)solution (ibid). This latter 
assertion creates a different discourse on the whole enterprise of problematisation, 
which must not be taken lightly. To think of Systems Theory as something like
38 Quite often the result of positivist remnants in logic
74
mechanics, which provides answers to problems with the answer built-in in the form of 
particular laws that govern the behavior of systems, is a grave mistake (Arbib and 
Comelis 1981). Equally it is argued in this dissertation that it is a grave mistake to think 
of the environment of a system as a causal texture (Trist and Emery 2000). ST is far 
more flexible, and allows for the specification of a few dominant assumptions about a 
particular system. The implications of these original dominant assumptions can be 
followed through, or these assumptions can be altered in order to see what the changes 
imply (ibid).
ST, therefore, is considerably detached from any cause-and-effect relationships that 
often de-contextualize the importance?lv of the observer, and tries instead to describe the 
problem domain (as viewed by an observer) and ultimately describe the significance and 
interdependencies of complex processes within the system, allowing them to be 
examined. In this manner, considerable insights can be gained by using the theory, but 
most importantly, it stresses increased vigilance into the systemic complications and 
implications that are entailed in decision-making processes (at any observer-level, e.g. 
regulatory initiatives), whether they involve technology or not.
No doubt, part of the reason that ST faces considerable criticism of the type outlined 
above is because it steers clear from reductionism, the practice of breaking up a problem 
into its parts and examining the parts instead™ (Crotty 1998). ST diverges from such an 
approach, by examining the system as a whole {embracing holism instead); something 
that does not mean that the parts of the system are not important. On the contrary, 
examination of the parts’ interaction remains crucial in a systemic fashion. Also, 
additional emphasis within systems theory is given to the idea of emergence™™' which 
will be further analyzed in the following sections superseding the main descriptions and 
review of systems theoretical concepts. It may initially appear contradictory how ST 
may stray away from reductionism once a system is defined as being constituted by 
subsystems, however, this is a restricted view of ‘system’, and there are considerable 
alternatives that complement such a structural perspective. In theoretical frameworks 
that are closely intertwined with a particular reference (or research) domain, theories 
have to adapt in order to accommodate new phenomena and/or incorporate changes 
from previous descriptions. The reason ST has endured is because, as a meta-discipline,
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it can be applied in a variety of domains where it successfully addresses problems 
‘beyond conventional reductionistic boundaries’ (Skyttner 1998).
Difference & Distinction
According to Professor Niklas Luhmann, we do not begin with an epistemological 
doubt, and therefore we have to accept that systems exist. The fact that this is first and 
foremost a matter of observation makes it ever more crucial, as once one accepts this 
initial premise then it becomes crucial to identify the ‘difference’ that is to be utilised 
for further exploration and analysis.
The start point of any systems theoretical analysis must be the difference between the 
system and its environment. Before proceeding with a description of the two distinct and 
different ways of ‘viewing and decomposing’ a system, it is crucial to conceptualize this 
difference between the system and its environment, and come to a realization that 
without the difference itself (difference as a unity), the definition of any system would 
be impossible, thus rendering its observation infeasible. The very process of defining a 
system has two subsequent and intertwined consequences: the creation of an 
environment that establishes this difference, and a delimitation that restricts the system’s 
conceptualization by setting its boundary. This becomes more evident in the following 
paragraphs.
Indeed, there is nothing more difficult than to conceive of something in splendid 
isolation; that is, to imagine a system without an environment. The reason is simple; 
nothing exists in a vacuum! Far from being a trivial assertion, this is a foundational 
statement, because every observation requires a differentiation from something that 
cannot be observed. By defining a system, a conceptual boundary is unavoidably set; for 
without the boundary, the system would have been impossible to start with. Boundaries 
then cannot be conceived without something beyond, and thus their very existence 
presupposes the reality of a beyond, and the possibility of transcendence (Luhmann 
1995). Once the boundary is decided upon, the environment follows next. Even though
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?0the overall triality (system, boundary, and environment) is automatically created as 
soon as any act of observation takes place, it is intriguing to note how the human mind 
naturally constructs the concept of the system first, and proceeds further with 
conceptualizing the rest.
Of course, this process does little to restrict alternative descriptions, because one can 
always define a system otherwise, by defining the environment as the system, and so on. 
Still, a testament to this process of differentiation comes with the recognition that the 
theoretical construct itself is a ‘Systems Theory’, not a ‘Boundary or Environment 
Theory’. Even if we define the triality as another system, all we have done is to 
introduce a meta-system, which is itself another system with a boundary and an 
environment, ad infinitum. This daunting infinite regression (that progresses! In the 
sense alluded to by NietzscheXVHI) in the construction (or even deconstruction) of 
systems should not pose a problem.
The definition of a system, indeed any definition for that matter, is above all an act of 
choice, and observer-relative. The observer is crucial in the construction of any system, 
as the construct implies the application of a distinction or a difference. ST has the 
capacity of describing itself in this manner40; Systems Theory therefore sees itself {and 
any other scientific theory) as a contingent distinction, a distinction that could have 
been drawn differently (Luhmann 1998). But regardless of such a difference in the 
drawing of the distinction for what constitutes a system, the difference between 
system/environment must be seen as absolutely fundamental.
It is truly impossible to think of an example where the above is not the case; that is to 
think of a system for which an environment does not exist. The most common fallacy is 
the ‘universe’. Even attempts to encapsulate the entire astronomical cosmos in a single 
word (universe) cannot abolish the idea of the boundary and its environment (Angell 
and Demetis 2005). Physicists have been debating this issue for decades, albeit 
unsuccessfully, whilst trying to resolve the paradox of the expansion of a ‘universe’ into 
‘nothingness’. But apart from the physical or philosophical difficulties of this paradox, a 
consideration of the construct alone exposes the problem. What is the word ‘universe’,
39 The existence of a three-party duality which in this case is (system-boundary, boundary-environment)
40 Within the tradition of second-order cybernetics employed here
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or any other word for that matter? Nothing more and nothing less than an element 
within a broader construct, with the overall construct being a notational schema like 
many others (Goodman 1976), and a system in itself. In this example, whereby the 
notational schema is language within which the word ‘universe’ resides, we have to 
recognize immediately that ‘language use itself is the choice of a system that leaves 
something unsaid’ (Luhmann 2002), particularly when words need to be interrelated for 
the production of meaning as, they too, cannot exist in isolation.
No system can therefore exist without an environment, because this is the only way that 
a system can ever be defined. The process of distinguishing between 
system/environment is called systemic differentiation, and is crucial to the system itself, 
because a system can only have self-reference -  that is, refer to itself -  by 
differentiating between itself and an environment (Luhmann 1995). According to 
Luhmann,
“Systems are oriented by their environment not just occasionally and adaptively, 
but structurally, and they cannot exist without an environment! They constitute 
and maintain themselves by creating and maintaining a difference from their 
environment, and they use their boundaries to regulate this difference. Without 
difference from an environment, there would not even be self-reference, because 
difference is the functional premise of self-referential operations. In this sense, 
boundary maintenance is system maintenance” (ibid)
The difference between system and environment, a pre-requisite for the self-reference of 
any system, has considerable implications for the act of observation, and hence for 
research itself. What we observe then ultimately conforms to a distinction, and without 
the distinction there would be no observation. In one of his theoretical masterpieces 
entitled Theories of Distinction’, Professor Luhmann points out:
“When observers (we, at the moment) continue to look for an ultimate reality, a 
concluding formula, a final identity, they will find the paradox. Such a paradox 
is not simply a logical contradiction (A is non-A) but a foundational statement: 
The world is observable because it is unobservable. Nothing can be observed 
(not even the “nothing”) without drawing a distinction...or to say it in Derrida’s 
style, the condition of its possibility is its impossibility.”41 (Luhmann 2002)
41 p. 87, chapter on the ‘Paradox of Observing Systems’
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As the above assertions about the construction through observation of both system and 
environment indicate, the environment should not be seen as something residual to the 
system (Luhmann 1995), but as something that is constitutive of the system’s existence. 
As the dissertation moves on to discuss the concepts of the system, boundary and 
environment, the aforementioned comments should be kept in mind.
The System
There are two important ways in which we can describe just what a system is. It is 
important to note here that any systemic description and observation must conform to 
the fundamental axiom of distinction that is constitutive of observation. In other words, 
in order to ‘see what is inside’ a system, that is in order to decompose the system itself, 
we will have to form yet another distinction. Typically, such a distinction is manifested 
in the two following ways:
i) A system is composed of subsystems
ii) A system is composed of elements and relations
Each of these scenarios is examined separately, and in order. If we state that a system is 
composed of subsystems then the operational difference between system and subsystem 
does not become immediately apparent. This is because each subsystem can be defined 
as a system in itself, and therefore distinguishing between systems and subsystems is a 
distinction that collapses automatically. What is then the guiding difference that can be 
used while decomposing a system into its subsystems? Where is the crucial 
differentiation here that allows for the observation to take place?
Environment
The answer to this question is once again, the 
difference between system and environment. The 
system replicates or mimics the difference between 
system/environment internally, and hence creates 
esoteric system/environment relations within it. Even 
though diagrams oversimplify the issue, it is still
Subsystem
System
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useful to use one at this stage that could potentially help in conceptualizing this matter.
There are two unit-differences here that need to be considered. This means that the 
difference is essentially one -  that between system/environment -  and that this 
difference exists simultaneously at two different levels as it is internally replicated in 
the system. The system in this scenario is the circle (which clearly incorporates 
everything in it -  including the subsystem) and is differentiated from its environment. 
However, the system/environment difference is replicated internally. For the subsystem 
therefore, the environment is the internal sketched area within the system. An 
interesting point emerges here that remains to be solved: is the external environment 
(external to the system) also an environment for the subsystem? The logical answer -  
guided by differentiation -  would be no42. But what would then be the difference 
between the two differences? In other words, what is the difference between 
system/environment (externally) and system/environment (internally)? One must realise 
here that first and foremost this is a matter of observation, and that the definition of the 
system guides this process, for it is only in this scenario (upon system definition) where 
system/environment esoteric differences can be realised. The difference in internal 
system/environment relations (of an esoteric type) is that they enjoy inferior complexity 
when compared to the exoteric system/environment difference; this is because the 
mechanisms for investigating internal complexity are highly structured, observed by the 
system itself, and accessible in the communicative processes during the formation o f the 
system, without which the system would not have been created (or identified by an 
observer). The difference between the two differences can therefore only make sense a 
posteriori of the definition, observation and constitution of the system. Without the 
definition of a system, both esoteric and exoteric system/environment differences would 
have been impossible. But even more so, esoteric system/environment differences can 
only be realised once the entire system is taken for granted.
The decomposition of a system into its subsystems is, however, a clearly structural 
perspective. Systems are composed of subsystems; subsystems are composed of sub­
subsystems, ad infinitum. The system itself is seen as an assembly of components that 
are organized as a whole (Checkland 1985) while each component works autonomously
42 To some this initially appears counterintuitive however the reason becomes evident once one considers 
the relations between systems and complexity.
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for a specific goal (Zemke 2001). In this process, it is not really these complexes of 
components that make a difference; their interaction is far more important (Bertalanffy 
1969). Even though the statement that a system is composed of subsystems might look 
like reductionism, such an assertion is fundamentally flawed for a series of reasons, the 
foremost of which being that it neglects the issue of emergence. Whereas reductionism 
is the process of breaking up a problem into its parts and studying the parts instead of 
the problem, systems theory primarily deals with emergent phenomena and the 
complexity that generates them.
Having discussed the first aspect of viewing the decomposition of a system, the 
dissertation now turns to the second scenario whereby a system can be defined by its 
elements and their relations. This difference is crucial. As there can be no system 
without an environment, elements cannot exist without relational connections (and vice- 
versa). These two distinct possibilities of viewing the decomposition of a system 
underpin different aspects of Systems Theory, both of which are equally important and 
complement each other considerably. The first kind of decomposition 
(system/environment) refers to system differentiation, whereas the second kind of 
decomposition leads to system complexity (Luhmann 1995). This distinction is crucial 
because:
“Only this distinction makes it meaningful and nontautological to say that 
system complexity increases with an increase in differentiation or with a change 
in the form of differentiation. Elements can be counted and the number of 
possible mathematical relations among them can be determined on the basis of 
their number. The enumeration reduces the relations among the elements to a 
quantitative expression, however. The elements acquire quality only insofar as 
they are viewed relationally, and thus, refer to one another” (ibid)
This quote from Professor Luhmann requires special mention, as it lies at the very core 
of the Systems Theoretical perspective and refers to the enumeration of elements. To 
illustrate this critical point that is found in many different types of systems, the example 
of the human brain43 is used. If one poses the question ‘can one cell think?’ then it 
becomes obvious that the answer is in the negative. If however one starts enumerating 
the cells in the human brain that are close to lOObillion, it becomes obvious that put
43 The first time I heard this example was when studying Physics at the University of Crete. I attribute this 
to Professor Gregory Psaltakis who described the example in his course on Quantum Physics and then at a 
conference on the Quantum Mechanics of the Brain with Dr. Dimitris Nanopoulos as speaker.
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together they construct a system of a different order, a function-system that produces 
cognition (Coward 2005).
The argument here must be made loud and clear. There comes a point where -  by 
putting things together -  a change occurs which is not solely quantitative, but one that is 
denoted by a considerable qualitative shift. The whole is more than the sum of its parts 
(Aristotle 1957). This renders reductionism irrelevant for describing higher-level 
systemic formation, as for any system (like the brain), decomposition into its structural 
parts fails to describe the new laws that govern the new levels; such new levels 
experience what are utterly emergent phenomena, and dependent upon the synapses or 
connections that are created amongst different elements within the system. An ever 
more crucial question, and one that merits considerable pondering (even though one can 
barely provide any conclusive comments in this regard) is how the threshold is being 
determined within the system whereby this change from quantitative to qualitative 
occurs. How many cells does it take to start thinking? How is that determined in the 
system as it evolves?
Such difficult questions and their pondering should be left aside as what determines the 
emergent behaviour (in any system), or the undetermined consequences, is heavily 
dependent on the system from which emergence propagates. As the eye cannot see itself 
seeing, self-observation regarding the attribution of emergence within the system itself 
has to remain inconclusive. Far more important is the recognition that there are indeed 
emergent phenomena, a set of properties that are based on, yet emerging from the 
systems’ components and their interrelations (Germana 2001); such emergent 
phenomena cannot be predetermined. They cannot be expected. One can therefore speak 
only of emergence as a phenomenon itself; a phenomenon that is based upon the 
internal complexity of a system, and a phenomenon that comes into being without being 
pre-conditioned by any one observer.
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The Boundary, the Environment et al
Following the definition of the system, we now turn to the importance of both the 
boundary and the environment, and associate them with the concept of the system itself. 
Through the exposition of the boundary and the environment, other important aspects 
and systems concepts will be unveiled.
As already discussed, no system can exist without a boundary and without an 
environment. There is however a fundamental difference between system and 
environment. For each system “the environment is more complex than the system itself, 
as systems lack the requisite variety (Ashby’s Law) that would enable them to react to 
every state of the environment, that is to say, to establish an environment exactly suited 
to the system” (Luhmann 1995). It is an unavoidable fact therefore that the system is 
inferior in complexity to its environment, and so has to compensate for such inferiority 
by “exploiting its contingency, that is, by its pattern of selections” (ibid).
The Law of Requisite Variety is crucial in conceptualizing this difference between 
system and environment, and hence requires further analysis. Suppose that we have two 
entities named R and D respectively. Both are participating in a strategy game. For 
example, we can pick R to be the system, and D to be the environment. What Ashby 
posits -  through an extensive analysis -  is that if R’s move is unvarying, then this 
means that R carries out the same move over and over again. Subsequently, D’s move 
would not matter because the variety in the outcomes would be as large as the variety in 
D ’s moves. In such a scenario, D would be exerting full control over the outcomes. If 
however, R had two moves, then the variety of the outcomes could be reduced to a half 
(but not less).
An important issue here is that only the variety in R’s moves can force down the variety 
in the outcomes. Put differently, only the system’s variety can force down the variety in 
the environment. As Ashby frames it:
“Only variety in R can force down the variety due to D; Only variety can destroy
variety ” (Ashby 1958).
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This means that if the system is to survive the changing environment, then variety and 
flexibility must be introduced and enhanced. At this point, another problem emerges 
that requires further clarification. If the environment (for any system) is far more 
complex than the system itself, then how is it possible for the system to survive at all? 
Doesn’t the variety in the environment, which enjoys superior complexity (to the 
system), destroy the variety of the system, and ultimately the system itself?
Two crucial aspects resolve this matter. One has already been mentioned, and refers to 
the system’s contingency. The system exploits its contingency, and therefore it can 
develop strategies for stabilizing the difference between itself and the environment; 
however, it is only the system and not the environment that can develop strategies for 
stabilizing this difference (Luhmann 1995). The way the system exercises and stabilizes 
this difference can now become clearer, and lead us towards another concept; that of the 
boundary. But before we proceed to describing the boundary and its vital importance, 
there is one more aspect that is related to the systems’ variety, and the reason why 
environmental complexity per se cannot force the system to immediate collapse. The 
environment itself is an agglomeration of different systems, and these conform again to 
the same principle of system differentiation. They too have an environment with no 
immediate access to its complexity. Hence, any system — both within and outside of the 
system itself44 -  has a complexity that is characteristic of its variety; such variety is 
limited, as it is strongly related to the process of systemic formation when the system 
was constituted and came into being. If that wasn’t the case, then there would be no co­
evolution between any system and its respective environment. There would be no 
systems at all, as they would immediately collapse from their environmental 
complexity, and the very act of observation would restrict itself to instantaneous flashes 
of systemic formations and destructions.
Needless to say, experience says otherwise. Not only do systems exist, but also they 
maintain their existence by ‘controlling’ their boundary, and appear to be relatively 
stable in a constantly changing world. System and environment engage in a structural 
coupling, a form of co-evolution; structural coupling means that there is an interaction 
between the system and its environment, but it does not mean that the evolving structure
44 A distinction that I have come to call self-referential differentiation
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of the latter can causally determine the changes in the former. The environment acts as a 
trigger for the subsequent structural changes that occur within the system (Maturana and 
Varela 1998). This means that the entities in the environment and their actions, once 
they are perceived by the system, may initiate changes in the system. But the opposite 
may also happen. Structural changes in the system also affect the environment. The 
reason that no causal relations can be found in the process of structural coupling is 
because both system and environment are constituted by a great number of stakeholders 
(systems in themselves), something that renders the monitoring of all interactions 
impossible (Angell and Demetis 2005).
Clearly, it becomes evident from the aforementioned comments that the boundary has a 
distinctive role to play in any systemic formation. However, defining the boundary is no 
easy a task, as it is ambiguous by its very nature. The boundary is simultaneously part 
of both the system and the environment. Hence, strictly speaking, there can be no causal 
control over the boundary for any defined system and for its respective environment. 
Complexity and variety within any difference between system and environment imply a 
continuous struggle because of the feedback between them. The fact that there can be 
no control over the boundary can then be complemented with the description that 
systems can -  through self-organization and improved communication amongst their 
subsystems -  increase their sensitivity to boundary feedback, and thus partially 
‘control’ the interaction with the environment, but without this implying any cause-and- 
effect mechanisms whatsoever. Even if the system increases its sensitivity concerning 
boundary feedback, and hence tries to ‘control’ the boundary, there is no way to predict 
environmental responses.
What then is the purpose of the boundary? What is its importance? Clearly, to answer 
these questions in-depth we will have to resort to the boundary’s ambiguous ontological 
status, and the fact that the boundary is at the same time both part of the system and the 
environment. It is this property of the boundary that essentially establishes the 
difference between system and environment, makes the differentiation between the two 
possible in the first place, and mediates the interactions between them. Put differently, 
the purpose and function of the boundary is to allow for the exchange of feedback 
between the system and its environment. As feedback is an interactive process, this 
means that changes in the environment will feedback across the boundary to modify the
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system itself. Furthermore, changes in the system will feedback across the boundary to 
modify the environment. Feedback in this sense becomes a necessity for structural 
coupling between the system and the environment, and refers to the exchange of 
codified information being transmitted between the two. From the systems’ 
perspective, this feedback can take two distinct forms, namely positive and negative 
feedback.
Positive feedback affects the system in a distinct way and ultimately threatens the 
system’s existence45. Within positive feedback lie the seeds of chaos that may explode 
systemic stability and amplify the processes that carry the system away from its 
reference state thus leading to disorder. A reference state in this regard is a recognition 
of a temporary state of the system that is used by to monitor minor variations in the 
system. An initial marginal event can, through positive feedback, be the cause of long 
term dramatic events of the Lorenz butterfly effect, named because even the 
‘insignificant’ flapping of a butterfly’s wings, through complex feedback, can trigger a 
major weather feature (Hilbom 1994). Due to the butterfly effect in any system, 
modelling and prediction becomes impossible; we have to accept the unavoidable fact 
that in a non-linear world the future is open and uncertain (Ramos-Martin 2003).
Each system is constantly fighting for its own survival. Positive feedback may reach a 
point of flux, creating havoc among the sub-systems and the processes they use to 
communicate, which can lead to the break-up of the system. Sometimes, the break-up 
can trigger the reform and regrouping of the sub-systems as a new system, or it can lead 
to extinction, especially in cases where there is little unity of purpose among the sub­
systems. Another outcome is a slow process of receiving positive systemic feedback 
that might give the impression of a relative stability -  albeit transitory -  but it still leads 
to an increase in entropy. Obviously, all possible outcomes cannot be accounted for 
because of the complexity. The actual outcome depends on what sub-systems will 
survive the forceful processes that occur within the system, and how they will change it. 
Sub-systems may also be rendered obsolete from changes in the environment. One thing 
is certain. What we term as a system is neither a stable nor an unambiguous entity.
45 The word ‘positive’ here does not imply that the feedback is favourable for the system, but quite the 
contrary.
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Negative feedback on the other hand has a clear opposite role and meaning from that of 
positive feedback, and that is to counteract any disruptive processes in order to reinforce 
the relative stability of the system (Angell and Smithson 1991). Both positive and 
negative feedback are most closely related to the concepts of entropy and negentropy 
respectively. Whereas entropy leads to the disorder and death of a system, negentropy is 
the exact opposite (relative stability). All systems tend to be entropic with the maximum 
state of entropy being death, and the apparent contradiction that arises when pondering 
the question of the possibility of systems being negentropic can be quickly resolved 
once we look towards the environment. So how is it even possible for systems to be 
negentropic? Since every species on the planet exploits the resources of the environment 
in order to be negentropic in the short-term (Mayr 2000), so systems can exploit the 
resources of their respective environments for the same purpose**.
Such a systemic exploitation of environmental resources (no matter how one defines the 
system) is considerably supported by the capacity and capability of the system to probe 
the environment through mechanisms of information exchange. The process of probing 
is made considerably easier as both system and environment are characterized by a 
property that does not allow them the flexibility of cause-and-effect exchanges, but 
instead introduces risk, uncertainty, and emergence; that property is complexity.
Complexity
Complexity is regarded as a systemic property, specific aspects of which will be 
incorporated into this chapter without examining the truly vast setting of Complexity 
Theory; this is because the inner workings and evolution of Complexity Theory are 
complex in themselves, display no characteristics whatsoever that could approach a 
unified theory, and contain many different branches of research (Mitleton-Kelly 2003). 
For the purposes of this dissertation, and as complexity will be used to describe 
particular systemic instances, a few crucial points will be described that will be 
absolutely fundamental when reflecting upon complexity and its consequences; for 
complexity is not a methodology, but a way of thinking (ibid); and one that has been 
used extensively in Systems Theory as an important property of systems. In this regard,
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Social Systems and Socio-Technical systems do exhibit complex characteristics for a 
series of reasons and descriptions that will be further discussed below.
But why is there such a thing as complexity? There are several reasons that point 
towards acknowledging its existence. The most important one establishes complexity 
via the impossibility to monitor all the interactions that take place within a system at 
any given time. Such impossibility is based upon observation itself, which operates 
through a (series of) distinction(s) and hence creates the possibility for unobservable 
interactions. This important role and function, which complexity preserves within 
systems, makes it no accident that the concept of complexity has been applied in several 
fields like biology, physics, mathematics, computing, etc, and that the literature 
surrounding complexity has exploded in the recent years (Maguire and McKelvey 
1999). However, despite such an explosion in the literature on complexity, relatively 
little work has been done on complex social systems (Mitleton-Kelly 2003), with the 
notable exception of Luhmann and a few others (ibid), and even less so on complex 
systems that include technologically oriented processes and the extent to which 
technology influences the complexity of those systems (Kallinikos 2006).
For Money Laundering (not Anti-Money Laundering here), complexity is absolutely 
fundamental, as it is a generated prerequisite for concealing transactions and blurring 
the money trail. Therefore, in ML we stumble upon a different type of complexity that 
is propelling and exploiting the intrinsic patterns of systemic complexity. In such a 
scenario, complexity becomes an absolutely critical mode of functioning for the money 
laundering system itself, instead of something that needs to be avoided or reduced. The 
AML system therefore faces a type of complexity that is deliberately generated by those 
engaged in ML. Within such a setting, technology becomes crucial, as complex 
technologically based processes supporting Anti-Money Laundering create a series of 
systemic phenomena within AML itself, which require considerable research (Demetis 
and Angell 2006). For these reasons, and since delving into the too many different 
aspects and variations of complexity research is outside of the scope of this dissertation, 
it is still necessary to include a small section on complexity in this chapter as it is 
interwoven and interrelated with ST, and can enhance the analysis that follows after the 
presentation of the research findings. Meanwhile some comments hopefully clarify 
some of the ambiguity in concepts that are interrelated with complexity.
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Chaos and emergence are two such concepts that are confused with complexity. One of 
the most common misconceptions is that chaos and complexity are fabricated in a way 
that formulates a proportional co-evolution (in the fashion whereby complexity may 
even equate to chaos). But it is not just chaos in the complexity (Gleick 1988). 
Spontaneous order and stability can also appear, however, the complexity of the 
interaction of elements in a system cannot, on its own, explain the behaviour, or predict 
the coming into existence of any emergent properties (Angell and Demetis 2005). 
Emergent properties are simplifications among the complexity (ibid), and the possibility 
always remains that the same order of complexity can spawn different emergent 
properties. Emergence is therefore simply one of the characteristics of complexity, 
while others include self-organisation, connectivity, feedback, co-evolution, etc.
In a previous section, mention was made of fundamentally different ways of viewing 
the decomposition of a system. One such way pointed towards the system/environment 
differentiation, and the other the difference between elements and relations that leads to 
systemic complexity. Within the scope of the latter difference between elements and 
relations, elements matter only if they are viewed relationally within the system. When 
it comes to systemic complexity as a phenomenon of emergent elemental complexity 
this has an important complication that essentially describes the process of systemic 
formation or constitution. According to Luhmann:
“We will call an interconnected collection of elements ‘complex’ when, because 
of immanent constraints in the elements connective capacity, it is no longer 
possible at any moment to connect every element with every other element. In 
this respect, complexity is a self-conditioning state of affairs: the fact that 
elements must already be constituted as complex in order to function as a 
unity for higher levels of system formation limits their connective capacity and 
thus reproduces complexity as an unavoidable condition on every higher level of 
system formation. We may hint at the fact that this self-reference of 
complexity is then ‘internalized* as the self-reference of systems.** (Luhmann 
1995) -  emphasis added
Hence the most crucial observation that one can make regarding the importance of 
complexity lies within the scope of a system’s constitution and formation. Elements 
within a system cannot but be characterized by restrictions in their connective capacity, 
for without such restrictions (that are being posed by higher level systems), elements
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would not be able to function as a unity5". Complexity viewed this way is something 
that cannot be avoided, but it is a property that is necessary, and without which higher- 
level systemic formations would be impossible; elements can only be viewed as 
participating in the complexity when the overall system emerges, and at the same time 
the participation of elements becomes dependent on them compromising their own 
internal complexity in order to interconnect with every other element. This reveals a 
very crucial point: interconnections between elements imply a compromise without 
which the interconnection would not have been possible to start with. Complexity then 
becomes an emergent property in systemic formation, a necessary compromise for the 
elements that need to interconnect, and one that limits their intrinsic capacity to do so.
This incompleteness in the connective capacity of elements is extremely crucial and 
aligned with the fact that observation implies the differentiation between what can be 
observed, and what cannot; a differentiation that is crucial for it is only by not- 
observing that one can observe. This then implies that ‘the observer points towards an 
incomplete selection, whose incompleteness is made necessary by the fact that 
‘comprehension of world complexity must be coordinated with the possibilities of 
its reduction’ (Rossbach 1993). Following observation, comprehension of world (or 
environmental) complexity, and the necessity for the reduction of complexity, creates 
then the concept of systems as ‘islands' o f reduced complexity (Luhmann 2004). If 
systems are portrayed as islands of reduced complexity then they exist within an 
environment of high complexity and they enable a containment of contingency that 
allows the development of communicative contexts that are particular to each system 
(ibid).
Here we reach another key point: observation implies a delimitation, a focus on what 
can be observed, and by doing so, guides the process of reducing world complexity. 
Complexity in this regard means ‘being forced to select; being forced to select means 
contingency; and contingency means risk’ (Luhmann 1990; Luhmann 1995). Even more 
importantly, the mechanism by which a system reduces world complexity is guiding 
itself internally in the selection of its elements, as well as its elemental interconnections 
and communications; the mechanism for reducing world complexity is self-reference.
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More will be said later concerning the relationship between complexity, risk, and 
communication.
Self-Reference
Continuing on from the description of Complexity, which has a central role to play in a 
system’s properties and -  as discussed earlier -  occupies a role constitutive and inter­
related in systemic formation, it is time to move on to a discussion of self-reference -  a 
key concept within ST46 - ,  and thereby gradually close this chapter.
The fact that self-reference has a key role to play in theoretical descriptions becomes 
evident from the concept’s use in major philosophical and scientific works. In a truly 
spectacular and insightful comparison of the works of Michel Foucault, Friedrich 
Nietzsche, and Niklas Luhmann, author Stephen Rossbach describes how Foucault 
came close to the concept, Nietzsche even closer, but it was only Luhmann that -  many 
years later -  made self-reference the centrepiece of his work. According to Rossbach, 
Luhmann managed to retain concepts of systemic complexity for constructing a theory 
for social systems, but also managed to consolidate systems theory (Rossbach 1993).
However, Luhmann himself didn’t just invent the concept of self-reference. He was 
greatly influenced by the entire enterprise of cybernetics (e.g (Ashby 1958)) and in 
particular, second-order cybernetics (Korzybski 1948; Von Foerster and Josiah Macy Jr. 
Foundation 1950; Von Foerster 1951; Von Foerster, Zopf et al. 1962; Bateson 1972) 
that already included concepts of control and communication, learning and adaptation, 
evolution, and most closely, self-organisation (Scott 2004). With the theory’s use in 
biology, and in particular via the concept of autopoiesis (Maturana and Varela 1998), 
other changes soon occurred and more distinctions were elaborated: autopoiesis is one 
such example. The word itself comes from the combination of two Greek words, 
namely auxo (auto -  meaning self) and 7iolr|aK; (poiesis -  meaning to make). 
Autopoiesis as a concept describes systems that have the capacity to ‘make themselves’; 
systems are constituted with the ability to refer to themselves and their constitutive
46 And one that has become Luhmann’s core concept in the design of his theory for social systems
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elements, thereby re-constituting their functioning parts. This presented a most notable 
and crucial connection in Biology where that Maturana and Varela made the connection 
with the the idea of self-organisation.
One of the first accounts of the concept of self-reference comes from Korzybski in 
describing language as a ‘uniquely circular structure, where an ‘effect’ becomes a 
causative factor for future effects, influencing them in a manner particularly subtle, 
variable, flexible, and of an endless number of possibilities’ (Korzybski 1948). Over the 
years this idea of a structure that is uniquely circular has intrigued the many researchers 
that attempted to describe a bizarre form of re-entry, a form that enters itself and hence 
can be characterized as self-referential. Many have attempted visualizations of this form 
of re-entry through mathematical descriptions of the constructs, and one of the most 
successful visualizations describing re-entry has been reconstructed below, that of the 
Klein Bottle.
Figure 4.1: The Klein Bottle47
The relationship between complexity and self-reference is also very crucial, and it is no 
accident that the major ideas around self-reference are presented here, following the 
section on complexity. For if the system, any type of system, perceives an increase in 
environmental complexity\ such an increase can only be made manageable via a series 
of systemic self-referential processes that have the potential o f increasing the system’s 
internal complexity, and hence the pattern of selections within the system. These in their 
turn can allow for a greater degree of flexibility and responses from the system, 
although such a process cannot be characterized by causalities. In this manner, self­
47 Reproduced with the Mathematica© Software Package (Wolfram Research)
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reference can also be recognized as the crucial mechanism with which the system 
reduces environmental complexity.
The literature predominantly distinguishes three meanings that for the concept of self- 
reference. According to Felix Geyer, these are: a ‘neutral’ meaning whereby any 
changes that occur in the system’s state are dependent upon the state of that system at a 
previous moment; a ‘biological’ meaning whereby the system contains information and 
knowledge about itself; and, the ‘stronger’ second-order cybernetics meaning whereby a 
system collects information about its own functioning, which in turn can further 
contribute to a change of its functioning (Geyer 2002). Some requirements for the latter 
to occur include self-observation, self-reflection, and some flexibility in acting for 
decision making (ibid).
This dissertation acknowledges the major influence of the latter description of self­
reference, one that comes very close to Luhmann’s use of the term. The description 
given also comes close to the organizational and technological implications for AML 
that will be further discussed.
With these initial comments it hopefully becomes clear that self-reference implies more 
than a mere reference of the system to itself. If that were the sole case then this would 
simply end up in a tautological form that would be of little or no use, and one that 
would be completely de-contextualized from the broader systems theoretical context. 
Self-reference must instead be seen as a central concept for the system, which can now 
be delineated as follows:
i) Self-reference as fundamental for systemic formation and systemic survival 
(the system refers to itself and its constitutive elements, but also maintains 
that (self)-reference for sustaining its processes and their outcomes -  these 
refer to processes of learning and giving meaning. In this way, the system is 
autopoietic, for otherwise the system collapses if self-reference is not 
maintained).
ii) Self-reference as fundamental for reducing environmental complexity. The 
system refers to itself and the relations that support it, so that it can exploit
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its pattern o f selections, and hence either increase its internal complexity and 
contingency, or refer to processes that can utilize streams of such 
contingencies and that could potentially handle the environmental changes. 
Utilization of such streams of contingencies are often reflected in the 
system’s subsystems ~ e.g a policy that has been used before, or a particular 
course of action, which is pre-decided when confronted with similar 
environmental events).
iii) Self-reference as fundamental for Information Processing, whereby the 
system refers to itself by interrogating those elements that are supported by 
Information and Communication Technologies.
This last aspect of self-reference put forward here has direct implications for the two 
former aspects. It implies that technology constitutes a system and is detached from 
organizational processes to form a distinct technological realm (something that will be 
further supported through the case study). Nevertheless, the term system here needs to 
be further clarified, as in no way does it imply a mere technological installation, a 
common confusion.
Technology as a system has systemic effects, it is characterized by an internal 
complexity, and is utilized to respond to environmental complexity. Technology is 
equipped with all the systemic properties discussed thus far. But even more importantly, 
technology as a self-referential system affects the way in which various inter-related 
aspects of information processing are handled within its domain. This description of 
technology as a self-referential system is used in order to discuss some absolutely 
crucial and fundamental perspectives on technologies used in AML, like profiling and 
data-mining. Such technologies have come to influence the realm of AML considerably 
through the electronic processing of information that they facilitate. While they support 
an information exchange both between system/environment as well as between 
elements/relations within the system, they are also constantly being probed for changes 
via they organizational processes they support.
The term system is therefore assigned a completely new meaning; that of self-reference. 
Let us provide an example from the field of sociotechnical studies and consider an
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Information System as what emerges from the interactions between a technical system 
and a social system (nowadays this understanding is engrained within the minds of IS 
researchers). This does not however imply that neither technical system nor social 
system are self-referential, and that only the emergent system enjoys self-referentiality. 
Quite the contrary; just as technology is used to produce other technology in various 
forms (a self-referential process in itself), and just as a social system re-produces itself, 
so too does the information systems. We must not forget that the definition of a 
particular system, or any definition for that matter, is observer-relative. But once a 
system has been identified and observed, self-reference becomes unavoidable; without 
it, the system would not have the capacity to refer to itself and its function. That 
however would lead to a paradox as the observer has a priori identified something to be 
a system and ultimately the power resides with the observer that decides upon the 
distinctions he/she employs).
We therefore do not start with epistemological doubt. Systems exist! And insofar as 
they exist, they are self-referential. However, before continuing it must be thoroughly 
understood that according to the tradition of systems theory, what in common parlance 
has come to be termed system has absolutely nothing to do with the term technical 
system used here. Indeed, even most people within the IS community refer to the word 
system when all they mean is the installation o f a technical system; one that is 
instantiated as a technological artifact (or series or networks of the latter). Typical of 
such a stance is the simple observation that within ‘systems analysis and design’, the 
term ‘system’ refers merely to the installation of the technical system, something which 
is symptomatic of the lack of a systems approach in the IS field, and typical of how the 
term system has been commandeered from its distinct theoretical provenance.
Still, as argued in previous paragraphs, self-reference can be found at any systemic level 
once a system is identified by an observer. Through the introduction of self-reference at 
the level of information processing, an example is offered here that may resolve the 
technological implications of self-reference. The example was deliberately chosen from 
outside the core topic of this dissertation48 even though it needs to be emphasized in 
advance that when technology is viewed systemically then the term self-reference
48 But within the researcher’s interests through the FIDIS project of the European Union
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acquires broader characteristics. Nevertheless, an initial example is useful to clarify the 
mechanism of (self)-reference within technology.
The example concerns a pattern recognition algorithm, that when presented with a 
handwritten image, returns two probability values, real numbers between zero and one. 
A series of 5000 images -  10 sets of 500 images (one set for each numerical digit 
between 0 and 9) - is processed, and the output is represented graphically in figure 4.2. 
Each set is drawn in a different colour -  handwritten versions of the digit 2 for example 
are drawn in green. The algorithm’s two output parameters are interpreted as a two- 
dimensional Cartesian coordinate within a unit square; each of the two mutually 
perpendicular axes representing one of the algorithm’s output parameters. Each of the 
5000 images is then scaled down (so that at the resolution of figure 4.2 it looks like a 
dot) and drawn at its coordinate position. The basic shape of each of the ten different 
digits, that enable us to differentiate between digits even when badly drawn, tend to 
cluster each of the ten sets in different regions of the unit square. Variations in 
handwriting cause the scattering within each cluster — if 500 images of the same 
typewritten digit were processed (such as the digit 2 shown in figure 4.4), then the 
corresponding dots would be more or less superimposed. Hence the resulting figure 
looks like ten clusters of different coloured dots. Zooming in on the predominantly 
green portion of figure 4.2 results in figure 4.3.
Figure 4.2: Pattern Matching, Visual Representation and Scattering
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Figure 4.3. Scattering o f 2s according to probabilities
Through this example, two crucial and different concepts must be discussed regarding 
pattern matching, an equivalent term to profiling. These concepts are categorization and 
abstraction. A category represents many entities within it that we may call instances of 
the category. While the instances display a notable variation within the category, the 
category in itself has to be related to an abstraction through which the category is 
represented. From the figures displayed above, and through the accompanying 
description of the aforementioned example, this conceptual delineation would take the 
following form: the instances would refer to all individual images containing the 
handwritten number two, the category would be the collection of all such images of the 
number two, and the abstraction to which the category is attached would be the number 
two itself.
Categorization then takes place in two distinct stages, one involving the conceptual 
delimitation of the category (i.e. the definition of the category), and another the 
algorithmic representation of the category and its computational processing. Let us 
examine these two stages in somewhat more detail.
In the scope of the first stage, someone has to designate what categories are to be 
considered. In this particular example, every number (0...9) constitutes a category. A 
particular category is then examined more closely, say the one that constitutes the 
collection of all such images of the number two.
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The function that technology comes to fulfill within this process of categorization is to 
act as an automated means of deciding the category where each individual image can be 
assigned (as previously noted). But in order to do that, from a computational standpoint, 
the algorithm that carries out the task of this internal decision-making process requires a 
mechanism for the decision to be made. This mechanism, which determines how the 
algorithm operates, is then based upon a juxtaposition between an abstraction and a 
specificity. The algorithm in effect constitutes the set of rules that penetrates this 
distinction between abstraction and specificity. The algorithm therefore examines how 
an examined instance (say any number from 0...9 according to the pre-defined 
categories) fits the abstraction of every category.
Within this process, however, an important problem emerges as there is a considerable 
variation within the examined instances. For example, there are 500 instances of the 
number 2 that have to be categorized by the algorithm. But that does not mean that the 
categorization carried by the algorithm will be effective. A badly handwritten 2 can be 
misrecognized as a 3 and so forth. Beyond these trivial technicalities, the important 
thing to consider is that all these underlying technological processes are manifested by 
reference to an abstraction. Abstraction then becomes the schema for information 
processing within computation.
2
Figure 4.4: This can only be an abstraction
How the abstraction relates to the concept of self-reference may not be immediately 
visible, but essentially, self-reference within this context becomes the underlying 
structure for information processing. The above figure represents just that: the abstract 
categorical schema on which computation relies for this particular example. Technology 
then refers to the constructed abstraction within itself, and this constitutes a process of 
self-reference. The abstraction is then deconstructed with the purpose of determining the
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abstraction’s informational elements that may be used. If the purpose of the comparison 
within computation is pattern matching, then the deconstruction of informational 
elements from the abstraction will involve shape, curvature of lines, and a series of 
other such attributes that will be searched for against incoming instances. The attributes 
will play the role of simulating the abstraction, but the entire computational process will 
have to accept a foundational error on the premise that the abstraction is unique while 
the actual incoming instances are multiple. From this difference, a set of problems 
emerges almost spontaneously and the process is jeopardized in effectiveness within 
several computational stages and interactions. The most important of these are:
i. The representation of abstraction has to be deconstructed and this causes
difficulties with incoming instances (e.g. Figure 4.4. that represents the 
abstraction of number 2 deconstructed by an algorithm; that deconstruction 
essentially determines what is a 2 in pattern matching according to the 
computation. Since different values may be given to analyze the ideal 
curvature of lines of the number 2 in its shape, etc., this implies that the 
abstraction of the number 2 that is computationally deconstructed can have a 
variety of representations).
ii. For the example of pattern matching, the incoming instances have to be
recognised as numbers (Os, Is, 2s, ...9s) and hence a suitable deviation has 
to be accepted as a basis of error. An incoming handwritten instance may not 
be an ideal number 2 according to the attributes extracted from the 
abstraction, but if its attributes exhibit ‘similarities’ within accepted 
deviations then it is accepted as a 2.
iii. The construction of the categories is arbitrary and how these categories (or their
interaction) come to affect the output, a potential evaluation, or other 
computational processes remains prone to the initial determination of the 
categories.
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If the example was not pattern matching digits, but instead simulating money- 
laundering behaviour, then the underlying computational process would exhibit the 
same foundational properties. In the laundering example the abstraction of a number is 
replaced by that of a model with properties describing what constitutes money- 
laundering behaviour. The categories are replaced by queries that have certain attributes 
describing money-laundering on the basis of transactions (frequency, time of 
association of the customer to the financial institution, age, location, amount, etc49). 
Finally, the instances within the categories (in the former example these were the 
variations of a category -  e.g. all handwritten digits of the number 2) are replaced by 
individual financial transactions. Such financial transactions are therefore screened on 
the basis of categories and their representational abstractions in the hope that suspicious 
transactions are produced; not by human beings but by technology.
When the comparison is made between the two examples (pattern-matching and money- 
laundering behaviour) the conclusion is inescapable. One can imagine a similar kind of 
scattering, a similar kind of variation displayed in Figure 4.2, but this time it concerns 
an effectiveness index of spotting suspicion for ML. Successful identification of ML 
cases is even more greatly compromised by the complexity of the ML problem domain, 
and the wide variety of informational elements that have to be considered.
Regardless of the problem domain, when it comes to technology, the system refers to 
itself in comparing what it receives as data against its systemically imposed abstract 
schemas. This process continues as long as the system is utilised and hence all 
information processing becomes self-referential.
The above example, technical though it may look, points towards a crucial aspect in 
self-reference that should be emphasized: self-reference has nothing to do with 
tautology, for it. implies systemic differentiation at its very core. The asymmetries that 
are created between abstraction and category and/or category and its elements remain a 
fundamental prerequisite for self-reference, for otherwise the system would have been 
incapable of internally differentiating between the abstraction and the constructed 
categories. In this regard, the distinction between internal input and external input
49 These are some of the most commonly used parameters in profiling money-laundering through 
technology
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becomes elusive, irrelevant, and utterly decontextualised in the scope of information 
processing and self-reference. What occurs is simple: external input is internalized 
within the system, otherwise the processing cannot take place3™1.
Later in this dissertation (following the description of the case study) further discussion 
and examples50 will probe and examine this underlying systemic core of information 
processing, to highlight underlying deficiencies in all technical systems that claim to 
target money-laundering. Such deficiencies are systemic and intrinsic to the technical 
systems employed, and the manner in which such systems come to affect each other.
Self-reference however should not be merely associated with such elemental 
information processing. Self-reference is what characterizes any identified system that 
can be pre-supposed or observed. The technical system clearly has a distinctive role to 
play within any other system that utilizes information processing, and therefore it 
becomes particularly relevant for financial institutions that are major users of computer 
technology.
50 Examples that I have come to realise, construct and delineate through my participation in two European 
Union projects related to Anti-Money Laundering (Projects SPOTLIGHT and GATE)
TTfte feam in j antCBjtowfedge tftat we ftave, is, 
at tfte most. But fittfe coyttpareffwitft tftat o f  
wfticft we are ignorant
Chapter V: Empirical Findings -  The Case Study 
Chapter Structure
This chapter discusses the main findings from the case study that was carried out over a 
24-month period in a Greek Bank. The chapter starts with an overview of the Greek 
Anti-Money Laundering system within which the Bank operates, and will contribute to 
the reader’s understanding of some critical, but perhaps contextual examples that will be 
given in due course.
Following the brief introduction of the Greek national AML system, issues of access to 
the Bank are discussed, along with an overview of what data was made available to the 
researcher. This is followed by an analysis of the internal reporting system of the bank, 
and an analysis of the increase in the number of suspicious transaction reports. The 
AML system of the Bank is then analysed in detail, based on the following distinction:
1) Investigations into money-laundering that are initiated by a request from the 
National Financial Intelligence Unit or a public prosecutor
2) Investigations on money-laundering that are initiated by the bank’s network of 
branches.
Along the aforementioned lines, critical information systems that influence anti-money 
laundering work are discussed, namely a Case Management System (CMS), whereby 
data is stored for all money-laundering investigations, and the POSEIDON Information 
System that is used to identify customers uniquely.
102
The Greek AML system
As a full member of the European Union, Greece has already taken the initial step of 
introducing a Greek Law for the prevention of money-laundering5 lxxn, based on the 
1991 EU Directive on ML (EU 1991). Even though the adoption of the 1991 Directive 
came with a four-year lag, the Greek law has extended several aspects of the 1991 EU 
guidance by including additional crimes in connection to money-laundering, such as 
blackmail, fraud, theft, illegal trade of antiquities, embezzlement, , etc. A series of 
Banking Directives from the EU have also been implemented, and transformed the 
Greek financial environment from a strictly regulated one, to a financial system more 
open to competition and hence, more risk (Goldberg and Pantos 2003). Despite the fact 
that Greece is not a major financial centre, it remains true that due to the country’s 
geographical position (at the southern end of the Balkans) as well as a remarkable 
geographical fragmentation that includes more than one thousand islands, it is very 
difficult to control drug-trafficking and smuggling of various forms.
Ten years after the first EU Directive on Anti-Money Laundering, the European Union 
issued another Directive in 2001, and although the deadline for its incorporation into 
national legislation December 2002, Greece did not take steps soon enough to 
implement it. Such an additional delay in complying with EU Guidance has resulted 
into some tension between the EU and Greece, with the former discussing a referral of 
Greece to the European Court.
With the European Union quickly responding to the global changes in Anti-Money 
Laundering, and the proposed 3rd AML Directive (EU 2005), Greece moved towards a 
draft law that would revise the previous law and incorporate the necessary changes for 
both the 2001 Directive, and the 3rd AML Directive. The revised law has been the 
subject of much discussion in the country, as several articles within the law have 
exceeded the requirements posed by the EU level, and have resulted in legislation that
51 Law No. 2331/95 (Amendments: Law No. 2515/1997, Article 6)
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was characterised by many as draconian. Two major changes in the revised52 legislation 
included jail sentences for bank employees, and a considerable reduction of the 
threshold for reporting suspicious transactions on money-laundering.
There are a few things worth mentioning concerning the revised Greek Law on money- 
laundering in order to exemplify the issues mentioned above. The first one concerns the 
possibility of jail sentences for bank employees -  up to 2 years -  a sentence that was 
characterised as mild by the regulators themselves. With the introduction of such a 
penalty, the bank employee had to face the potential of a jail sentence even in the case 
where money laundering has taken place due to an employee’s ‘severe negligence’. In 
the past, jail sentences used to require proof beyond doubt that the employee was 
involved in money laundering. Furthermore, as the definition of money laundering in 
the revised legislation was expanded into both criminal and domestic law, a surprising 
legislative contradiction has emerged; whereby the money launderer could be charged 
with an offence of a low-value crime resulting from a small violation of the domestic 
code, and facing a jail sentence of six months; however, the bank employee who 
accepted the proceeds of this crime is facing two years in prison. Considerable changes 
have also occurred in terms of the definition of thresholds, whereby any criminal act 
(either penal or domestic) that results in financial proceeds in excess of €4,000 would be 
considered as money laundering. Such a change clearly constitutes a great shift in the 
Greek AML system, and is a big expansion in the definition of money laundering. 
Serious problems are posed in terms of implementation; and the potential effects of 
these changes on the national reporting system of suspicious transactions will take years 
to unravel. Taking into consideration that tax evasion is included as one of the crimes 
for money laundering, further problems emerge as financial intermediaries are burdened 
with the task of checking the tax obligations of their customers, something that goes 
outside of their scope, role, and functionality.
Also, contrary to other EU countries (e.g. UK) or the US, when a financial institution in 
Greece receives a fine for non-compliance of AML regulations, the size of the financial 
fine imposed by the Central Bank of Greece is not made public. This in theory may
52 The revised legislation goes by the name of ‘Modification and revision o f articles o f  the Law 2331/95 
and compliance o f the Greek Laws to the Directive 2001/97/EC o f the European Parliament and Council 
for the prevention o f the use o f the financial system for the purposes o f legalising proceeds that source 
from criminal activities ’
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have two direct consequences: first, since the financial fines for non-compliance on 
AML are not made public, then the financial institutions upon which the fines are levied 
have no fear of reputational risk emanating from it. As a further and complementary 
consequence, non-compliance is not signalled to the market, and therefore further 
detrimental economic effects are not realised™". In aggregated form, however, the press 
has learned that a total of seven financial institutions were fined a total of €1.87million 
for non-compliance against the Greek Law on the prevention of money-laundering53.
After the introduction of the Greek legislation, two additional steps improved54 the 
country’s stance on AML. The first one was the constitution of a Financial Intelligence 
Unit (FIU), otherwise known as the Committee55. The Committee has the task of 
collecting, assessing, and investigating the reports from suspicious transactions. The 
committee’s meetings are presided by a judge or public prosecutor, and members range 
across senior officers of the Ministry of National Economy, the Ministry of Finance, the 
Bank of Greece, the Athens Stock Exchange, and the Hellenic Banking Association. 
The Committee, also called the ‘Competent Committee’ in the legislation, may enjoy 
confidentiality and trust, but certainly not admiration in terms of its efficiency and 
working structure. The latter is often viewed as overly bureaucratic, while the members 
of the committee are seen as people who have ‘nothing in common with each other, and 
in any case no expertise or training on Money-Laundering issues ... This poses an 
obstacle rather than an incentive to the AML efforts. It is worth mentioning that upon 
receiving a suspicious transaction report, the reaction time of the Committee upon 
receiving a suspicious transaction report is about one week before even referring the 
case to either the public prosecutor or to the SDOE56, who for their part have also the 
task to investigate before taking any effective action’ (Katsios 1999).
As well as setting up the Committee, another extremely important step under law 
2343/95 was the creation of a Unit responsible for combating Financial Crimes. The 
Financial Crimes Enforcement Unit (SDOE) has the task of enhancing coordination
53 http://www.in.gr/news/article.asp?lngEntitvID=723290
54 This is not a value-judgment here. Improvement refers simply to the critical aspect o f  constituting an 
FIU where none existed before.
55 Constituted in article 7 o f  the 2331/95 law
56 SDOE is dealing more broadly with economic crime in different forms, tax-evasion, etc. At the 
Committee for AML there is always a SDOE representative
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between different agencies, and investigating financial crimes stemming from drug 
trafficking, weapons trade, etc. The Unit started its work in 1997, on a wide range of 
financial crimes, including money-laundering.
Banking supervision in the Greek financial sector is carried out by the Central Bank of 
Greece (BOG hereinafter), in full accordance with the Basle Principles and all other 
international standards. The BOG is also responsible for supervising the sound and 
efficient implementation of the FATF recommendations, and of course, for imposing 
fines in cases of non-compliance.
All of the above initiatives, along with the setting up of both the Committee and the 
Financial Crime Unit, demonstrate the country’s intention to participate fully in the 
fight against money-laundering and to adhere to international standards. Even so, new 
risks are appearing, despite the fact that Greece could not be described as a major 
financial centre. This is due to the country’s geographical location, the immigration 
problem, which has intensified, and an increase in drug trafficking. Consequently 
money-laundering is becoming an increasing concern (State 2001). Drug trafficking for 
instance, has increased dramatically within the last 5-7 years, as drug offences have 
almost tripled57 (Interpol 2002).
Access to the Bank
Before moving on to describe the main findings of this case study, the researcher -  once 
again -  expresses his gratitude to all the staff members of the bank for their support, 
cooperation, patience, assistance and helpful remarks. They have always been truly 
wonderful and supportive of this effort and provided a wealth of useful information. 
Confidentiality agreements do not allow the exposing of either the names of employees 
or the name of the bank being researched; these legal and ethical obligations are 
honoured throughout this document.
57 The connection between an increase in drug trafficking is not clear, although it is commonly assumed 
that it accounts for 80% of the money being laundered.
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First of all, the name of the bank has been changed to that of ‘Drosia Bank’. Even 
though the topic of Anti-Money Laundering involves internal working processes of high 
confidentiality for obvious reasons, the researcher was granted an unprecedented level 
of access whilst conducting the research. This included access to:
1) The ‘Know Your Customer’ Policy of Drosia Bank
2) The bank’s policy on Money Laundering
3) The Internal Regulation of the Bank concerning the monitoring of unusual 
Transactions
4) Suspicious Transaction Reports initiated from staff members across the 
branch network of the bank
5) Reports that the Money Laundering Reporting Officer (MLRO) forwards to 
the Greek FIU58
6) Access to the Case Management System of the Bank where all cases 
concerning money-laundering are recorded
7) Statistical data concerning the whole branch network of Drosia Bank and the 
reports filed from each individual branch
8) The entire manual of the Case Management System as provided by the 
company that was responsible for its development (the project of building 
the CMS was outsourced)
9) The Bank’s Intranet containing all the internal guidelines
10) The POSEIDON59 system which contains basic account information for the 
customers of the bank, and is used by the money-laundering analysis team
11) The specification requirements for the CHIMERA online system
12) The Fast Transmission of Electronic Messages (FTEM60) System
13) The Electronic Updates System (EUS), which is used to inform 
electronically tellers and other personnel
14) The TEIRESIAS online system where banks share information between 
them
58 In the Greek AML system, a report has to be authorized by the MLRO before being forwarded to the 
FIU, an approach that differs from one national system to another (in the UK for instance, members o f 
money-laundering analysis teams can file a report directly to National Criminal Intelligence Service, and 
more recently to SOCA replaced NCIS)
59 Yet another fictional name
60 Fictional name for the Information Systems platform that the ML AT uses to communicate with 
branches
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15) Online Training Material
Besides documents, a series of semi-structured interviews were conducted with various 
stakeholders from Drosia Bank as well as other institutions, with the purpose of 
identifying systemic effects in the Greek national AML system. These include series of 
in-depth interviews with:
1) The Money Laundering Reporting Officer of the Bank
2) The Money Laundering Analysis Team (MLAT61) of the Bank
a. The Manager
b. The Assistant Manager
c. Personnel working in MLAT
3) The Compliance Group of the Bank
4) The Information Systems Analysis, Design and Management team of 
the Bank
5) The Hellenic Banking Association
6) The Central Bank of Greece
7) The Ministry of F inance
8) The Financial Intelligence Unit of Greece also known as ‘The 
Committee’
The largest number*™ of both semi-structured and unstructured interviews was 
conducted with the MLAT of Drosia Bank, the unit within the bank responsible for 
receiving the suspicious transaction reports from the bank’s branches and subsequently 
undertaking investigations before deciding whether a report is suspicious enough for the 
MLRO to approve it being sent to the Greek FIU. Also, MLAT alone has access to the 
Case Management System for recording suspicious transactions in respect of money- 
laundering.
61 Not to be confused with the term Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty
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D rosia B ank
While it is very difficult to describe a bank without exposing its identity, some broader 
comments can be attempted. Such comments aim at an overview of the Anti-Money 
Laundering processes within the Bank, and the steps that have been taken thus far 
towards improving AML. These will briefly precede the more extensive discussion on 
the suspicious transaction reporting system of the bank, the increasing number of 
suspicious transaction reports and its effects, the working processes underpinning AML, 
and the role of Information Systems therein.
Drosia Bank is a major financial institution in Greece. It has swiftly reacted to 
improving its internal procedures and working processes for AML from the very first
fS )introduction of the Greek Law concerning money-laundering . Two important related 
policies were introduced, one on ‘Know Your Customer’ rules and the other on Money 
Laundering. The KYC policy of the Bank clearly outlined the objectives of having such 
a policy in a short consolidated guide that was distributed to all the employees of the 
Bank, and emphasis is given to several issues, such as customer identification, 
suspicious conduct, and suspicious transactions, etc. The policy outlines the importance 
o f such identification every time a Bank-customer relationship is established, as well as 
stressing the collection of sufficient information for the development of individual 
‘transaction profiles’ for customers***. An outline of how the process of identification 
should take place is clearly stated within the policy. It covers personal accounts, other 
deposit accounts and correspondent accounts. Ways of identifying a customer’s true 
identity are discussed, and increased vigilance is suggested on the various occasions 
when the origin of funds might not be clear. Money laundering typologies are discussed 
and consolidated with practical advice for the bank’s tellers, as it is they that constitute 
the first line of defence against money laundering activity. Consideration of the 
aforementioned aspects also takes into account data protection legislation, so that the 
processes behind any information gathering, storing or processing is in line with 
national articles of data protection. It is worth noting here that according to Privacy 
International63, Greece came first in the national privacy rankings for the year 2007.
62 Law 2331/95
63 http://www.privacvintemational.org/
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The policy on money-laundering extends that of KYC, and emphasizes the risks 
associated with money-laundering. The Bank’s personnel are encouraged to do 
everything within their power to avoid involvement with any kind of illegal activity no 
matter how attractive (in financial terms) the relationship with a customer might be. The 
broader outline of the money laundering policy places much emphasis on the protection 
of the Bank, by putting issues like the preservation of credibility and reputation against 
possible abuse by money launderers. The policy on ML re-instates the importance of 
KYC, thoroughly analyzes the process of reporting suspicious activities within the 
Bank, and discusses the regulatory obligations that must be taken under consideration. 
Furthermore, the policy on ML introduces fundamental issues surrounding AML, 
discusses what day-to-day operations require protection from potential abuse by money- 
launderers and it emphasizes compliance with current legislation. The policy stresses 
that every effort should be made to report any suspicious activity that is detected, so that 
the financial institution has the option to examine it further (through the specialised 
team working on money-laundering) and potentially to report it to the Financial 
Intelligence Unit.
Compared with the other Greek banks visited by the researcher, a considerable number 
of employees have been hired for the analysis and investigation of suspicious 
transaction reports. This particular bank was chosen as a case study as a result of initial 
interviews of Money-Laundering Reporting Officers from nearly all the major banks in 
Greece.
Increased vigilance on money-laundering, the introduction of AML procedures, policies 
and guidelines within the bank, and the training of personnel have also brought about 
significant changes in the reporting of suspicious transactions. As demonstrated in 
Figure 5.1 below, throughout a five-year period the bank has seen an important increase 
in the number of STRs received by the Money-Laundering Analysis Team.
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STRs received from branches
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Year
Figure 5.1: Increase in STRs64
In order to accommodate for such a change in the volume of suspicious transaction 
reports, the bank has recently decided to employ even more staff within the Money 
Laundering Analysis Team. As the trend is likely to continue, a simple statistical 
analysis was carried out for investigating the increase so far. This is demonstrated in the 
Figure 5.2 below for which the Money Laundering Reporting Officer made the 
following comments:
“Such an increase is indeed alarming but nevertheless expected. The ongoing 
training o f personnel is one o f the reasons behind this trend and we are likely to 
expect even more STRs in the years to come for multiple reasons (i.e. legislation 
changes, new Information Systems in the bank, etc). We have already requested 
additional resources to handle such an increase and we are likely to employ even 
more people to handle it. AML however is only a cost centre within the bank so 
that might create a few frictions when asking for more resources”
64 Numbers on the y-axis that could potentially identify the bank have been removed. It is the trend o f  
increase that is o f  interest here; not the numbers themselves.
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Figure 5.265: Linear fit  ofSTR-projection
As with the previous figure, actual numbers from the y-axis have been removed; only 
the general trend of increase is of interest.
Such an increase has become the source of a variety of problems in terms of 
investigation, and has brought to the surface subtle issues on what it would mean to be 
efficient within the internal reporting mechanisms of the bank. In particular, despite the 
fact that the number of STRs had increased considerably within this five-year period, 
the percentage of reports that were deemed suspicious and worthy of reporting to the 
FIU became gradually disproportionate. Therefore, as the trend of the number of STRs 
increased, the percentage of STRs that were submitted to the FIU tended to decline!
Figure 5.3 below deserves particular attention. In the year 2000, nearly 73% of the 
STRs received from staff reports were forwarded to the FIU after investigation from the
65 Best fit in the graph was calculated with the method of Least Squares. The R-squared value is the 
relative predictive power of a model. The R-squared can take a maximum value of 1 if the linear 
approximation is a perfect match with the empirical data. In this scenario, with a value close to 0.99, the 
approximation is surprisingly good and the result disturbing for the MLAT if the trend does not face a 
discontinuity.
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MLAT. That number reached the peak of 84% in the year 2001, while in the year 2004 
the percentage of STRs that were forwarded to the FIU had dropped to 28%!
P ercentage of Reporting to  the FIU
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Figure 5.3: Reversion o f reporting
Juxtaposition between figures 5.1 and 5.3 demonstrates a clear trend of disproportionate 
reporting from staff members of the bank’s network when compared with the reports 
that are actually deemed suspicious after further investigation and forwarded to the FIU. 
Following this finding from access that was provided to statistical data, and following 
discussions concerning the above finding with several interviewees, the following 
observations and comments were carried out:
a) According to the Manager of the MLAT, the number of reports sent 
to the FIU in the first two years (2000, 2001) does not reflect the 
quality of the reports sent to the Money-Laundering Analysis Team. 
Fear-compliance along with potential fines from the supervisory 
authority also played a role in such a high percentage of reports being 
sent to the FIU.
b) The sudden drop in the reports sent to the FIU between 2001 and 
2002 (84% and 43% respectively) reflects a change in senior 
management and a new line of action. The MLAT was encouraged to
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be more cautious, to refrain from reporting nearly everything, and to 
focus on those cases that were worthwhile reporting (where there was 
serious suspicion for actual money-laundering going on). 
Complementary to this change in the internal policy of the bank, it is 
worth noting that the Greek FIU had also contacted the bank 
informally and urged it to submit fewer STRs as the volume of 
reports from the totality of the Greek Banking system was clogging 
the processing capacities of the FIU, and was creating a backlog.
c) Despite the increase suggested from figure 5.1, throughout the last 
two years, it is worth considering that such an increase has done little 
to affect the percentage of reports forwarded to the FIU. This 
percentage has remained surprisingly stable from 30% in the year 
2003 to 28% in the year 2004.
In respect of point c), even though a full explanation for such stability in times of 
change and where a multitude of factors come into play cannot be attempted, there is an 
underlying qualitative aspect that underpins such a condition. That aspect is of systemic 
nature and associated with every system’s internal capacity of interconnectedness, and 
particularly its information processing. Once a system reaches a certain degree of 
organisation, then the internal quality that characterizes its information processing 
capacities does not usually deviate much from the norm. This having being said, a more 
detailed analysis on such systemic implications can be found in the Analysis Chapter.
AML within the Bank
There are predominantly two mechanisms that influence the work of the money- 
laundering analysis team of the Drosia Bank, namely:
1) Investigations on money-laundering that start with a request from the FIU or a 
public prosecutor
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2) Investigations on money-laundering that are initiated by the network of branches 
of the bank via the traditional route of filing an STR
In examining the two, the role of Information Systems (IS) will become more evident in 
the broader suspicious transactions reporting system, while the ultimate purpose of the 
examination remains to expose that role and to examine the intricacies of particular IS 
implementations that have influenced -  and continue to influence -  the Anti-Money 
Laundering domain. The problems that usually emerge at a systemic level, (an analysis 
of which is provided in the Discussion Chapter) come from the interaction of computer- 
automated systems and human-activity systems. The existence of such hybrid systems 
becomes extremely important in the understanding of the systemic effects of AML- 
related technologies.
An initial differentiation amongst these two mechanisms related to the reporting system 
will assist us in unfolding the details of the case study. This initial delineation is done 
between the two scenarios, each of which is analysed in more detail:
Examining Scenario 1
Quite often, the Greek Financial Intelligence Unit or a prosecutor will request 
information from Drosia Bank on investigations concerning money-laundering. Such 
requests typically require the provision of transaction-data from the Bank. Sometimes 
these requests are limited to transaction data for a period of 5 years, and on various 
occasions -  that have become more and more frequent -  the requests will require all 
transaction data from the time o f opening o f the account It is worth noting that there 
are occasions when the FIU or a prosecutor requests all transaction data from the time 
of opening of the account irrespective o f the size o f the transactions. This creates a 
massive explosion in the bureaucracy and the amount of documentation that has to be 
collected and forwarded to either the FIU or the prosecutor.
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Such requests for the provision of transaction data by the authorities are handled by the 
Money-Laundering Analysis Team (MLAT hereinafter), and then forwarded 
appropriately within the bank. The first source of retrieving such data is the Automated 
Centre for Transaction Recording of Drosia Bank, which restricts itself to providing 
transaction data for the latest 40 months of the account’s transactions.
With such a restriction posed by the Automated Centre for Transaction Recording, the 
bank makes use of an Information System that was bought a few years ago, namely the 
Fast Transmission o f Electronic Messages (FTEM) system. This system allows 
communication by electronic means, and interconnects all the branches of the Bank 
with a centralised platform to which the MLAT has access. An employee from the 
MLAT will then gain access to the FTEM system, and manually input the information 
concerning the names being investigated. Even though the FTEM system has a facility 
through which the input of standardized text is allowed66, this is one example of an 
option that is not currently being utilised. Furthermore, the requests received by the FIU 
are never sent in an electronic format, and therefore duplication of work becomes -  to a 
great extent -  unavoidable. In cases where many names are being investigated along 
with their details (National Identity Numbers, etc), this becomes a considerable 
effort30™.
Once an employee records all the details of the names under investigation, an electronic 
message is sent via the FTEM system to all the branches of the bank. Individual 
branches must then process that information through their own link to the FTEM 
system. Access at the level of an individual branch to the FTEM is gained by either the 
Manager of the branch or the Chief Teller, and they will typically check for such a 
transmission every two or three hours each day.
If it is found that any of the people under investigation have an account with a particular 
branch, the manager of that branch will assign an employee to investigate the physical 
records (transaction slips). Depending on the data that have initially been requested by 
the FIU, the employee will undertake the following tasks depending on the 
circumstances of the request: if the transaction data requested conform to a time period
66 By using Macros so that initial details are already recorded and used
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where the data are available in transaction slips, the employee will collect all the slips 
and manually handwrite all the transactions -  one by one -  on a pre-formatted paper 
form that is provided for this purpose. In the event that transaction data are requested 
from the time of the opening of the account, the employee will have to resort to 
microfilms where this data resides. Checking the microfilms for such individual 
transactions becomes then a painstaking process for the employees involved and might 
take weeks. The format of the microfilms is such that they are practically unreadable, 
and this renders the whole process of extracting transactions from individual accounts 
even more difficult.
Once this cumbersome process reaches an end, it becomes evident how time-consuming 
AML investigations can become, especially if there is more than one branch involved in 
the collection of the transaction data-sets. Once all the branches that have accounts 
under the names being investigated respond to the MLAT, the transaction records will 
be forwarded to the FIU for further examination.
The end result therefore consists o f a folder containing printed transactions from the 
Automated Centre for Transaction Records along with all the remaining transactions 
that have been handwritten by the employees. On various occasions, the transaction 
slips have been requested as well. The Greek FIU or the prosecutors will therefore 
receive a printout o f such information, as there are no facilities to allow for the 
electronic communication between banks and the FIU, and o f course, such information 
collection is contingent upon the internal working processes and systems o f individual 
financial institutions.
The Greek FIU uses similar methods of communication to the totality of the Greek 
banking sector, so it becomes evident that data collection can be extremely time- 
consuming. As those under investigation may have more than one bank account and 
often operate in different financial institutions, data-collection significantly increases 
the complexity of the investigation. The process o f data collection alone can sometimes 
take three to four months before the data are eventually forwarded to the FIU for  
further investigation.
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The Greek FIU subsequently relies on a manual examination of such transaction data 
before forwarding to the prosecutor. Taken that the FIU currently employs a maximum 
of ten people (along with a few assistants), it becomes clear that a thorough 
investigation of all transactions is rendered difficult just by the volume of the 
documents collected alone. Furthermore, as no means of electronic processing is 
involved at this end, there is no mechanism for identifying if potential launderers 
involved in past investigations are named in the new reports sent to the FIU, unless 
someone actually remembers the name of the person being mentioned in past reports or 
if the suspect constitutes a primary suspect in a case that would have been filed under 
his/her name. For persons not identified as primary suspects in an investigation but for 
whom connections are established with those that are suspected of money-laundering, 
things get even more complicated.
Those requests from the FIU or prosecutors targeted towards Drosia Bank (or other 
financial institutions) that aim to retrieve all transactions irrespective o f the scale o f 
transaction, appear to be indiscriminate and demonstrate lack o f understanding o f the 
problem domain. Not surprisingly then, financial institutions like Drosia Bank that have 
to undertake the task of data collection and have a better understanding of the internal 
working processes of their respective institutions, will often discuss with the 
prosecutors or the FIU, so that a threshold amount can be agreed before proceeding into
£>7
data collection .
Examining Scenario 2
The second distinct way in which an investigation concerning money-laundering takes 
place is via the traditional route; that is, when a member of staff from one of the 
branches of Drosia Bank files a suspicious transaction report. That is done manually 
through a standard form that the bank uses, and which is based on the guidelines issued 
from the Central Bank of Greece (BOG). These guidelines make use of typologies that
67 For example, in a recent investigation there were so many transactions involved that it would be 
impossible and would probably burden the authorities if the bank were to send all data irrespective of 
amount. This was discussed and it was finally agreed that only those transactions that were above €1,000 
would be forwarded.
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include amount thresholds. It has to be made clear, however, that whilst typologies are 
used when filing an STR, a transaction does not necessarily have to conform to any of 
those typologies in order to be reported. A narrative section is also found in the 
standard form, the importance of which has been stressed by all interviewees from the 
MLAT. In the narrative section, the employee that files the suspicious transaction report 
usually describes the reasons of reporting along with additional information that can be 
useful in the investigative part of the work. One of the problems of having such a 
manual internal suspicious transaction reporting system is that it is actually the bank 
tellers that have to fill out the reports, while at the same time these people have to serve 
the customers and barely have time for anything else. Staff members that further 
analysed these reports have often complained that the quality of handwriting is often so 
bad that they can hardly make any sense of the content. The issue of internal electronic 
reporting as an antithesis to manual or hybrid systems will be dealt with extensively in 
the following chapter.
The analysis of such manual STRs is undertaken by the Money-Laundering Analysis 
Team (MLAT) and each one is assigned to a member of staff by the MLAT manager 
and investigated thoroughly before a decision is made as to whether the report deserves 
further consideration, attention from the MLRO, and potential forwarding to the FIU. A 
record of what person is assigned which investigation is kept by the manager of the 
MLAT, so that the work is evenly distributed and no one employee is burdened with 
more investigations than any other.
Every single STR that is received from the Bank’s network is logged on an Information 
System that is a basic Case Management System68 (CMS hereinafter) and a simple 
facility that the software provides is used to extract statistical information from the 
reports being investigated. Reporting statistical information from Drosia Bank to the 
supervisory authority of the Central Bank of Greece is compulsory and takes place 
annually.
68 Thanks to the Manager of the MLAT, I have also received the full manual of the Case Management 
System that the team uses, describing every single work flow and potential of the software. Whilst such 
extensive details cannot be disclosed, they have greatly contributed to my own understanding o f the 
internal processes involved.
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The CMS was installed in 1999, when most Greek banks started showing increased 
vigilance over anti-money laundering, and sought after Information and Communication 
Technologies that would facilitate parts of AML work. Ever since, it would probably 
fair to say, the CMS system has become the main companion for work of the MLAT 
team within Drosia Bank. Even when new STRs find their way into the MLAT, the 
team would first check whether there has been a previous report on the names being 
investigated within the CMS.
This particular software was bespoke, and not an off-the-shelf solution. The project was 
outsourced to a company that undertook the task of building the software after working 
together with the personnel of the bank. The consultation period between MLAT and 
the company in charge of the project for building the CMS lasted for about two months 
with only a few rounds of consultations. After the requirements specifications were 
formulated, the software was developed and installed. However, the company that took 
charge of developing and installing the software seemed to lack essential understanding 
of the dynamic nature of money-laundering investigations, and this resulted in the 
creation of a software package with few capabilities, stringent processes, and inflexible 
controls. Requirements specification was unfortunately carried out hastily, and in a 
manner that prevented critical changes from being performed in the future, as they could 
potentially jeopardise the underlying informational infrastructure of the Case 
Management System that was already in place. This will be discussed to a larger extent 
later.
The semantics of the software’s name also play an important role, as the software itself 
claims to be a tool for the electronic processing o f suspicious transactions. Far from 
being an automated tool that monitors electronic transactions, and far from being a 
profiling tool for modelling money-laundering behaviour, the CMS software operates 
offline with no link to any other system or database. As the manager of the MLAT 
commented:
“The software does not have any ‘intelligence built in’. Actually it is not provided 
for that reason. It is very simple and in many ways restricts the work that we want 
to do. There are many instances where the software is inflexible. For example, if 
one bank branch merges with another, there is no way of putting those two 
together in the system. Therefore, subsequent non-existent branches will virtually
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continue to exist and cases on money-laundering cannot be transferred. Statistical 
information can only be extracted for particular categories while particular changes 
that we requested from the software company were not feasible for technical 
purposes. In a sense, we are locked into this particular platform which we have 
been using for more than five years now”
The manager of the MLAT continued on a quite different topic regarding the software, 
and in particular commented upon the fact that the particular software platform was 
operating offline:
“Sometimes it becomes evident that we are in many ways cut-off from live*3™1 
systems and unavoidably remain restricted into carrying out a post-mortem o f the 
cases. Considering however systems that would automatically make such decisions 
on what is suspicious and what not (perhaps with some real-time intervention) 
might present other considerable difficulties”
Various other problems were discussed about the CMS. For instance, every case under 
investigation is input into the CMS with a unique reference number. Subsequent 
investigations however about the same people would have to be inserted into the CMS 
with a different unique number, thus increasing the information complexity of 
individual cases, and compromising the usability of the software and the data retrieval 
in investigations. Apart from the CMS itself, there is however another Information 
System that is being used by the MLAT, and which has played an important role within 
the bank itself.
The POSEIDON Information System
The Information System discussed in this section has taken another pseudonym for non­
identification purposes. The name POSEIDON seeks to reflect a sea of troubles with the 
implementation of this particular information system. This does not mean that the 
implementation per se has resulted in a failure; quite the contrary. The POSEIDON 
system itself is fully operational up to the time of writing, and it is one o f the most 
important information systems o f the bank to date. But as is the case with many 
information systems, the resulting system has little to do with what was originally 
intended. “A system is what a system becomes; and not what it was intended to be”
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(Angell and Smithson 1991). The implications for both the Money Laundering 
Analysis Team and AML within the bank will become evident later in this section.
The POSEIDON system was an in-house development effort, but based on another 
technological platform that was bought off-the-shelf from a company operating in 
another EU country. As discussed with several interviewees, the purpose behind the 
implementation of the POSEIDON system was to link together disparate information 
systems within the bank, and to create a system whereby all account information would 
be held, and perhaps more importantly, each customer would be identified with a 
unique identification number, namely the POSEIDON ID.
After the system’s implementation, POSEIDON became a crucial information system 
within the bank, and is currently part of the online50""1 system that bank tellers use to 
carry out day-to-day transactions. The simplest case where the system is used is when a 
customer goes to the branch to open an account. Staff would then access the system and 
assign the customer with a Unique Identification Number (ULN henceforth). The system 
has various features that show the overall position of the customer, such as account 
information, deposits, withdrawals, etc. It also allows the extraction of account statistics 
for individual customers, and for groups of customers.
Tracing back the problems that emerged with the adoption of POSEIDON, it became 
evident that as the prior information systems of the bank were gradually developed, 
implemented, and deployed, they had become an integral part of a highly complex 
infrastructure. In this lengthy process, one immediate consequence that stemmed from 
the creation of highly complicated informational infrastructures was the difficulty in 
maintaining consistency in the database format. The different information systems were 
far from uniform. New technologies were constantly being developed, and as new needs 
were constantly emerging, variety in computer systems became unavoidable. Written in 
different computer languages and database structures like COBOL, PL1, DB2, and so 
on, these problems became ever greater when the bank decided to implement 
POSEIDON, yet another system where basic account information would be stored. 
POSEIDON became an agglomeration of data from various sources. In other words, this 
system was greatly affected by the variety of different databases already existing prior 
to its own implementation. One such database that was used to feed POSEIDON with
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customer information came from the bank’s spin-off company that issued debit and 
credit cards. There were many other databases, each set up for their own, and disparate 
reasons. As a staff member from the department of Organisation and Management o f  
Information Systems commented:
“ ... that was exacdy the problem. The initial process o f feeding the 
POSEIDON system with customer information was problematic because it 
was contingent upon many different databases and databases themselves 
degrade. No database was complete in itself. The POSEIDON system inherited 
in this way many problems which have not so far been solved. It looks like the 
problems are never going to go away because the processes of rectifying them 
take a considerable amount o f time and meanwhile new needs are being 
developed”
Apart from the problems that emerged after the implementation phase of the 
POSEIDON system, there are various other factors that influenced the system’s 
integrity and purpose. Some accounts, which were quite old in terms of the time o f  
opening o f the account, were not part of the POSEIDON system at all. They had to be 
entered manually. Furthermore, the system has been constantly misused (and continues 
to be so) by staff members, who would just not bother looking into the system for 
already existing customers. This meant that customers who went into a branch with the 
purpose of opening an account, but who had already opened other accounts with the 
bank, would simply be given an additional Unique POSEIDON Identification Number. 
Instead, what the branch staff member should have done was to unite all the accounts of 
the customer under a single ID number in the system. Whilst interviewing personnel 
from the MLAT, I was even told of customers with ten POSEIDON Identification 
numbers. One staff member from the compliance group of the bank mentioned that she 
had five UID herself. On top of these issues that rendered the system’s basic 
functionality heavily problematic, apart from basic account information that was 
compulsory, staff members in the branches of Drosia Bank would not enter all the 
customer information. Fields of information would be missing, or would be entered 
incorrectly. Postcodes, addresses, occupations, and many other details were 
compromised. A multi-threaded matrix of complexity was suddenly realized, and 
clearly, something had to be done about these problems.
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Shortly after the bank had recognised the problems with POSEIDON, a decision was 
made to make consistent attempts at rectifying them. It turned out that the branches 
would be burdened with clearing out the underlying complexity; a complexity to which 
they themselves had greatly contributed69. The Automated Centre for Transaction 
Recording would then query its own databases*™ and produce lists with people that had 
multiple accounts with the bank and consequently several different POSEIDON 
‘Unique’ Identification numbers. These printed lists would subsequently be sent to the 
branches, and they would have to cross-check the identification documents from the 
customers, and proceed into uniting the different accounts under a single POSEIDON 
identification number. The instructions that were given to staff members would also 
include collecting the required information missing from the POSEIDON system. This 
additional information (e.g. postcode, occupation) was needed so that the database was 
as complete as possible, with the ultimate purpose of creating a single POSEIDON 
Identification Number in those cases where multiple accounts existed.
According to estimates given to the researcher by the Department of Organisation and 
Management o f Information Systems of the Bank, there are two issues worth mentioning 
that concern the process of rectifying the problems in POSEIDON. Five years after its 
implementation, it was estimated that only 40% o f all the accounts o f Drosia Bank have 
been added to the POSEIDON database. Out of those, and after several years of trying 
to rectify the problems, only half of the customers originally given multiple ID numbers 
had been given a Unique POSEIDON ID. That number was considerably lower 4-5 
years ago when a mere 15-20% of the customer base had a unique identification 
number.
The implications for the Money Laundering Analysis Team were clear. Considering that 
POSEIDON is the only online system to which the MLAT has access70, its use heavily 
affects AML work. It is perhaps worth noting here that use of the POSEIDON system is 
structured in a particular manner in order to allow access for security purposes, since it 
constitutes a key operational transacting platform for the bank. POSEIDON was 
designed to be used only by tellers and chief tellers, and so in order to allow the MLAT
69 Describing this whole story somewhere else (conclusions) -  as a self-referential process of 
correcting/injecting problems into the system itself
70 Apart from the TEIRESIAS system which links all banks for a different purpose
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team access to all of the core information modules, they were given permission to carry 
out transactions as if they were tellers/chief-tellers. This of course exposed a slight 
security risk had the staff of MLAT been prone to insider-fraud, but this occurrence has 
yet to happen. Supervision of MLAT work is very carefully managed when overseeing 
the entire investigative progress.
In any event, the identities of those under investigation by MLAT for money-laundering 
are cross-checked in POSEIDON. Establishing the identity of a person under 
investigation becomes then time consuming when there are multiple ID numbers. Basic 
information concerning their account balance can also be retrieved. But as POSEIDON 
is incomplete, further problems become unavoidable. For example, if the same person 
has five different accounts within the bank, and five different ID numbers within 
POSEIDON, every single one would have to be checked, making the process of getting 
an overview of the person’s financial position more complex and time-consuming.
Awareness of the level of incompleteness of POSEIDON creates an additional problem 
when undertaking such important investigations. The team has to be certain that data is 
accurate and hence has to resort to contacting all the branch-network o f the bank 
through the Fast Transmission o f Electronic Messages system as a complementary step 
of verifying customers identities and their accounts. The communication throughout the 
entire branch-network in such a way entails a series of risks. For example, maintaining 
confidentiality becomes more difficult with such informational decentralisation, 
particularly in high-profile cases that have received considerable publicity. Even though 
such confidentiality breaches have been very rare, they have indeed occurred.
These multiple difficulties collapse into one fundamental problem: The MLAT cannot
71be certain whether a person under investigation has an account with the bank by 
making use of POSEIDON as it is incomplete. As the manager of the MLAT team 
commented:
“Our investigations are based on information that is far from being adequate and
complete. This makes the investigative part o f the work hard and in various
71 Obviously this only applies to the cases where the FIU requests information
125
occasions a very time-consuming process, something that is critical in cases where 
money-laundering has potentially taken place”.
It is evident from the aforementioned comments and analysis that there are various 
factors that influence Anti-Money Laundering investigations internally within the bank. 
Some of these problems are considerably influenced and exacerbated by the use of 
various Information Systems within the bank. These systems range from systems 
designed for specific tasks relating to AML (like the Case Management System) to 
Information Systems that have a different purpose and functionality (such as 
POSEIDON), but which are still utilised for and crucial to money-laundering 
investigations.
The extent and form of asymmetry in STRs
The finding described in this section regarding the asymmetry of STRs could be 
considered as not only one of the most critical pertaining to the systemic effects of the 
suspicious transaction reporting, but also, a very important one in terms of both the 
processes underpinning the reporting mechanisms and the manner in which they are 
influenced and subsequently managed. There are also considerable implications for 
Anti-Money Laundering in general that will be discussed in the following chapter 
regarding the lack of homogeneity in reporting STRs. An attempt is made here to 
examine the matter analytically.
This section proceeds by placing even more attention to confidentiality issues. Any 
characteristics that may have exposed the bank throughout this analysis have been 
removed or generalised so that the bank is not identifiable. Attention to preserving 
confidentiality has not however jeopardised presentation of the findings. What is 
presented in this section is both typical and statistically representative of the entire 
branch-network of the bank.
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At this stage, and before proceeding 
with an examination of the 
distribution of the suspicious 
transaction reporting system, it f 
would be useful to remind the * 
reader of something that was 
discussed at the beginning of this 
chapter, and in particular, the 
observation that the number of suspicious transaction reports received by the MLAT has 
increased considerably over the last few years. What does not however become obvious, 
from any observation that has its source in aggregated statistical data, is whether -  and 
to what extent -  the entire network of branches of the bank contributes in a similar and 
homogenous manner to the volume o f the suspicious transaction reports sent to the 
MLAT.
In the first place, the answer would appear to be in the negative. One could rightly 
expect that some form of asymmetry would be prevalent in the distribution of the 
suspicious transaction reports. The impossibility of a total homogeneity in the 
distribution o f STRs is after all swiftly inferred once one considers the variety of factors 
(i.e. geographical distribution, etc) that come into play. But if one moves past that stage 
to ponder the question of what is exactly the form that such an asymmetry could take 
then it becomes obvious that additional information and data are required in pursuing 
the answer to this question. Furthermore, the underlying reasons that gave rise to such 
an asymmetric character, as well as the implications for the asymmetry, become of 
immediate concern as issues of further research interest.
Once again, this sort of information was made available by the MLAT. Retrieving 
aggregated data required the help of CMS at an individual branch level, although 
without any statistics (or visualisation for that matter) as their software was not 
equipped with that functionality. When data at branch-level were manually retrieved 
with the help of the CMS and aggregated statistically, the problem of visualization had 
to be solved due to the high volume of both transactions and branches. This was
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achieved by using a data-mining platform72 with which the following results were 
produced.
Figure 5.4 depicts the distribution of the number of suspicious transaction reports in 
respect of the branch network. First of all, the actual labels from the x-axis have been 
removed for confidentiality reasons. The graph displayed here is only a sample, and 
does not include all the branches o f the bank, however, the sample provided here is 
characteristic of the broader picture observed for the entire network of the bank. 
Groupings in the y-axis73 indicate branches of the same geographical region, while 
every single dot in the diagram represents an individual branch. The higher the dot is 
placed along the y-direction, the more suspicious transaction reports have been reported 
from that particular branch to the Money-Laundering Analysis Team of the bank.
A num ber 
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Figure 5.4: STR-submission asymmetry in the branch network
From the above graph, it is evident that the vast majority o f branches within the network 
o f the bank are almost inactive insofar as reporting suspicious transactions; that is, the
72 For this data-mining platform (DataDesk v.6.2) and the feed o f  ASCII data into it, I have to thank Dr. 
Carsten Sorensen from the London School o f  Economics for his help, introduction to the software, and 
assistance.
73 Hence such a big difference in reporting is not attributable to geographical factors.
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vast majority of the branches send extremely few suspicious transaction reports in 
contrast to only a handful o f  branches that produce the bulk o f STRs. The reader is 
reminded once again that although only a sample, the above graph remains 
representative of this asymmetry throughout the entire branch-network of the bank. The 
form of the asymmetry and lack of homogeneity in reporting can now be better 
articulated. It becomes evident that when one examines this submission of STRs 
throughout the bank-network, then the degree of asymmetry that branches exhibit in the 
reporting of STRs requires further pondering and investigation.
When the above finding was discussed with both the manager and the assistant manager 
of the MLAT, as well as personnel within the MLAT, it became evident that all were of 
course aware that some asymmetry like this would exist; they said that some branches 
are more active in sending suspicious transaction reports than others. But as this was the 
first time that this data -  in this form -  had become available and that the problem was 
exposed throughout the entire-branch network of the bank at such a scope, no initial 
satisfactory explanation could be provided as to why such a large number of branches 
were inactive in reporting. This led to a subsequent investigation, for which additional 
data-mining of the extracted dataset was carried out in order to determine the 
percentages of the distributions for which STRs have been sent from individual 
branches.
The purpose of this additional examination was threefold (even though the following 
elements are interrelated):
i) To identify the percentage of the branches that -  in the course of their 
existence within the network of the bank -  have sent no suspicious 
transaction reports whatsoever,
ii) To identify the percentage of the branches that have sent very few STRs,
iii) To identify the pattern of distribution that stretches from those groupings 
o f branches that have sent very few suspicious transaction reports to 
those that have sent the bulk o f the STRs.
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Once again, the same data-mining platform was used for the categorisation of branches 
with the same number of suspicious transaction reports; this produced the following 
graph:
S T R s
Figure 5.5: Asymmetric distribution o f STRs in aggregated categories
It has to be made clear that the actual numbers of how many branches are in each 
category are not made available for anonymisation purposes, but the percentages are 
clear and hopefully o f striking importance! The categories on the right part of the graph 
are the number of STRs that correspond to the particular colour in the pie-chart for the 
respective percentage (categories match the distribution pattern clockwise with the first 
category indicating that the largest percentage grouping are the branches that have 
never filed an STR with the MLAT -  the 0 STRs category).
Similarly, as indicated from the pie-chart, we can see that more than 50% of the 
branches have one or less STRs throughout the whole history of AML in the bank. We 
can then continue to observe the following correlation: As the number o f suspicious 
transaction reports increases, the distribution becomes denser. At the far end o f the 
distribution (clockwise) we have branches that have submitted a large total o f STRs. 
This implies that the vast majority o f STRs (as shown in the Figure 5.5 above) comes
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from less than 7-8% o f the entire population o f the branch-network!! Just how fast this 
increase in density occurs becomes evident from the following graphical representation 
in Figure 5.6 below, where STRs are grouped in categories of five (branches that have 
sent 0-5 STRs are displayed in the first column, etc).
Figure 5.6: Decreasing STR-production graph
Different interviewees have given different but complementary explanations as to why 
this form, type, and extent of asymmetry can be observed. Their interpretations are of 
considerable interest. As one of my interviewees from the MLAT commented:
“Those branches that are over-reporting are simply those branches that are sticking 
to the letter o f the bank’s policy, which has of course been formulated in 
accordance to the guidance from the Central Bank of Greece. These branches are 
therefore typically ‘ok’ with their obligations and simply operate very formally. It is 
the other number of branches that haven’t reported anything that should concern 
us. Those branches that have been quite moderate in reporting also put some 
judgment before sending an STR”
For this issue, the MLRO commented:
“Let us not forget that training (which proceeds gradually) is an important issue 
here and some sort of asymmetry was expected. But obviously, this is too much.
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What I expect in the future is that more of the branches that have been somewhat 
inactive will send more and more suspicious transaction reports. Clearly, there 
needs to be considerable thought on how such an increase will be handled, for 
which additional resources will be required (resources that we have already asked 
for). The impact that technology will have is also something that we have to 
consider. Imagine what would happen now if we gave to some of these 
people in the branches that are over-reporting the possibility to report to us 
the suspicious transactions electronically74...We wouldn’t be able to cope 
because o f the massive volume and the backlog would be tremendous. As the 
Greek law has also become very strict after its renewal, reporting is going to sky­
rocket and the employees are going to take few chances.”
A testament to such a problematisation, and an additional fact to be considered is the 
effectiveness of the branches that are over-reporting. Following the reflections and 
comments for the form of asymmetry in reporting STRs, a sample was chosen in order 
to examine the percentage of unsuccessful reports (those that, after manual and careful 
examination by the MLAT, were deemed to be unworthy of further escalation and 
reporting to the FIU). As the software used within the bank (the Case Management 
System) did not allow for the extraction of such statistics at a branch level, manual 
examination of each individual branch would have had to be undertaken in order to 
produce statistics representative across the entire branch-network of the bank. As this 
would be a cumbersome process, a small sample was selected of the ten most active 
branches in reporting STRs to the MLAT in order to examine further the percentage of 
those reports that were deemed to be unsuccessful and were subsequently archived in 
the CMS without further escalation or reporting to the FIU.
74 Emphasis added
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Figure 5.7. below indicates this percentage for the more active branches in reporting 
STRs:
Percentage of Unsuccessful reports in the top 10 more active branches
100
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
Branch Number
Figure 5.7. Top 10 most active branches in reporting 
(percentages of unsuccessful reports)
From Figure 5.7 we can observe that amongst the top ten branches in reporting activity, 
the first 6 have a considerably high percentage of unsuccessful reports of around 90%. 
This means that only one in ten reports is considered to be suspicious enough to be sent 
to the Financial Intelligence Unit after careful manual analysis from the MLAT. A 
considerable implication that is of qualitative nature and cannot be easily quantified 
becomes the impact of such dynamics of STRs to the MLAT that is responsible for their 
analysis. For example, how is the MLAT influenced by receiving a report from a branch 
that has a 90% ‘failure rate’ in reporting? Could the risk-based approach be extended to 
include this type of granularity, where individual branches would be scored on success 
rates of STRs? Are there any circumstances under which reports from such branches 
become prejudiced following a series of unsuccessful reports? Regardless of the answer 
to such questions, and the qualitative subtleties or personal judgments that could be 
involved, it quickly becomes evident that a risk-element is prevalent here. Therefore 
intelligence gathering that points towards effectiveness in reporting STRs from
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individual branches could be further used fo r  consideration and integration with a risk- 
based approach in reporting, something that could become very useful in light of the 
projected increase in suspicious transaction reports.
Other branches, however, appear to be far more effective in their reporting (even though 
the number of STRs that these branches send to the MLAT is a little lower compared to 
those exhibiting a higher rate of unsuccessful75 reports).
Interesting as this observation may be, the study of identifying -  at branch-level -  what 
those elements might be (whether those are working processes, training methods, staff 
demographics, statistics, or anything else) that are strongly related with a branch’s 
relative success or failure in providing useful STRs to the MLAT, is a set of matters that 
is somewhat different in scope from the issues that this dissertation set out to examine 
and one that would require considerably different methodological techniques.
Thus far the broader AML system of Greece, the internal reporting system of the Bank 
as well as the reporting implications towards, the FIU, the different ways with which 
investigations can be led, as well as clear implications of technology within AML in 
Drosia Bank have been examined in some detail. Two such examples came from the 
Case Management System of the Bank where investigations for AML are logged, as 
well as the POSEIDON system that is used throughout the Bank for uniquely 
identifying customers. As this chapter comes to an end, it will proceed with a more 
forward-looking topic (as far as Drosia Bank is concerned) that is related to new 
automated solutions for Anti-Money Laundering, the implications that these exhibit, 
and the influence that they have.
The CHIMERA System -  New Automated Solutions for AML
First of all it has to be made clear that unlike other countries, in Greece there has been 
no initiative whatsoever from the Central Bank or the Bank of Greece to urge the
75 An ‘Unsuccessful report’ here means that after further analysis from the MLAT, it is not forwarded to 
the FIU. It is not connected to any other processes at this stage.
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financial institutions towards implementing and adopting profiling or other AML- 
related technologies’0” . Every single financial institution acted on its own initiative, and 
therefore some variety can be observed in the Greek banking sector. Some financial 
institutions have already bought automated solutions, but most have built their own 
software for monitoring suspicious transactions.
Drosia Bank has had (as already discussed) a series of Information Systems, but never a 
centralised and bespoke system targeting particular aspects of money-laundering. Even 
though the focus of this dissertation lies broadly in the technological structures that can 
affect AML, and not explicitly in profiling, data-mining or other risk-oriented software 
for AML, it is important to describe the story behind the CHIMERA system, the latest 
system to be implemented in Drosia Bank.
As profiling technologies for AML were becoming fashionable around the world, and 
the software houses providing them truly successful in gaining disproportionate (to their 
efforts) financial gains, Drosia Bank and -  many other banks at the time -  started 
looking for automated and profiling solutions for AML. These solutions would typically 
claim to act in an ‘intelligent’ manner, thus capturing the ‘behaviour’ of money- 
launderers, and through a series of techniques that could go under the most mystical of 
names to the uninitiated (neural networks, artificial intelligence, etc), software claimed 
considerable success in targeting money-laundering, a success-bubble that soon burst 
(Demetis and Angell 2006).
Still, the decision to look into buying a software package was taken by Drosia Bank as 
some monitoring problems of STRs needed to be looked at. Internet banking for 
example was not monitored at all for money-laundering or scrutinised in any way unless 
particular cases were brought to surface from other routes (such as an STR from one of 
the branches of the bank) and then specific searches were carried out to observe the 
pattern of transacting from online banking. It was similar for ATM transactions. 
Discussions commenced in the year 2000, and continued up to the year 2004. During 
this period, and following this initial line of interest into the purchase of a software 
package, the Managing Information Systems Department of the Bank took the initiative 
of requesting representatives from various companies that supplied software of that type 
to present some of the inner-workings of the software and the underlying functionality.
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Major companies that presented their AML solutions to Drosia Bank included (without 
this list being exhaustive): Norkom, Unisys, Hughes Financial Analysis, Thompson 
Financial Services, SearchSpace, Intrasoft, IDL, NetEconomy and Mantas.
When asked to comment on the functionality of AML software that was presented to 
Drosia Bank, the Deputy Director of the MIS Department of the Bank commented the 
following:
“The vast majority o f AML software that were presented to us were overly 
complicated and either did a series of things that we would never ever need, or 
were incapable o f being customised to the extent that we would want them to be, 
something that will prove crucial in the decision to buy one. To give you an 
example of what I mean by overly complicated we don’t need to go far as this is a 
phenomenon I have observed in software packages throughout the last years. If 
you take Microsoft Word as an example, it quickly becomes evident that 
justification of different versions, updates, and so on that would justify the cost (or 
the increase in cost of the package), have overloaded the software with a series of 
things that nobody hardly ever uses.”
Interestingly enough, according to my interviewee from the MIS Department of Drosia 
Bank, while the negotiations were taking place regarding the various technological 
platforms that could be purchased, an analyst from a company that was presenting their 
AML software platform was attributed with the following quote:
“We know that the problem is very difficult and we must admit that no profiling 
technology actually works. Ours is relatively cheaper and you need it for demonstrating 
compliance. That’s all”
When the process of consulting with software companies regarding AML solutions was 
completed, the decision was eventually made by the management not to buy one, and a 
firm choice and commitment was made that opted for the development of an in-house 
component that would be part of the POSEIDON Information System; one that would 
be most closely and explicitly related with money-laundering prevention and 
investigation. This turned out to be a system that will hereinafter go by the name 
CHIMERA, whose scope will be examined here. In several interviews in the MIS 
department of the bank, the decision not to buy an off-the-shelf software platform for 
AML was discussed. Several reasons were identified:
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1. A major problem was the poor interoperability of the software package with the 
already existing infrastructure of information systems that operated in the bank. 
The complexity of the endeavour would be overwhelming as more than 50 sub­
systems operated and the solution (of achieving interoperation and hence 
increased interoperability) would have to be achieved through a series of 
middleware, thus introducing even more complexity and in various cases 
reducing the functionality of the software package provided.
2. It was believed that many more problems would emerge when the software is 
bought off-the-shelf. On the contrary, it was viewed that in-house development 
is much better, particularly when one sees beyond the software packages that 
were presented, and comes to the realisation that there is an underlying core 
functionality that is truly very basic (and that the Bank would not really need 
any more than that for compliance purposes).
3. Beyond the integration and interoperability of the software, an additional 
problem was the administration of the system, and the profiling rules that would 
be used for monitoring money-laundering. There was considerable ambiguity 
over whether the software companies had actually delved deeply enough into the 
issues of ML-modelling, or if the construction of their profiling solutions was a 
simple automated transfer of a huge number of typologies.
4. A further issue that contributed towards the decision of not buying a software 
platform was that on a large number of occasions, more centralisation at the 
level of both STRs and transactions would adversely affect the MLAT. This 
would considerably change the KYC balance of the internal STR-regime of the 
financial institution, and hence it was viewed that the MLAT should not carry 
this burden. This was of course a matter of emphasis, and it is worth noting that 
different financial institutions have different perspectives on this issue. For 
Drosia Bank, the locality of branch-level knowledge was more important for 
scrutinizing suspicious customers than a centralised software platform. It was 
viewed that the KYC responsibility lay mainly within individual branches.
Following the decision to build the CHIMERA system in-house, and which is now 
operational in its first implementation stage, specifications were discussed with a series 
of interviewees, both from the MLAT and the MIS Department of the Bank. An attempt
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is made here to consolidate the results of these interviews here in order to discuss some 
aspects of the software-functionality and its consequences:
1) The core function of CHIMERA (initially at least) was to provide a platform 
that would connect to all online systems of the Bank, but mainly 
POSEIDON. CHIMERA is essentially a database of suspicious names of 
individuals and companies that are consolidated and interrogated from other 
systems in the Bank. So far, three lists are used to feed information into 
CHIMERA; the intemal-updates of these lists customised for Drosia Bank 
can only be updated by the Money-Laundering Analysis team. These three 
lists currently are: the CFSP76 list from the European Union, the OFAC77 list 
from the United States, and a complementary list from the Bank of Greece 
that basically forwards FATF requirements and countries that are sanctioned 
(currently only Myanmar at the time of that implementation).
2) The CHIMERA system is not directly associated with profiling for money- 
laundering, and there are no immediate plans to attempt behavioural 
profiling within CHIMERA, other than to check for smurfing, which is done 
centrally once per week, but which is not within the function of the system 
itself. At a second phase of implementation, the CHIMERA system will 
provide for the monitoring of suspicious transactions, including identifying 
the thresholds at which transactions should be screened more carefully. 
However, this is likely to be delayed in its implementation because the full 
consequences of a possible -  and considerable — increase in the number of 
suspicious transaction reports. Profiling attempts, when they materialise, 
should be within the scope of the money-laundering analysis team where 
there is considerable intelligence about suspicious cases, namely those cases 
recorded on the Case Management System.
3) The focus in CHIMERA is essentially to interlink with POSEIDON. 
Transactions that are being performed by tellers are constantly cross-checked 
for name verification against the CHIMERA system. In case the customer is
76 http://ec.europa.eu/comm/extemal relations/cfsp/sanctions/list/consol-list.htm
77 http ://www .ustreas. gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/
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found in one of the suspicious lists then the transaction is automatically 
blocked and a chief-teller/manager has to be informed, and who then takes 
responsibility for further informing the MLAT of the incident.
4) It is useful here to note that one of the problems discussed was that the 
tellers always find the filing of a suspicious transaction report to be a 
cumbersome process, and one that takes considerable amount of their time. 
This was discussed in relation to the opportunity that was given to allow for 
the electronic submission of STRs via the CHIMERA system. Even though 
the MIS department of the Bank was in favour of integrating a module for 
the electronic submission of STRs by tellers, the MLAT and the Compliance 
department of the Bank were against this option, as it was (and still is) 
believed that it would considerably undermine the KYC process, which is 
considered to be paramount. Despite this however, the option of electronic 
reporting was built into the CHIMERA system for potential future 
implementation, but this would also require the development and 
implementation (along with training and use) of electronic signatures for 
employees, something that has not been provided thus far. Staff within the 
MLAT also wanted the electronic submission to go ahead as some of the 
handwritten reports were so badly written by the tellers that it took quite 
some time to figure out what the report was about.
Following the design and implementation of CHIMERA, a few problems started to 
emerge that are worth discussing in brief. Some of them were emergent, and others were 
due to organisational problems and lack of sufficient coordination. Despite the fact that 
the initial feed into the CHIMERA system of database information for the suspicious 
transaction lists was done automatically from the CFSP and other lists, and that the 
format in which the lists were available was the Extensible Markup Language 
(XML50" 1), which is considered to be the most interoperable format available in 
computing, no provision whatsoever was made initially for updating the list in an 
automatic fashion from the MIS department of the bank. It was believed that the initial 
feed of data would be a cumbersome process, and that consequently slight modifications 
would be required. This meant that the whole task of updating the CHIMERA system 
would have to be undertaken manually, and so the task was passed on to the MLAT.
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Following an interview with a manager in the MLAT it became evident that the original 
estimation that the updates to the CHIMERA system would be minimal, even though 
done manually, was an underestimate, to say the least. ‘Suspicious’ lists always entail 
the possibility of sudden explosions (in scandals like the one with the government of 
Belarus) and the manual input of the names and details of all those involved became a 
cumbersome process that took considerable time away from some critical working tasks 
and investigations. Furthermore, shortly after the CHIMERA implementation, it was 
realised that the Case Management System (CMS), where STRs from the branch 
network are recorded, also required die input of the suspicious names from the widely 
available lists. Difficulties in the way the CMS functions, but also failure to address the 
issue of the interoperation between CHIMERA and the CMS, meant not only that 
manual input from lists o f suspicious persons and organisations became unavoidable, 
but also that this process o f manually inputting was further duplicated in order to 
update both the CMS and CHIMERA, hence doing the exact same working task twice.
This lack of interoperation between the CMS and CHIMERA exposes further the lost 
potential of gathering intelligence on ML behaviour. The fact that the CMS contained 
details of all cases that have been investigated for money-laundering from the very 
beginning of operations of the Money-Laundering Analysis Team and the 
computerisation of their work, meant that there was a wealth of information that could 
have been exploited for intelligence purposes within the financial institution itself. 
Since the CHIMERA system was essentially a way to manage a particularly structured 
risk (with this risk being a scenario in which customers in any suspicious lists would 
attempt to transact with the bank), similar risk-management paths could have been 
drawn alternatively with the help of the CMS and/or with an interoperation between the 
CMS and CHIMERA. In negotiations between the MLAT and the MIS Department of 
the bank, this option however was never requested and an opportunity was missed for 
the integration and use of intelligence between the two systems (old and new).
But it was not only the CMS that was affected by the introduction of CHIMERA. The 
underlying functionality of CHIMERA interfered with the functionality of the Fast- 
Transmission of Electronic Messages (FTEM) system. The reasoning is simple; instead 
of sending messages that included suspicious names to all branches in the bank through
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the FTEM system, those names were simply loaded into CHIMERA. In case tellers 
attempted to carry out any transactions in which any of those names are involved, the 
transactions would be stopped by CHIMERA, the teller would be prompted to call for 
chief teller/manager’s assistance, and the latter would notify the MLAT for further 
advice. Despite the obvious overlap between the two systems, following a series of 
interviews post-CHIMERA implementation, it was clear that both systems were 
operating simultaneously and independently, and that CHIMERA had done little to 
replace the FTEM. The overlap however was striking, and the MLAT decided to 
examine whether the scale of usage of the FTEM in handling suspicious lists can be 
minimized. Going through the CHIMERA manual, and discussing this issue with 
someone from the MLAT, the reason that the overlap was hard to resolve became clear: 
the CHIMERA implementation that affected the online transactions of Drosia Bank was 
restricted to a series of transactions (transaction codes to be more specific, where for 
instance the act of depositing money into an ATM machine may constitute one single 
transaction code) that did not encompass the totality of the transaction codes within the 
bank. Coupled with the incompleteness of POSEIDON, with which CHIMERA was 
linked, a complex network of system interdependencies emerged in the handling of 
suspicious lists. It is worth noting that whereas there is only a handful of transaction 
codes that are checked online and real-time against the transactions that tellers attempt 
to carry out, the remainder of the transaction codes that are not linked to POSEIDON 
are checked against CHIMERA once a week for all the clientele of the Bank and for all 
transaction codes. In the event someone has not been spotted via other means, batch 
processing will uncover it, even if somewhat later; this is of no consequence since there 
is no requirement whatsoever that imposes a time frame for the reporting of suspicious 
transactions.
But even within individual transaction codes that were linked with CHIMERA, further 
unexpected problems emerged. The capacity to send SWIFT messages is such an 
example. Due to a particular structuring of the SWIFT messaging service, input must be 
constructed in Latin characters in individual lines that are checked one by one against 
CHIMERA. If the recipient is ‘DEMETIS INTERNATIONAL INDUSTRIAL 
COMPANY’ and due to the length of the name the last word (COMPANY) is moved to 
a next line of the SWIFT message then that is individually checked by CHIMERA 
against all suspicious entries that contain the word COMPANY within any of the lists -
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and clearly these are a substantial number (as many as are companies). All generate an 
alert! When this problem was realised, an exclusion of keywords from CHIMERA was 
deemed to be the optimal solution for resolving a large number of alerts in the online 
transacting system of the Bank, otherwise tellers would have to face an increasing 
number of alerts that did not correspond to any suspicion.
An additional problem that was realised in CHIMERA, insofar as it was interlinked 
with POSEIDON, was the matching of suspicious names provided in the lists of the EU, 
OF AC, etc, that are delivered in Latin-based characters, and with those kept within 
POSEIDON in Greek characters. An automatic routine was employed to convert the 
names from the Latin-characters to the Greek-characters within POSEIDON. A sample 
is provided below:
A A
B - » B
C - » K
D -> A
It was soon realised however that such an automatic conversion came with several 
problems. In a standard check for OSAMA BIN LADEN by using only the keyword 
LADEN in the system, and by typing the last name in Greek, an employee from the 
MLAT found that there was no alert whatsoever in any of the transacting codes. It was 
immediately obvious that something had gone wrong in the conversion of the name, and 
that had Osama bin Laden transacted with the financial institution by electronic means, 
the transaction would have gone unnoticed. Looking at the conversion list it became 
clear that in the particular scenario, the ‘D’ letter in the ‘LADEN’ would require two 
letters so that the pronunciation can equate to the English equivalent and that these two 
letters would be ‘NT’. Phonetically then, ‘D’ in English that is equivalent with ‘NT’ in 
Greek would require the conversion D-> NT. The problem was quickly rectified for 
CHIMERA in this case and the conversion was re-run.
But as with any automation (the example in this chapter in the initial feed of 
information into the POSEIDON system is typical), problems may percolate within the 
system that can only become obvious after the event. Let us suppose that the
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researcher’s name was in one of the suspicious lists, and an MLAT-member was 
looking for it in the CHIMERA system. Following the automation rule for LADEN then 
DEMETIS would have been ‘NTEMETIE’ whereas the spelling of my name in Greek 
would be ‘AEMETHL’. Here we observe the following:
D can be both A and NT. In such a scenario therefore, differentiation between the two 
requires an extra proxy that can be connected to the conversion of the name, another 
difference in itself. Nationality for example could be such an extra proxy for 
determining the difference of the difference, but it quickly becomes obvious that within 
any proxy there are other differences that would require other proxies in themselves. 
The problem of identity and establishing one’s identity is never as straightforward as 
some view it to be, and it is definitely not something to be seen as a unitary package. 
Identity is a set o f attributes that we use to refer to someone and therefore it depends 
upon the choice of attributes and their number. Particularly within the scope of 
language, and the multilingual needs that have been posed by globalisation at an 
alarming pace, interesting research is currently addressing this problem area78.
The problem, trivial as it may initially appear, becomes considerably more complicated 
by the vastness of data structures where trillions of records are stored, and require 
automation in their handling. No database is perfect and error-free, and as has already 
been mentioned, precisely because of the underlying complexity, databases in 
themselves degrade. New needs are developed that require a change in the structures, 
while the new needs require integration and interconnection with previous structures 
that are, in themselves, incomplete.
It then becomes obvious that interconnections and the interdependencies between any 
two systems that need to be connected pose both structured problems that must be 
studied thoroughly by analysts and resolved where possible, and also unstructured 
problems that emerge from the interaction between the systems and cannot be attributed 
to either system; the very act of interaction comes with complications that become far 
more important for the systems themselves and those that depend on their functionality.
78 A simple example o f  the problems faced by UPS in handling the multilingual challenge in an 
information system setting can be found at: http://www.cio.eom/archive/Q 11501/et.html
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The Electronic Updates System
As this chapter gradually concludes, right before some broader comments about the 
Drosia Bank are presented, and before we move on to the discussion, it is useful to note 
that a very important and interesting aspect in AML concerns the manner in which 
employees of the financial institution receive information and updates. Such updates 
involve changes in internal guidelines, policies of the bank, and various other AML- 
related news.
A system that is being used by employees to receive new information items is the 
Electronic Updates System (EUS). All employees have access to the EUS through the 
bank’s intranet. Next to each individual information item there is a box that the 
employee must tick to indicate that he or she has been informed of the specific 
information item: and the process is repeated ad nauseam.
Most of the remarks made by interviewees regarding the EUS pointed to the fact that it 
is very difficult to carry out a timely distribution of critical new information items or 
guidelines to the bank tellers, even when EUS is utilised. Tellers have an extremely 
limited amount of time at their disposal whilst working at the bank, and it has been 
observed that it is commonplace for employees (and in particular bank tellers) to 
acknowledge that they have read the relevant guidelines by ticking the boxes related to 
each guidelines, whereas in reality they had no time to read anything due to the time 
restrictions that they face. This becomes a considerable problem in day-to-day 
operations that remain one of the most vital fronts against Money Laundering. The EUS 
is meant to allow branch managers that have access both to the system to see whether 
their employees have been informed about the new information items, and to an 
analysis of who has been informed of what. However, branch managers too are 
confused about the functionality of this system (in conjunction with the time-restrictions 
that are in place) as they find it difficult to control the process and to make any sound 
inferences of who has been really informed of the new guidelines.
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Broader comments
Despite considerable delays in the improvement of the overall AML system in Greece, 
it becomes obvious that Drosia Bank has established considerable working processes 
around anti-money laundering, and the interests of the Bank often surpass mere 
compliance purposes. Genuine interest is shown in improving working life around 
AML, improving efficiency and effectiveness, and further targeting the problem domain 
that presents so many diverse challenges. It would be fair to say that all the interviewees 
in Drosia Bank saw the AML domain as a challenging, and the multiplicity of 
difficulties they are faced with as an interesting intellectual experience.
However, Drosia Bank is subject to different influences, some from within, and some 
from its immediate environment (i.e. FIU). Some brief comments were made in the 
beginning of this chapter regarding the situation of the Greek AML system. This was 
intentional, so that the discussion of the findings does not become de-contextualised 
from the immediate regulatory context. Being subjected to often unrealistic demands 
from prosecutors or FIU (such as providing all transactions from the time of opening of 
the account, and irrespective of any threshold), Drosia Bank unavoidably operates 
within a bureaucracy that is often posing considerable constraints, one that often 
restricts innovation because it preconditions the structure that needs to be considered 
before any change is done. This is something that also ‘helps’ and supports the creation 
of an internal bureaucracy that is required to sustain the working processes.
In this regard, the dispersed Information Systems that have been examined here in detail 
create a truly complex fabric of electronically-processed influences on Anti-Money 
Laundering in the operations of the Bank. As already discussed through various 
examples that include POSEIDON, the Bank’s Case Management System, and 
CHIMERA (amongst others), the AML processes that are supported by Information 
Systems succumb to a complexity, and they influence each other in ways that are often 
surprising. Such processes, the information that surrounds them, and their outcomes, are 
never straightforward in the causal sense; they recoil from each other, challenge each 
other, permit or deny each other, are blind to each other.
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In this regard, the study of the internal suspicious transaction reporting system has been 
considerably revealing. The extent of its asymmetry in the branch network of the Bank, 
the increase in the number of STRs, the respective consequences in information 
management, and its handling, demonstrate that variable degrees of analysis expose the 
interconnected problems in a different degree of granularity.
But this chapter finishes with the quotation that started it, the knowledge that what we 
have gained in discussing any knowledge-creating path cannot but include those things 
for which we remain ignorant. The only benefit that one can claim by such an 
examination is an increased confrontation with the systemic complexity of the case 
being examined; but the confrontation with such a complexity becomes a system in 
itself; it has to be reduced if it is to be communicated, and aspects of it utilized for 
decision-making changes within the system that employs its operations.
In the final chapter that follows, these aspects are brought together and the systemic 
complexity eventually confronted in the combination of systems theory as outlined in 
Chapter IV, and further expanded in the analysis, and in the multiple insights provided 
by the empirical findings in this present chapter. By laying down a theoretical path that 
confronts the way in which technology participates in the broader societal order, the 
links between Systems Theory, AML and technology were systemically expanded, 
while providing theoretical contributions in ST and practical contributions for AML.
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Chapter VI: Analysis & Discussion 
Chapter Structure
This final chapter deals with the analysis of the findings through the lens of systems 
theory by providing a theoretical synthesis that places AML and the case material of the 
previous Chapter V within the context of systems theoretical concepts as outlined in 
Chapter IV. A theoretical treatise is developed that constructs the Anti-Money 
Laundering domain as a system. Then the role of technology in the AML system is 
reflected upon (on the basis of empirical data collected and theoretical insights), thus 
dealing with the two research questions outlined in the very beginning of this 
dissertation. Following this treatise, theoretical contributions to Systems Theory are 
outlined and practical contributions to AML are further discussed. Finally, some 
conclusions are discussed, and considerations for further research are provided.
Introduction
The remainder of this dissertation must confront a considerable difficulty. Within the 
scope of analysis and discussion that will be carried out in this chapter, an attempt is 
made to synthesize the two distinct poles that have been presented thus far, and thence 
to bring together the core theoretical aspects of Systems Theory and the more practical 
aspects that have been outlined for Anti-Money Laundering. Amidst attempts to provide 
such a synthesis, some opening remarks will hopefully be of use to the reader by 
providing a set of clarifications for the analysis itself.
79 “All that I know is that I know nothing” (Socrates)
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The scope with which the synthesis between anti-money laundering and systems theory 
will occur is separated into two distinct phases. Firstly, some broader comments are 
provided on how Anti-Money Laundering can be viewed as a system through systems 
theory, while elaborating on the differences between AML-representations from 
different stakeholders. This builds on previous work that attempted for a first time to 
merge systems theory with AML (Angell and Demetis 2005). Secondly, following this 
initial step, such a description is re-visited to provide a novel re-conceptualisation of the 
AML domain by positioning Anti-Money Laundering within the systemic schema of the 
functional differentiation o f society, and clarifying how such a differentiation constructs 
AML in a completely different manner.
Finally, with the help of empirical evidence gathered throughout the case study, the role 
o f Information Systems within the construction o f Anti-Money Laundering is discussed, 
a description that will on many occasions rest upon the systems theoretical concepts that 
have been outlined in Chapter IV and the empirical data presented in Chapter V. This 
will manifest itself in different ways, in the descriptions given of the role of technology 
in the construction of the suspicious transaction reporting system, the communication of 
suspicious transaction reports, and also, the risk-based approach that has been the latest 
step within the evolution of regulatory initiatives.
The System of AML
While the word system has been one of the most abused, misused and misunderstood 
words of the English vocabulary, and one that has been hijacked from its initial 
theoretical provinces to be used in either various disciplines or in everyday life, there is 
nothing vague in the word system within the context of Systems Theory. Chapter IV has 
already outlined both the epistemological foundations that give rise to the concept of the 
system, and the interrelated theoretical concepts that the ontological presupposition of a 
system propagates (i.e. boundary, environment, etc). While it is true that the definition 
of a system is always an observer-relative process, and that an observer may define a 
system differently, there is much to gain from complementary insights. Nevertheless, 
such a systemic conditioning does not imply a change in the unit of analysis within 
research. Even though the unit of analysis within this dissertation can unavoidably be
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associated with the single financial institution that has constituted the case study (Drosia 
Bank), systemic considerations cannot be restricted to a unit of analysis for a series of 
reasons: no system exists in splendid isolation as analysed through the constitutive 
difference between system/environment; cause-and-effect relationships between 
systems and their environments are shattered by the forcefulness with which complexity 
replicates within systems and affects their environment.
Despite any differences amongst systems or subsystems, generalisations (and hence 
practical or theoretical contributions) generated with the help of systems theory exhibit 
increased cross-context and cross-system resilience. The abstract level of the systemic 
language itself and the foundations of systemic properties help to accommodate 
multiple specificities. In other words, one is allowed to be extremely specific in his or 
her descriptions regarding systemic properties while utilising an abstract vocabulary. 
There is nothing contradictory in that. Combinations of abstractions may cancel 
themselves out into creating specific descriptions that penetrate the heart of a problem 
domain.
All these systemic attributes imply that there is a considerable need to stray away from a 
tidy demarcation that is typically projected within the broader realm of Anti-Money 
Laundering. This demarcation projects a hierarchy of AML stakeholders that function 
according to well-specified rules, and where problems can be overcome by the 
specifying further rules, Within AML, such a projected hierarchical modus operandi is 
observed in various ways, although always implying a considerable degree of linearity. 
The governmental and regulatory views are typical of such a stance, whereby the 
broader AML System is neatly decomposed into three distinct levels, each containing a 
variety of organisations. These levels can be designated as follows: the local, the 
national, and the transnational.
Transnational organisations are responsible for norm-production, and hence are believed 
to be (and to a certain degree they are), constitutive of the broader AML domain itself. 
At the very least it needs to be recognized that they generate much of the initial 
momentum of acting on ML, regardless of what possibilities or mechanisms these 
transnational organisations control for the diffusion of such momentum and the 
monitoring of measures’ effectiveness. Examples of norm-producing institutions for
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Anti-Money Laundering range from the United Nations, to the Financial Action Task 
Force, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the International Monetary Fund, 
etc. Such institutions are supposed to have greater regulatory, administrative and 
supervisory powers than those at the national level, but such a statement could very well 
be viewed as an uninformed value-judgment that has merely been institutionalised and 
enforced by governmental momentum. ‘Greater’ power in this context becomes 
irrelevant. Does ‘greater’ power imply more ‘control’? If yes, then how is that ‘control’ 
supported? Even more importantly, to what degree do processes exist that counteract 
such a top-to-bottom demarcation of control, and do they create additional difficulties 
for the AML itself? We will see in due course how such processes come into being.
Following the transnational level, national level organisations are in this regard viewed 
as the next step within the three-level hierarchy of the broader Anti-Money Laundering 
domain. Organisations at this level have to comply with the norms that are set at an 
international level while they also monitor institutional stakeholders at local level. 
Examples of organisations at the national level would be: Central Banks, Financial 
Intelligence Units, Tax Collectors, Law Enforcement Agencies, Company Registrars, 
etc, while financial institutions, exchange bureaux, etc, constitute some examples of 
local stakeholders.
U nited Nations 
F A T L IM L IW L
Norm Diffusion 
C om pliance
Central Banks, 
FIUs, LEAs,_
Domestic Banks, 
Exchange Bureaux, _
II
Figure 6.1, The Standard Model o f the 3-tier hierarchy
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Such tidy hierarchical thinking of the broader Anti-Money Laundering domain is clearly 
an oversimplification of the complexity that resides within the domain itself. 
Recognition of such a complexity, which -  to a certain degree -  becomes irresistible 
due to the large number of stakeholders involved in the domain itself, creates the need 
for moving away from such a linear method of differentiating between AML-levels and 
moving towards a systemic description of their influences. This implies a considerable 
shift in focus, not merely a change in terminology. By adopting the systems theoretical 
approach one is forced to submit the AML domain to a variety of internal and external 
influences that have little or no planned effects on AML itself. The idea therefore 
behind the three-level hierarchy constituted by transnational, national and local 
stakeholders needs to be completely shattered. Similarly, the idea of norm-diffusion in 
the linear sense needs to be abandoned.
Systems cannot be described by such attributes. Levels become inappropriate. This 
means that the AML-system cannot be characterised as the totality of the local, national 
and transnational stakeholders. However, via the description of the systems theoretical 
lens, the system o f AML can be characterised as a complex array of subsystems (systems 
in themselves) that become prone to both positive and negative feedback exchanges 
between themselves, and that simultaneously oscillate the AML-system in different 
ways from a virtually non-existent equilibrium/reference state. Clear separation of these 
processes is impossible no matter what observer is utilised for identifying the AML 
system; for the unavoidability of systemic interpenetration cannot otherwise be 
accounted for.
The convenient myth that there is such a thing as an equilibrium state implies an 
observer that can observe the systemic totality o f AML without carrying out a single 
differentiation, and such an observer does not exist. One can only study the domain 
itself by carrying out an internal differentiation, hence automatically creating a 
distinction between what can be studied and what cannot; what can be observed, and 
what by necessity is left unobserved. By treating the stakeholders (say a financial 
institution) as systems, one needs to escape the edifice that is mere compliance of well- 
structured and formulated rules, and move towards an examination of the underlying 
processes and mechanisms that feed the complexity of the system itself. Systems then 
become ‘islands of reduced complexity’ as analysed in Chapter III; the reduction is
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necessary for observation to proceed, but that does not mean that there is a disregard for 
the complexity within the system. Quite the contrary; identification of internal processes 
(whether supported by technology or not) that generate complexity out of complexity, 
and ultimately, risk out of risk, become the centrepiece of discussion and analysis.
Within such a systemic approach, the tidy demarcation of AML levels collapses and 
gives rise to a loose assembly of institutional sub-systems, which are intended, through 
‘coordinated’ activities (but never controlled activities in the causal sense), to combat 
the phenomenon of money-laundering. The regulatory belief that these systems co-align 
to target money-laundering also collapses as an oversimplification that undermines the 
intrinsic systemic complexities within such systems. In this manner, and if we take a 
single organisation as an example (say a financial institution or any other AML 
stakeholder along with the environment within which that institution operates), another 
need comes into being: the need to '‘differentiate between organisations themselves (i.e. 
FATF, a Central Bank, a Domestic Bank) and the systems that emerge from the way 
these organisations operate. Each system is the totality o f all that emerges from an 
organization’s operations, and it is not restricted to a naive description via an 
organizational chart and a collection o f organizational documents’ (Angell and 
Demetis 2005). “A system is what it becomes, and not what it was intended to be.” 
(Angell 2000) Beyond the organisational aspects, if one considers the system of 
technology, which surpasses the mere technical domain of its installation, things 
become much more complicated as demonstrated by the variety of information systems 
and processes of AML in the case of Drosia Bank.
The interpenetration of systems within the domain of AML effectively means that no 
system is independent of other systems. Any given system at any given point in time is 
structurally coupled with a considerable multiplicity of other systems with which it co- 
evolves. AML itself is structurally coupled with ML in a form of co-evolution that 
brings the entire co-evolving structure (AML and ML) within the realm of self­
reference, and beyond the conventional ethical domain of good and evil. Furthermore, 
any assumption that there is a unity of purpose behind any such system implies a cause- 
and-effect process in controlling the outcomes, and that needs to be rejected. This 
means that by adopting the systemic way o f thinking, the common justification for the 
existence of AML that ML as a problem per se is bypassed by the systemic necessity of
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the system/environment difference, which points to the fact that one cannot exist 
without the other. Analytical differentiation, which is a prerequisite for observation, 
becomes an ontological coupling between AML and ML whereby their existences 
depend on each other. Such interpenetration, however, also implies confusion of 
purpose. This becomes widely observed in a variety of AML systems that wittingly or 
unwittingly counteract the ‘perceived goal’ of combating the phenomenon o f money 
laundering**11. This is often because sub-systems impose their own agendas that can 
often be contradictory to such a ‘perceived goal’, either because of increased 
complexity and the subsequent difficulty of controlling the outcomes of decision­
making processes, or simply because the outcome of their decision-making activities 
generates unexpected positive feedback. Such positive feedback tends to destabilise the 
working processes of another stakeholder within the AML System that is supposed to 
share the same goal of targeting ML.
An example from the United Kingdom can be viewed as typical of such a phenomenon, 
where the introduction of AML technologies (imposed by the Financial Services 
Authority80), as well as compliance-fear and financial fines, generated a positive
Q 1
feedback that left the FIU of the UK (the National Criminal Intelligence Service ) in a 
state of denial, swamped with STRs and forced either to prioritise the reports or to put 
them on hold, unable to cope with their volume. There is a backlog of STR processing 
of more than 8 to 10 months between the time a suspicious event is triggered and when 
it is actually forwarded to a Law Enforcement Agency (LEA)82, which is characteristic 
of the explosive complexity that can be witnessed, and one can only begin to imagine 
the organisational implications of such deficiencies (KPMG 2003).
Systemic considerations of such processes are therefore never straightforward. Such 
processes of interactivity, interdependence and co-evolution, exhibit a simultaneity of 
existence at various subsystems. As these subsystems interact in both structured and 
unstructured ways, their interaction generates emergent phenomena that can only
80 With the introduction of discussion paper DP22 by the Financial Services Authority (FSA), entitled 
Reducing Money Laundering Risk -  Know your customer and anti-money laundering monitoring, 
technology adoption for AML was on the table for discussion. Even though many financial institutions 
had already started looking into automated technological solutions for dealing with AML, this FSA 
initiative institutionalised the use of profiling (mostly) technology considerably.
81NCIS -  currently transformed as part of the Serious and Organised Crime Agency (SOCA)
82 In the UK, a total of 500 staff work for the 57 LEAs (!) have to cope with the forwarded STRs.
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become visible a posteriori the interaction. These complex interactions imply that the 
subsystems constantly interpenetrate each other.
As this constant interpenetration between systems, subsystems, etc, takes place, 
observers come along posing questions of the phenomena they observe within and 
between systems of interest. Then suddenly, systems acquire purpose, and questions are 
derived by observations: questions that target the phenomena, questions that observers 
attempt to resolve with unique answers (e.g. whether something is true or false). But 
questions with a binary resolution (true/false) can never satisfy the demands posed by 
the systems theoretical stance. Truth is forever elusive as ‘there are no hard distinctions 
between what is real and what is unreal, nor between what is true and what is false. A 
thing is not necessarily either true or false; it can be both true and false’ (Pinter 2005). It 
all depends on the observer who is employing his or her own operations of observations, 
and automatically leaves something unobserved (Luhmann 2002), while recognising 
that different observers can attempt different descriptions of any problem domain. On 
such occasions success or failure become equally irrelevant. The success or failure of 
any AML stakeholder is but an isolated incident within the vast gulag of underpinning 
complexities with which they operate and/or they help generate. Philosophically, this 
requires the complementary recognition that any function (such as success or failure in 
AML) is never an intrinsic characteristic o f the object o f study, the system that is being 
examined; it is always observer-relative and imposed (Searle 1995).
If we are to ask at this point, about the properties of the AML-system and how it may be 
described in general systemic terms, then a typical first response might be attempted as 
follows: the AML-system can be described as a system of considerable complexity, 
structurally coupled with ML in the form of a co-evolution, and deviating considerably 
from what is commonly perceived to be a tidy demarcation of hierarchically structured 
organisations that exchange data. However, as the systemic character of AML begins to 
unravel, it is clear that there is still a great deal to resolve.
What AML system? How does that ‘AML-system’ fit in with other systems, and what 
are those systems? How are they constituted, and how do they affect each other in the 
systemic sense? What are the properties of each such AML-system? What is its most
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fundamental characteristic? How do Information Systems come into the picture, and 
how do they affect the world of AML?
Following what has been discussed thus far in this first attempt to bring together some 
aspects of AML and systems theory, we will now delve deeper and ponder the 
fundamental questions outlined above, by turning to one of the most significant societal 
applications of systems theory: that of the functional differentiation of society, as 
described by Luhmann, a differentiation that does not, however, include technology in 
its account and influence. By seeking to outline and include this aspect, the aim is to 
extend Luhmann’s theoretical description by positioning technology within such a 
schema, and thereby describing how technology comes to affect society, within both the 
realm of Anti-Money Laundering, and the scope of a broader stratum of systems where 
technology penetrates their functions in fundamental ways.
The functional differentiation of society & the role of AML
Anti-Money Laundering does not exist in a void; as already discussed, it is structurally 
coupled with money-laundering in a multitude of ways, and the two co-evolve in ways 
that surpass both conventional descriptions of cause-and-effect, and its implied 
linearity. But there is another important and complementary aspect for describing the 
way in which AML becomes co-dependent with other societal systems, while 
preserving its own hypostasis. Such a description can be found in what has become 
known as the functional differentiation o f society into subsystems of an autopoietic 
nature (Luhmann 1995; Moeller 2006). As analysed in the Systems Theory chapter, 
autopoietic systems are systems that have the ability to make and re-make themselves 
by referring to their own functioning, and by utilising their own elements.
The functional differentiation of society into subsystems is informed by four essential 
assumptions:
i) there are functions that characterise the subsystems in themselves, and these 
functions become constitutive of a subsystem’s internal operations. 
Functions are different from hierarchies in that functions always synthesize a
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multitude of possibilities within the subsystems, and become an alternative 
form for expressing unity and difference.
ii) The system of society is considered to be -  within the systems theoretical 
approach for social sciences83 -  the predominant system to which all others 
refer, and into which all are incorporated; it is only the system of society that 
is operationally closed by the function of communication that is central for 
any societal aspect.
iii) Differentiations within society are those that give rise to the constitution of 
subsystems within it. Such subsystems also communicate in the societal 
sense, as this is the primary function of the society within which they are 
embedded. The importance of communication is intertwined with the 
existence of the subsystems upon which the system is operatively dependent. 
Without communication at the subsystemic level, communication between 
the system and its environment becomes non-existent. This implies that 
positive feedback generated by the environment would enter the system and 
would ultimately threaten the system’s survival. Prevention of such a self- 
destructive mechanism indicates that subsystems within society also equip 
themselves with additional forms, norms and codes of communication that 
become an intrinsic and representative characteristic of their own 
functioning. In this sense, communication itself becomes differentiated 
within the formation of subsystems, and two modes of communication can 
now be realised. One mode of communication is used within the subsystem 
and is utilised to communicate the function of the subsystem amongst its 
own stakeholders (other systems in themselves), and the other that allows the 
exchange of communication -  and hence codes -  between different 
subsystems of society like the political, the legal, or the economic.
iv) Following functions, society and differentiation, autopoiesis becomes one of 
the most important characteristics within the functional differentiation of 
society into subsystems, for without autopoiesis the subsystems lose their
83 As outlined in ‘Social Systems’ by Niklas Luhmann
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ability to ‘re-make themselves’ and reconstitute their elements, as they face 
the ambiguities of the environment with which they are coupled. Autopoietic 
systems are operatively closed, and in this sense they are autonomous 
systems (Luhmann 2005). A system in this sense cannot be more or less 
autopoietic; but it can be more or less complex (ibid).
With these initial comments regarding the functional differentiation of society into 
different subsystems, one can proceed into consolidating these above aspects in a 
definition for such a differentiation. According to Luhmann,
“ ‘Differentiation’ means the emergence of a particular subsystem of society by 
which the characteristics of system formation, especially autopoietic self­
reproduction, self-organization, structural determination and, along with all 
these, operational closure itself are realized” (Luhmann 2000).
However, it needs to be made clear that such a differentiation of society into subsystems 
is not a process that occurs as a top-to-bottom imposition, but rather it is guided -  at its 
initial stage -  by particular inventions that generate the differentiation, and hence make 
the constitution of subsystems necessary. One can observe then that,
“Unlike in the ancient European description of society, such as Plato’s theory of 
the politically ordered society (politeia, republic), this does not happen in the 
form of the division of a whole on the basis of essential differences between the 
parts. Indeed, differentiations in social evolution do not arise in this way, from 
above, as it were, but rather on the basis of very specific evolutionary 
achievements, such as the invention of coins, resulting in the differentiation of 
an economic system, or the invention of the concentration of power in political 
offices, resulting in the differentiation of a political system. In other words, what 
is needed is a productive differentiation which, in favourable conditions, leads to 
the emergence of systems to which the rest of society can only adapt” (ibid).
Within such a description of functional differentiation of society, the question that arises 
almost immediately is how AML as a system can be positioned within society. Can it 
even be characterised as a system? One can begin to suspect that AML refers to the 
economic system and hence can be described as just another system within the system 
of economy, but that doesn’t say much; even more importantly -  as far as this 
dissertation is concerned -  the positioning of technology within systems, and how 
technology comes to affect the construction of the AML system remains elusive. Is
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technology a system, and if so, how84? To attempt to resolve such issues within the 
systemic realm for AML, this dissertation resorts to the crucial issue of coding. In order 
to do that, it is important to see the interrelationships between the domain of AML and 
the attributes outlined above for autopoietic systems (function, differentiation and 
autopoiesis itself).
In this regard, and within the systemic scope of the functional differentiation of society, 
the system o f AML can only be characterised as a system within the specificity of the 
aforementioned attributes, and hence an elaboration of those becomes necessary. Once 
again, how one carries out such a differentiation implies an observer-relative 
positioning, and ultimately remains an act of choice. This is very much true for any 
system, but one must not go as far as to question the ontological hypostasis of systems. 
It needs to be emphasised that such an ontological positioning is clear; systems exist. 
The epistemological consequences, however, are another matter. The aspects that 
determine ‘how we know what we know’ regarding systems and their functioning 
become substantially imposed by the observations and differentiations selected. 
Therefore, the issue of how AML as a system gains its hypostasis is a different matter 
from how it can be analysed and researched. Whether and to what extent different 
observers perceive, construct, and analyse a different AML system is one thing; but to 
deny the ontological presuppositions that give rise to the AML system itself, including 
the institutional fabric of the political, legal and economic systems (we call them 
function-systems) that support the institutional realm of AML, would be a grave 
mistake. It is interesting to note, however, that the manner in which this institutional 
support is given is self-referential and even more so, autopoietic! All function-systems, 
the political, the legal, and the economic, constitute within themselves subsystems that 
refer to the projected function that a potential constitution of an AML system could 
attempt (targeting ML). Following functional systemic communications and interactions 
between these subsystems, what emerges can be described as the perceived single entity 
that we may call the AML system. Even though schematically oversimplified in Figure 
6.2 below (as is the case with any graphical representation), this description of the AML 
system strays away from the hierarchical mode of functioning depicted in Figure 6.1.
84 A first attempt to examine the systemic nature of technology was presented at the end of the Systems 
Theory Chapter where organisations and technology were described as a self-referential and co-evolving 
structures.
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The need for communication between the function-systems is essentially what destroys 
much o f the hierarchy and linearity. Function-systems have their own intrinsic 
complexity, but they allow for other function-systems to penetrate this complexity by 
means of communication. It is this communication then that becomes responsible for 
the emergence o f new ‘structures’.
P olitica l System
Figure 6.2: The functional differentiation o f AML
Even though, for the purpose of retaining analytic simplification, the predominant 
functional differentiation of the political, legal and economic systems describes these 
three as systems in themselves, that does not preclude the idea of them being subsystems 
within society. However, the subsystems indicated in the above graphical representation 
(a graph that again oversimplifies the issue) refer to the constitution of subsystems 
within the political, the legal, and the economic system. These subsystems express - by 
inter-communication - the systemic formation, constitution, representation, and 
sustainability of the AML system. The realisation of exploitation of the economic 
system had to be realised first of course — in what would become known as money 
laundering -  along with its societal consequences, before political power and legislation 
were introduced.
L eg a l Sijstein E conom ic System
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Such a functional differentiation implies that diffusion of norms is not following a 
hierarchical mode of organisation. Every system contributes in a different manner 
within the broader schema of the emergent AML system.
The political system expresses the initial momentum within the function that 
characterises the political system itself, that of power***111. The legal system contributes 
within its own function by constituting the illegality of particular acts and embedding 
within its system the expressions that can be further communicated for characterising 
the ontological status of money-laundering within the legal system itself (ontologies can 
be drawn differently, and hence that does not mean that the legal system defines money- 
laundering; this is merely a delusion that will become more evident later on). Finally, 
the economic system contributes by providing those organisational structures where the 
applicability of AML laws and regulations can be realised and implemented (financial 
institutions for example). Subsystems -  at this level -  indicate the unavoidable 
observation that not all of the political system is exercising its power for AML 
purposes; not all of legal codes refer to AML, and not all of economic functions are 
subjected to compliance with AML regulations. This does not mean that systemic 
interpenetration is absent; the possibility that other subsystems within any of the 
functionally-differentiated systems will be influenced by AML is not only present, but 
becomes unavoidable whenever a change within the AML system occurs. In this 
manner, different subsystems regroup and reorganise for the production of a change that 
may occur accidentally or in an unplanned fashion (triggered by the environment for 
instance ~ ML in this occasion), or planned by the AML system that communicates its 
deficiencies to itself within its own self-reference, and subsequently, automatically to all 
other systems (political, legal, economic) within which AML exists. Through such a 
complex array of interactions and communications, it becomes clear that neither 
hierarchies nor control mechanisms are appropriate for a systemic description of AML. 
The idea that the AML system is something separate, which can be manipulated, is 
therefore completely shattered. The AML system is neither static nor controllable in the 
cause-and-effect sense. This requires that the function-systems that come together for 
the emergence of the AML system cannot be static also; the relations they develop keep 
being negotiated systemically and it is this re-negotiation that contributes considerably 
to the self-referential evolution of the AML system itself.
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This emergence of the wider international AML system from the functional 
differentiation of society and the major function-systems that dominate it is something 
that was previously described to be self-referential. This deserves some further 
consideration even though the description of self-referentiality has been provided in 
Chapter IV. Now that the dissertation has incorporated the functional differentiation of 
society within the domain of systems theory in order to analyse the AML system as a 
system in its own right, the issue of how self-reference participates in this can be better 
articulated.
Consider the political system, which refers to its own operations, and hence is able to 
refer to its elements for the constitution of any subsystem within it. In this manner, it is 
self-referential, as are the legal and economic systems. By the ability of all these 
systems to refer to themselves (the primary concept of self-reference), they gain the 
capacity to carry out internal differentiations, and hence constitute other systems within 
themselves. In the particular scenario that has been examined, it is such a subsystemic 
constitution that results ultimately in the emergence of an AML system. This 
tremendous systemic capacity of self-reference implies that an emergent system (e.g. 
the AML system) acquires the property of self-reference out of the systems that 
communicate for the act of its systemic formation. In this way, the newly established 
self-referential system participates in a broader process that not only re-creates self­
reference out of self-reference, but in doing so, it also creates systems out of systems. 
Therefore the subsystems that come together for the emergence of the AML system 
harbour the possibility of uniquely determining the hypostasis of its self-reference, as 
the self-reference that characterises them serves the function o f  generating 
autopoiesis out o f  autopoiesis when relating to systemic formationI
This autopoietic transcendence from systems to systems implies that the autonomy of 
systems expressed through self-reference is passed on from other forms of functionally 
differentiated systems, which gifts the new systems with the property of autopoiesis. 
Systems equip the new systems with something that can solidify their autonomy and 
then systems merely compete with each other (and their environments) on the 
evolutionary advantages that they seek to gain from such interactivities.
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So what is that something that supports the autopoiesis of the AML system as described 
above? We have already seen how the AML system is differentiated within other 
systems of society, and how that differentiation helps to construct an emergent AML 
system when other function-systems like the political, legal and the economic contribute 
in the process of differentiation. But differentiation itself is not enough; autopoiesis 
needs to be present as a systemic characteristic of the new system, otherwise without the 
ability to ‘make itself the system ceases to exist.
Thus the autopoiesis of the AML system comes into being out of the autopoiesis of the 
systems that generate it. This renders autopoiesis itself insufficient for sustaining any 
system, as the property of autopoiesis would have to be complemented with a function 
that describes the specificity of what it is that any such system does. Of course, within 
the concept of autopoiesis we may find the general characteristics of self-organisation 
and the re-arrangement of a system’s elements and relations. However, beyond the 
concept of autopoiesis, it is the concept of function that represents a co-alignment of 
purpose at the subsystemic level, a purpose that is simultaneously expressed at the level 
where these subsystems are included (i.e. system). Elements and relations come to be 
aligned and re-aligned in order to serve (or destroy) the function with which observers 
equip systems.
The concept of function therefore is absolutely central to the constitution of the AML 
system. But what is the particular function of the AML system? Is it to combat ML? 
Clearly, that would be an understatement, given the structural coupling between the 
two. But what has been described thus far brings us to the realisation that within 
systemic formation (like the formation of the AML system), function, differentiation, 
and autopoiesis are equally necessary for the system’s existence and operative closure. 
They are created together. And in this event, as with any other system that comes into 
existence, there is something more that brings and holds together all three primary 
concepts (function, differentiation, autopoiesis). That something is what we designate 
the code of the system that is being differentiated.
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Coding
The issue of coding and the code that characterises a system lies at the core of this 
chapter. It will serve as a step towards combining systems theory, the formation of 
AML, and its systemic relationship with technology. First of all there might be a 
terminological ambiguity that needs to be resolved. The issue of coding has got 
absolutely nothing to do with computer coding. The latter process if required is always 
termed ‘computer programming’, so as to avoid any confusion.
A code within a system has a primary utility: communication. Communication takes 
two distinct forms based on the code: the code serves (1) to communicate the function 
of the system amongst its subsystems, and (2) to ensure that there is something that 
constitutes the fundamental difference being communicated from subsystem to 
subsystem in a self-referential fashion(hence maintaining and re-creating autopoiesis as 
described in Chapter IV). Regardless of the variety or complexity that subsystems may 
exhibit, they always have to refer to the code in one way or another. Each of these 
possibilities will be examined separately in order to make this point as clear as possible, 
and for this purpose the example of the legal system is used before turning to AML.
The code of the legal system for example is being determined inside the distinction of 
legal/non-legal. The code can only be established as the unity o f the distinction being 
systemically used in order to communicate the system's goals throughout all o f its 
subsystems and as a reference point to itself This means that whatever subsystems may 
exist within the - functionally differentiated from society in general -  system of law, 
such subsystems always communicate within the constraints of, and by the use of, the 
fundamental distinction between legal/non-legal.
This distinction between legal/non-legal that serves as the code of the legal system has 
considerable systemic implications, because ‘while the distinction between legal and 
illegal can be maintained for individual coding, the system as a unity can never decide 
the basis of what is legal or illegal. It can never apply the code to itself as a system. 
There is no foundational value establishing what is legal or illegal, only operations’ 
(Luhmann 2004). Therefore the code itself is foundational in system formations that are 
functionally-differentiated from society. As the code in itself characterises the primary
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function of differentiation of the system, it is impossible for the system to use the code 
to describe itself. This means for example that the distinction being used ‘enables the 
legal system to operate legally (!) by declaring that something is legal or against the 
law’ (Luhmann 2000). The code exposed in this way becomes the first expression of 
self-reference within the system, and also the foundational representation o f all 
autopoietic functioning without which the legal system would not be able to sustain 
itself, let alone become differentiated.
Within five major functionally-differentiated systems of society, the code in respect to
o r
each system is portrayed in the table below (Moeller 2006) :
The fact that the code cannot be applied by the system to itself is something that should 
place the concept of the code at the centrepiece of systemic formation (the act of 
formation of any system designated by an observer). If the system was able to apply the 
code that is constitutive o f the system’s differentiation, then that would mean that the 
system would be able to describe itself fully. However, that possibility of a system 
describing itself fully can only arise if the system uses its whole self for the description. 
That is tautological. It creates an entity with no connecting value, an entity that cannot 
be connected to any other. In recognising the importance of this problem, Luhmann 
remarks the following:
“If one tries to observe both sides of the distinction one uses at the same time, 
one sees a paradox -  that is to say, an entity without connective value. The
85 This is an adapted version o f  the table presented here in order to indicate only system and code
System
legal/illegal
government/oppositionPolitics
true/false
immanence/transcendence
Science
E conom y payment/non-payment
Figure 6.3. Codes and Systems: Fundamental unities o f distinction
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different is the same, the same is different. So what? First of all, this means that 
all knowledge and all action have to be founded on paradoxes and not on 
principles; on the self-referential unity of the positive and the negative -  that is, 
on an ontologically unqualifiable world. And if one splits the world into two 
marked and unmarked parts to be able to observe something, its unity becomes 
unobservable. The paradox is the visible indicator of invisibility. And since it 
represents the unity of the distinction required for the operation called 
observation, the operation itself remains invisible” (Luhmann 2002)
This makes the point of the primacy of a code for a function-system even more crucial. 
The code is not only a necessary paradox that cannot resolve itself (in being utilised by 
the system that incorporates it), but also a foundational aspect of the constitution of any 
system of knowledge and all action. Without this necessary initial asymmetry exposed 
by the fact that the code cannot be defined by the system, an asymmetry that takes the 
form of a paradox, the system would not have been able to expand itself or even 
communicate within its internal differentiations. The asymmetry induced by the 
introduction of the code within a system is a necessary prerequisite for the evolutionary 
steps the system will take in re-defining itself and exploiting its environment. In other 
words, asymmetry is a necessary pre-requisite for self-reference.
The very fact that asymmetry is a foundational prerequisite for self-reference places 
asymmetry at the very core of scientific evolution, and even more so, approximation, as 
an unavoidable consequence of this asymmetry. Without acceptance of such an 
asymmetry, self-reference cannot sustain itself, and collapses into a tautology. The 
whole scientific system would then become a series of tautological definitions that 
would escape application. But the moment an application takes place it implies a 
differentiation between what is being applied, and what ‘hosts ’ the imposition o f the 
application. That difference in itself is enough to form the basis upon which self­
reference can expand through new operations (and always through new asymmetries 
and approximations). Asymmetries therefore become a necessary prerequisite for 
sustaining self-reference.
Having dealt with the relationship between code and self-reference, it is now time to 
turn to the second most important role that the code helps to establish, that of 
communication between subsystems within the system. But that is not the only form of 
communication possible. The system, and any system, also communicates with its
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environment. If we again take the legal system as an example, then it becomes obvious 
that the legal system functionally differentiates itself from other systems in society by 
referring to its code (legal/non-legal). Systemic interpenetration requires that the legal 
system influences other functionally-differentiated systems of society (such as the 
economy) by ‘transmitting’ its code. The way in which this happens is through the 
depiction of the code into an instance of a notational schema that constitutes the means 
of communication, typically in the form of legal documents, articles, etc.
But even within the legal system, the code serves as a mode of communication between 
subsystems of the system itself. If we take the legal system as a whole then it becomes 
obvious that the subsystems within it also utilise the code legal/non-legal, as a means of 
both establishing and perceiving themselves as subsystems of the legal system (say a 
law firm). In this way subsystems become autopoietic, and they also gain the means of 
communicating with other subsystems within the system. The code of any system 
therefore plays a critical role. Regardless of how one may carry out internal 
differentiations within the legal system and hence attempt different subsystemic 
observations and interactions, the code remains primary to the concept of system and of 
any communication within that system. The code is what penetrates all subsystems 
within a functionally differentiated system, and is what ties together function, 
differentiation and autopoiesis o f the system itself
The code of the AML system
Making the utterance that there is such a thing as an ‘AML system’ and that that system 
is a system as outlined in the foundations of the systems theoretical aspects presented in 
Chapter IV and expanded here in the analysis, means that the AML system displays all 
of the attributes discussed in Chapter IV (such as self-reference, emergence, complexity, 
entropic and negentropic effects, etc), as well as those characteristics discussed above: 
function, differentiation, and autopoiesis. It also means that there is a code for the AML 
system with which the system is able to bring all these aspects together and hence 
function, differentiate and become autopoietic.
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As the aspects of how AML differentiates itself and becomes autopoietic have already 
been analysed within the schema of the functional differentiation of society, what is 
essentially left is establishing the code of the AML system and discovering how that 
code is applied within the system, thus creating its function, and in effect, the identity of 
the system. As Luhmann notes in his book on Risk regarding the applicability of the 
code and its relation to the system,
“Codes are abstract and universally applicable distinctions. Although formulated 
in terms of a distinction between a positive and a negative value, they contain no 
indication of which attribution is correct, the positive value or the negative one. 
Truth, for example, is no criterion for truth, and property is no criterion in the 
question of whether it is worthwhile acquiring or retaining it. It is only under the 
condition of openness towards both the positive and the negative condition that a 
social system can identify with a code. If this occurs, it means that the system 
recognizes as its own all operations that are guided by its own code -  and rejects 
all others. The system and the code are then firmly coupled. The code is the 
form with which the system distinguishes itself from the environment and 
organises its own operative closure” (Luhmann 1993)
In looking at what one might term an AML system in the systems theoretical sense and 
extrapolating from Luhmann’s important observation, there is only one abstract and 
universally applicable distinction within AML that at the same time can be formed 
within both a positive and a negative value. That is the difference between 
suspicious/non-suspicious, and hence it becomes evident that for the AML system, the 
code is the unity o f the distinction between suspicious/non-suspicious. This has further 
considerable implications on how the system itself enables communication amongst the 
subsystems within it.
From what has been discussed thus far regarding the issue of coding, we are now on 
track for elaborating the particular code for the AML system while examining various 
ways in which the code itself is influenced within the system of Anti-Money 
Laundering. The unity of the distinction between suspicious/non-suspicious which 
constitutes the code is first of all associated with the constitution of the AML system 
itself, and its emergence as a functionally differentiated system within society. As an 
abstract yet universally applicable (within the system) distinction, the code becomes 
applicable to all different subsystems within the AML system. As a fundamental code
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for the system (system and code are structurally coupled), it provides -  along with 
differentiation and autopoiesis -  the function of targeting money-laundering.
As with any other system that is designated by an observer, it is also the case with the 
system of AML that the code cannot be applied by the system to itself. Hence, applying 
Luhmann’s remarks to the AML system, there is no foundational value establishing 
what is suspicious/non-suspicious, there are only operations (ibid). This exposes the 
semantic problem of AML at its systemic core. It may be difficult to establish what is 
truly suspicious, but the operation takes place anyway otherwise the subsystemic 
functions are rendered redundant. They have to signal to other subsystems, and to the 
environment of the system to which they belong, that suspicious behaviour is 
communicated. In fact, as this is the required function of all AML subsystems, 
suspicion is established regardless of whether there is an underlying process to support 
its validity. What is difficult therefore is abandoning the other side of the distinction 
embodied in the code (/non-suspicious). As ‘truth is no criterion for truth and property 
is no criterion in the question of whether it is worthwhile acquiring or retaining it’ 
(ibid), so it is with suspicion: suspicion is no criterion for determining whether 
something is suspicious or not. The code of the AML system, being the unity of the 
distinction between suspicious/non-suspicious, never ceases to exist within AML; both 
sides to the distinction created by the terms suspicious and non-suspicious must be 
maintained. This may temporarily create a contradiction and a question may emerge: 
how is it that when something is identified as suspicious that the non-suspicious side is 
not eliminated, but is instead maintained?
At the philosophical level, the unity of the distinction remains intact as one presupposes 
the other for communication. At the pragmatic level where AML stakeholders operate, 
communication implies that new stakeholders within AML will be called either (1) to 
re-instate the distinction and establish further the side of it that had been communicated 
(say suspicious) or (2) to reverse the distinction and maintain the other side (non- 
suspicious in this case). The complex operations that come together in order to 
determine (not causally) whether it is one or the other side of the distinction that is 
communicated are considerably influenced by the different organisational structures and 
managerial circumstances within which AML individuals operate. These processes are
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also considerably influenced by technology and the complex informational processes 
that technology supports.
How the unity of the distinction that constitutes the AML-code is preserved can perhaps 
become clearer with the following example. Let us suppose we are examining the 
process of the monitoring of transactions, where a particular staff-member of a financial 
institution identifies as suspicious a single transaction (or series of transactions related 
to each other). The method for communicating such a suspicion is encapsulated within 
an STR. The function of the STR is then to generate and communicate a temporary 
asymmetry between suspicious/non-suspicious, hypothetically abandoning the non- 
suspicious side of the distinction and communicating suspicion alone. However, 
identification of suspicion by one stakeholder within a financial institution neither 
negates the code, nor dissolves the distinction between suspicious/non-suspicious. What 
it does is merely to create a temporary asymmetry in the distinction. When another 
stakeholder (say an MLRO) receives an STR, he/she is called to re-realise the 
distinction between suspicious/non-suspicious. The MLRO in this case does become 
aware of the initial intentionality of a staff member to communicate suspicion, and by 
deciding to forward the STR further to the FIU, the suspicious/non-suspicious 
distinction is equipped with another asymmetry towards the suspicious side of the 
distinction. This self-referential spiral of the distinction between suspicion/non­
suspicion can never be totally dissolved within the AML system. As long as 
communication amongst the subsystems of the AML system takes place, it is the 
asymmetry between suspicious/non-suspicious that is essentially reinforced. One of the 
two sides of the distinction is therefore strengthened while communication takes place 
within AML, but that communication does not negate the existence of the distinction 
itself. Until communication takes place between the AML system and the legal system, 
which will in turn create operations that will refer to its own code (legal/non-legal), ML 
prosecution cannot be justified. Even though the handling of the AML code within the 
AML system is indeed informed by what is legally defined to be money-laundering (e.g. 
through particular typologies), the code suspicious/non-suspicious becomes constructed 
in its own right within the AML system. The variety of examples discussed within the 
case study of Drosia Bank illustrate that this construction of the code suspicious/non- 
suspicious is supported by a number of complex (and often contradictory) processes. 
Even though it may be claimed that these processes are originally constructed by
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legislative stimuli (e.g. the legal system defines what processes are to take place and 
how ML should be handled), the variety of these processes and the complexity that their 
interactions recreate, become more impenetrable as their effects deepen. However, it is 
only the legal system, and in fact, the prosecution of an individual or networks of 
individuals that can determine whether an act can be classified as money-laundering (if 
individuals are eventually found guilty of ML).
With the introduction of the now infamous risk-based approach, which is supposed to 
provide an improvement in how the AML system handles its cases, the code plays a 
fundamental role in the construction of risk. Accepting that risk is always implied in the 
construction of the distinction between the terms ‘suspicious’ and ‘non-suspicious’, we 
can then observe how the communication of the distinction in the form of an STR, does 
not in fact collapse the distinction to its ‘suspicious’ part! In fact, and as noted in the 
sections above, the distinction between ‘suspicious’ and ‘non-suspicious’ has the 
potential of transcending different subsystems within the AML system. Technological 
support that automates the handling of suspicious transactions, compliance fear, as well 
as the issue of over-reporting are but a few elements that intensify the problem (Demetis 
and Angell 2006) . In the UK for example, as financial institutions and other 
stakeholders simply viewed the entire process as a ‘tick in the box’, they reported 
almost all possible suspicions under the fear of regulatory enforcement. Thereby, the 
risk was passed on to the FIU, whose staff could not be certain whether ‘real suspicion’ 
was being reported. They therefore, were being forced into re-realising the distinction 
between suspicious and non-suspicious, despite the fact that the STRs are supposed to 
communicate suspicion alone! The quality of the reports was therefore brought into 
question, and extra risk was introduced. The systemic implications of this need to be 
made clear: just because the distinction (suspicious/non-suspicious) collapses in the 
form o f an STR, which is supposed to identify only suspicious transactions, that does not 
mean that the distinction has disappeared (Demetis and Angell 2007). The distinction 
between suspicious/non-suspicious can re-surface again, and again, and again, and 
differently to every possible stakeholder operating within the AML system. The 
oversimplification, that STRs are there to indicate suspicion needs, to be re-considered; 
the preservation of the fundamental distinction between suspicious/non-suspicious has 
considerable implications for risk. Risk cannot therefore be specified or pointed out
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simply because it is categorised, even when the perception of risk is communicated; its 
re-genesis will transcend any system that attempts to manipulate it.
For a theoretical treatise on self-reference and risk as well as practical considerations 
please refer to:
Appendix I: A treatise o f the Risk-Based Approach with practical considerations
T he role o f technology in the A M L system
Before the role of technology is examined within the AML system along the lines 
described above, and on the basis of the empirical data collected within the scope of the 
case study in Drosia Bank, it is important First to ponder the question of the broader role 
of technology in modem society, and then to reflect on what consequences technology 
has had on the AML system. As it has become obvious in the systemic theorizing 
carried out in this chapter, the AML system transcends all subsystems within which the 
code suspicious/non-suspicious can be communicated. While the majority of the 
empirical findings have arisen from the case study, and therefore justified inferences 
can be attempted within the realm of financial institutions, this does not mean that the 
role and influence of technology stops there. Technology does have an important impact 
on FIUs as well, but to be able to detail such an assertion one would be required to carry 
out further research on two different fronts. One would assume the incorporation of 
technology within the FIU itself, and the consequences of utilising different information 
systems for coping with the work in the FIU. The other would require an investigation 
of how the generated complexity from information systems comes to bear upon the 
broader national AML system (part o f which is the FIU). In this latter case, an example 
is analysed further, based on data collected from the Greek FIU (see below).
One set o f consequences has become evident in Chapter V of the case study through the 
in-depth study and description of a variety of scenarios within which technology places 
itself and influences AML work within a financial institution. In trying to expand these
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inferences and to examine the interplay between information systems and human 
activity systems (such as prosecution of money launderers) some further data has been 
gathered on one more instance that systemically affects the FIU and prosecution 
authorities in Greece, and for which technology at the level of financial institutions 
remains crucial. Needless to say that the process of juxtaposing data collected at FIU 
level with data regarding prosecution of money-launderers in Greece was a painstaking 
process due to access restrictions. Despite the small amount of data that could be 
collected for this purpose, the systemic results are crucial and complementary to this 
dissertation. This work was carried out in order to support further the argument that 
technology is a system in its own right, both within the domain of AML that 
incorporates it, as well as in any other domain that is technologically supported.
In considering technology as a system within the realm of this structural yet 
constitutional differentiation between system and environment, a set of issues arises 
almost immediately. If technology is a system, then what is its environment? If 
technology is treated as a system within the schema of the functional differentiation of 
society, which has emerged in a bottom-to-top fashion from particular scientific 
breakthroughs (like the invention of the microchip), then in the environment of 
technology as a system would be other function-systems like the legal system, the 
financial system, and the political system. But in such a scenario wouldn’t technology 
refer to those systems (say a computer-based system designed to operate for the 
financial system), and hence collapse to a subordinate form  that loses much of its 
distinctive character? The answer to this question is no.
Technology resists much of its subordination to a collapsed form  of application in a 
multitude of ways, mostly by penetrating the core of other systems that attempt to 
manipulate it. Of course the systemic aspect of complexity analysed in systems theory 
could be alluded to here, or indeed, the law of unintended consequences that stems from 
such a complexity. But there is something more to the phenomena that technology helps 
generate.
Interpenetration of other systems with the system of technology implies a fundamental 
consideration that should not be underestimated. It implies that technology -  with its 
distinctive character -  counteracts top-to-bottom processes of other systems that attempt
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to employ technology as form by generating bottom-to-top processes that display a 
unique set of properties and that elevate technology from form  to system. The concept of 
form  in this regard implies a subordination and control of technology by individuals and 
organisations that adopt technology for application in a particular problem domain. 
Contrary to form, the concept of system, when referring to technology, implies that 
technology retains all of its systemic attributes regardless o f the problem domain that it 
might be structurally coupled with, and that the influence that technology has in any 
problem domain lies in retaining this systemic character. Therefore, to see technology as 
system in its own right, differentiates the role that technology comes to play within any 
given problem domain.
Furthermore, the question becomes different within the tradition of second order 
cybernetics employed within this dissertation (mostly by referring to the works of 
Niklas Luhmann). What is the observing system that is able to differentiate between 
form and system insofar as technology is related to the observation being made? What 
makes current beliefs mostly reduce this differentiation regarding technology as form, 
and what is to be gained in examining the underlying processes in restructuring this 
difference?
In order to remain true to the core principles of second order cybernetics, the issues of 
observation and system (whether a function-system or not) need to be treated as 
intrinsically related. The constitution of any system must be, above all, an observer- 
relative act. Function-systems may of course be separated on the basis of purely 
analytical targets, but this in itself constitutes a form of simplification at the core of 
function-systems themselves; a paradox coming from an observational simplification 
that makes observation possible in the first instance. The possibility for an artificial 
differentiation and separation of function-systems is somewhat countered by the 
concept of interpenetration and observation. This affects not only the systemic character 
of technology but also its code.
It is precisely at this point that this dissertation departs from Luhmann’s perspective in 
order to expand the systemic treatise of social systems (like AML) by treating 
technology as a system in its own right, while examining their interplay. There is ample 
support for taking such a perspective following the implications studied in the empirical
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data collected throughout the case study and presented in Chapter V. Theorizing about 
the systemic nature of technology (and complementing it with further data), this 
dissertation seeks a theoretical contribution at the level where technology systemically 
affects other functionally differentiated systems.
Despite the vast theoretical rigour displayed in Luhmann’s works, Luhmann has little to 
say about the role that technology has come to play in modem society and in affecting 
systems within it. Before the properties that can be attributable to the systemic character 
of technology are examined by drawing from primary concepts of systems theory, like 
those of system/environment, observation, and self-reference, it would be prudent first 
to test Luhmann’s perspective on technology , which is mostly depicted within his 
notion of functional simplification and closure. Resolution of the dilemma behind form 
and system cannot be dealt with without reflecting upon these concepts.
Functional simplification is a term that implies a reduction of an initial complexity that 
is subsequently streamlined within the realm of computer-based technologies. Closure 
implies ‘the construction of a kind of protective cocoon that is placed around the 
selected causal sequences or processes to safeguard undesired interference and ensure 
their repeatable and reliable operation’ (Kallinikos 2006). But to what extent does 
functional simplification and closure accurately describe the Geist of technology?
Here, it is claimed that functional simplification and closure remain considerably 
insufficient in describing the role that technology stimulates within modernity. The 
underlying assumptions behind functional simplification and closure imply that 
technology is subordinate to the initial reduction of complexity chosen by any one 
observer, while technology itself restricts its consequences and becomes devoid of 
observations. This does not agree with the theoretical stance developed in this 
dissertation, and so an explanation will be provided straightaway.
Almost immediately, the above implication raises the question of whether machines can 
observe. This has to be treated differently in how observation operates within the realm 
of humans compared with that of machines. Inasmuch as observation is reflexively
86 Indeed Niklas Luhmann has not extensively analysed technology but has focused instead on primary 
aspects around it.
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related to cognition, then machines can never observe, for they have neither the 
cognition nor the intelligence that comes with it. Intelligence in this regard is not 
logical, but biological (Angell, 1993). The evolution of such intelligence may very well 
be a product of both logical and biological operations, but never purely a logical one. It 
is the spontaneity in the generation of distinctions that ultimately guides observation 
and becomes the guiding factor in an emergent cognition (such as that of humanity) 
over its evolution, and which differentiates thinking from a purely reductionist approach 
to constructing a ‘cognition’. Since machines are restricted to carrying out simulations 
of logical operations, then how can they possibly observe, and why should we treat their 
so-called ‘observation’ as anything more than mere data collection, and a set of pre­
programmed actions?
Nevertheless, there is one particular reason for assuming that technology does have 
some observational capacities, but only in the self-referential world of computation. 
This is because that world is one of excessive scale, information overload, and induced 
complexity that cannot be ‘observed’ by humanity, only by machine. This implies that 
technology becomes -  to a large degree -  impenetrable and that this is precisely what 
grants technology a systemic character that is much more complicated that the picture 
portrayed by Luhmann, whereby technology is merely a form that hosts other functional 
simplifications. The fact that ‘observation’ by technology (say in the form of algorithms 
or a technology used in a financial institution for profiling ML) is devoid of all 
spontaneity and cognition, and does little to reduce the systemic character of technology 
itself.
The difference in how the term ‘observation’ comes to mean different things within the 
two distinct domains of man and machine can now be better articulated and considered: 
while humans possess a spontaneity in the generation of distinctions (though limited by 
sense-making restrictions and cultural biases), machines cannot spontaneously generate 
distinctions without a computational and engineered platform that will guide the process 
of generating distinctions. Computers may, of course, adjust, distort, manipulate the 
distinctions, but the rules for such adjusting, distorting, and manipulating (ultimately for 
data collection and for a purpose) are pre-engineered constructs.
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Ultimately machines cannot think purposefully. Their non-cognition implies an 
Artificial un-Intelligence, and this is precisely their strength. Without non-cognition and 
un-intelligence, the machine operations that we now characterise as linear and 
automated would have been impossible. This is not to be taken as a patronising 
assertion, or indeed as a celebration of the superiority of human-kind. Humans view 
machines to be intelligent because machines are unintelligent. Machines thrive on 
linearity and automation. They streamline the logical predetermined paths that are pre­
programmed to perform certain functions or operations. The inability of humans to 
perform large-scale automated operations quickly (say trillions of calculations per 
second) profoundly distorts our concept of intelligence, so that we believe machines can 
be eventually infused with a self-determined purpose. Consequently the mundane 
automation of tasks is elevated to something beyond mere processing.
Ironically, it is precisely this capacity for automation encapsulated by technology that 
creates its systemic character. Technology as a system can then be characterised by all 
the systemic attributes put forward in Chapter IV and here. Technology as a system is 
above all a self-referential system. Technology refers to itself in two distinct and general 
ways. One way involves technology influencing another technology (much like an 
information system in a financial institution influencing another information system 
within the same institution -  this is supported by the majority of examples given in the 
Drosia Bank case study. Another way involves connections between any technological 
artefact and itself, a self-referential system that evolves on the basis of information it 
receives from its environment. Interpenetration becomes evident between these two 
ways of technological self-reference.
An example here might help in clarifying this matter. Referring to a particular 
stakeholder (say a financial institution), technology as a system that influences the 
stakeholder essentially sets itself up in order to receive information of a particular type, 
such as financial transactions. Technology as a system then further structures this 
delimitation. Even more importantly, technology serves the function of auto’mation, a 
function held together by the systemic code o f technology, the unity o f the distinction 
between automation/non-automation.
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Systemically then, and based on the foundations of observation, the code of technology 
is no different than the form of any other code. It is an abstract distinction for which 
both sides to the distinction are necessary. It is also universally applied within the 
system of technology, as every technology has to incorporate both automation and non­
automation. In constituting a system then, and much like observation that automatically 
implies non-observation of something else, the very act of constructing a technology 
implies that what is determined to be automated within the realm of a single 
technological artefact, immediately leaves non-automated elements that become 
constitutive of technology itself, and without which selection of automation and thereby 
the initial reduction of complexity would have been impossible.
As nothing can be considered in splendid isolation, technology too cannot be seen to be 
systemically removed from the other systems that incorporate it, or outside of the 
multiplicity of interactions that it fosters. As it has become evident from the empirical 
findings, when different technological artefacts come together (either wittingly by their 
designers or unwittingly by circumstances of systemic interpenetration and complexity), 
the process of reflecting upon the distinction between automation/non-automation 
becomes considerably more complicated, but illuminating nevertheless. In the case of 
Drosia Bank, this process is considerably revealed by the exposition of the POSEIDON 
information system that still is the most central information system in day-to-day 
operations.
As in the case of POSEIDON, it becomes evident that systemically, all problems start 
with an assumed unity (or rather the delusion of a perceived singularity). A false 
impression may initially be given that POSEIDON constitutes a single information 
system with neatly categorised informational consequences. However, in the research 
carried out in Drosia Bank, it has become evident that underneath the presumed unity of 
the POSEIDON information system lies a much more complex picture that cannot be 
easily decomposed or even fully resolved to the benefit of the organisation itself in its 
use of this important information system for transacting, marketing, and other purposes. 
In this example, analysed fully in Chapter V, it became evident that the underlying 
complexity of informational requirements and restrictions that created POSEIDON 
came from a variety of other ‘singularities’; other information systems with other 
targets, scope and applicability. Examples in those systems that influenced POSEIDON
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included: card-data that were fed into the new system; previous legacy systems in 
different formats; as well as continuous interactions by staff members with POSEIDON 
that fed the system with multiple unique-identifiers of customers and wrong typologies.
Thus, information systems and their interaction play an important role in shaping the 
unity of the distinction between automation/non-automation. As each information 
system operated with its own set of rules for dealing with this distinction (rules that 
were affected considerably by designer choices, the needs of the financial institution, 
and technological and regulatory evolution), interpenetration -  or actually forced 
interpenetration for centralisation purposes that ended up in what is now known as 
POSEIDON -  brought out precisely this distinction between automation/non­
automation.
Along with the introduction of POSEIDON, new needs were therefore developed. 
Within the realm of the new technology coming along to serve new needs, it became 
almost inevitable that information elements, which were not considered in previous 
systems (and were hence left non-automated), had to be considered in light of 
POSEIDON. However, these non-automated information elements were structurally 
coupled with those that were automated, and further structured in a particular format. 
This observed interpenetration between old and new information items, which was re­
constructed as a necessity during the creation of POSEIDON, created a variety of 
further problems. The starkest of all problems coming with the existence of POSEIDON 
was that of multiple unique identification numbers for a large number of customers, a 
problem that was effectively countering the original purpose for constructing the 
system!
From a purely operational perspective, none of this affected the customers of the 
financial institution itself, as there were no implications for their banking transactions. 
The system had to be fully operational or otherwise daily business would have been 
non-existent. However, the emergent problems that came with the introduction of 
POSEIDON did create a number of difficulties for the Money Laundering Analysis 
Team. These ranged from establishing identity, investigating customers’ total financial 
positions and transactions, etc. On a number of occasions, time consuming AML 
investigations thus became even more problematic; something that led to the utilisation
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of other information systems (like the FTEM analysed in Chapter V). Complexity of a 
newly-established informational base grew out of the complexity of a pre-established 
one.
With this example in mind, and the myriad other examples coming from the case study, 
it becomes evident that functional simplification and closure remain insufficient for 
capturing the systemic dynamics that technology brings into play. Technology becomes 
a system in itself, and retains a distinct systemic character that considerably affects the 
context within which it is embedded. The relationship then between the two systems of 
interest here, namely that of Anti-Money Laundering and Technology, can be framed on 
the basis of the coding interactions, as portrayed in the image below:
AML Technology
suspicious automation
non-suspicious non-automation
M
Systemic Interpenetration ami coding interference
Figure 6.4. Interpenetration between the systems o f AML and technology
The consequences in such a systemic interpenetration become evident on the basis of 
the two unities of distinctions that are framed for each system respectively. For the 
Anti-Money Laundering system, the major distinction that is communicated is the 
distinction between suspicious/non-suspicious, while for the system of technology this 
distinction captures the difference between automation/non-automation. Systemically, 
linear analogies here should be avoided. This means that a direct relationship between 
what is technologically automated and utilised by the AML system, does not 
immediately relate to suspicion. The same analogy can be drawn between non-suspicion 
and non-automation. Such an analogy would imply that the interpenetration between the 
two domains does not follow a direct correspondence or any causal pattern. Not only 
does the possibility arise that both suspicions may be left non-automated, and non­
suspicion automated, but also that this possibility is in fact a necessary precondition for
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the interpenetration of the two systems. Both sides of the distinction to each respective 
systems (AML and technology) are always present.
In the example of the CHIMERA system, which became the first automated system to 
consider some filtering on the basis of lists like OFAC, CFSP, BoG, etc, and thereby to 
determine suspicion, the seemingly simple differentiation on the basis of the unity 
between suspicion/non-suspicion quickly generated complexity for other information 
systems that were affected by the introduction of CHIMERA, or that were affected by 
CHIMERA itself. A variety of other issues directly or indirectly affected the CHIMERA 
system. The SWIFT messages service problem analysed as an example in the case study 
(by pointing to the exclusion of keywords) was such an issue, only to be followed by 
language conversion issues, and a variety of complex patterns of interactions between 
AML and technology. Furthermore, shortly after the implementation of CHIMERA, it 
was realised that the Case Management System (CMS), where STRs from the branch 
network are recorded, also required the input of names of suspected persons, names that
o ' 7
were aggregated into widely available lists . Duplication of manual inputting of the 
names on those lists of suspects became unavoidable, and another layer of complexity 
was added for the MLAT to deal with. The obvious overlap with the FTEM system was 
also deemed to be problematic, however as a variety of typologies were not covered in 
POSEIDON, problems in the simultaneous operation of the two systems became 
unavoidable.
FTEM
: m s
POSEIDON
Figure. 6.5 CHIMERA influences
87 The practice o f  blacklisting individuals particularly for Terrorist-Financing has received some 
considerable criticism lately from the European Commission where it was stated that the ‘procedures used 
by the UN Security Council for blacklisting individuals are “totally arbitrary and have no credibility 
whatsoever”:
http://assemblv.coe.int/ASP/Press/StopPressView.asp?ID= 1972.
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One can observe that with the introduction of yet another information system relating to 
AML, the systemic emergent complexity increases considerably. This is in no small part 
due to the considerable interactions and interdependencies that any given system creates 
and generates. This emergent complexity, however, also stands as an opportunity to 
ponder the broader effects that technology has in the AML-system.
Within Drosia Bank a small part of this influence was demonstrated in the skyrocketing 
of the number of suspicious transaction reports year after year. The example for that 
bank in experiencing such an increase is portrayed again below in Figure 6.6 that was 
constructed for the purposes of Chapter V, and put forward here again to make another 
important connection regarding the increase of STRs.
S T R s re ce iv e d  from  b ra n c h e s
-■III
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Year
Figure 6.6.: STR increase in Drosia Bank
Beyond the increased vigilance and training that staff members in Drosia Bank have 
had, one cannot but include technology as systemically organising the increase of 
suspicious transaction reports for a number of reasons (within this individual financial 
institution). The CHIMERA system was explicitly designed for such a purpose and 
integrated within POSEIDON. But long before that, the FTEM system communicated
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possibilities for suspicious names that could be further investigated at branch level, 
while at the same time serving as a reminder of the need for AML vigilance.
This increase in the number of suspicious transaction reports within the financial 
institution being examined is of course something that has alarmed the compliance 
officer and the management of the Money Laundering Analysis Team. To deal with this 
problem, as was previously noted, additional resources have been requested, and the 
MLAT has nearly doubled in size within a period of two years.
However, in taking a closer look at this problem of STR growth, an additional question 
was raised along the lines of the core research interests of this dissertation, and for 
which further data were sought at a national level. The question had two important 
parts. Is the increase witnessed internally in this single financial institution, typical of 
the whole Greek Banking sector? Has the number of STRs increased overall at the 
receiving end (the Greek FIU), and if yes, what has been the corresponding prosecution 
rates?
AML -  ‘islands of reduced complexity’
In attempting to answer these two further questions, and to reflect on this particular 
systemic aspect, relevant data were sought from the authority that was responsible and 
involved in both AML and prosecution. The data therefore that needed to be collected 
involved both:
a. Aggregate data on the total number o f STRs received by the Greek FIU per year. 
The STRs in this case came from the totality of financial institutions that 
submitted their STRs to the FIU. The data was in aggregate-form and therefore 
it was not possible to discover how many STRs came from specific and 
identifiable financial institutions.
b. Aggregate data on the total number o f prosecutions for ML per year
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Two issues that restricted a deeper line of inquiry emerged. First, due to access 
restrictions it was not possible to aggregate the information regarding conviction rates 
in ML cases being prosecuted. Second, the period for which aggregate data were 
provided on both data sources referred to the 4-year period from 1999 to 2002. While it 
was not possible to retrieve further data on this matter, the data for this period remain 
representative of the Greek AML system.
Below, figure 6.7 presents the consolidation of these two sources that were disclosed to 
me during my research. The blue column represents the number of disclosures to the 
Greek FIU in the form of STRs, while the purple column represents the number of 
prosecutions for each corresponding year. The horizontal axis refers to the particular 
years for which data were provided.
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Figure. 6.7 -  Disclosures/Prosecutions for the Greek AML system
One cannot but observe in this figure 6.7 that while the number o f suspicious 
transaction reports was nearly doubling over the period of 4 years, the number of 
prosecutions remained nearly static.
Number of disclosures to the Greek FIU
1999 2000 2001 2002
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A series of important considerations can be attempted in light of this finding and 
Systems Theory can once again bring this observation into some perspective through 
what was analysed in the Chapter IV, namely the concept of systems as ‘islands of 
reduced complexity’. In order to evoke this concept, and to apply it in the particular 
circumstance, we require a differentiation between two further systems within the 
totality of the AML system. Having previously established that systems are observer- 
relative entities, we can further create the difference between the system o f generating 
AML-cases and the system o f prosecuting ML-cases. In this case, both systems would 
themselves be ‘islands of reduced complexity’, and the only consideration to be made 
analytically would be how the complexity of one system feeds forward to the 
complexity of the other. The major difference between the two systems, however, lies 
precisely in the possibility of technological incorporation that manifests itself, once 
more, through the distinction between automation/non-automation. While the system of 
generating AML-cases mostly refers to financial institutions that submit their STRs to 
the FIU and that are heavily influenced by an underlying stratum of technological 
implementations, the system of ML-prosecutions unavoidably rests on manual 
processes. In effect, the system of ML-prosecutions can be characterised as a human- 
activity system that re-examines the code-distinction of the legal system (that being the 
difference between legal/illegal) in order to determine whether to proceed with a 
prosecution or not.
As a human activity system, the legal system faces a restriction that is not present in the 
system of AML-cases: its capacity for information processing is further limited by the 
manual processes that are a prerequisite for the system’s own functioning and 
constitution. This creates another reduction of complexity that is not to be 
underestimated. First, the system is limited in itself as an ‘island of reduced 
complexity’, the moment it is identified as a system by any one observer studying it. 
Second, another reduction of complexity is imposed by the system with which it is 
structurally coupled (e.g. in this case that would be the system of generating AML- 
cases). This imposition of a further reduction of complexity is carried out by reframing 
the code-distinction between automation/non-automation. While the system o f  
generating AML-cases activates the distinction between automation/non-automation, 
and this activation impacts on how STRs are being generated within individual financial
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institutions, for the system that is attempting prosecution of ML-cases the distinction 
between automation/non-automation is only a background.
Systemically then, this implies that the system of generating AML-cases, with the 
possibility of incorporating technology and utilising the distinction between 
automation/non-automation, affects the proper function of the system of ML- 
prosecutions, which is acting on its own code (prosecution/non-prosecution). With the 
information processing capacity of the latter system in mind, the volume o f submitted 
STRs remains practically irrelevant. As an ‘island of reduced complexity’ itself, and 
even further, one facing a double-reduction in complexity, the system of ML- 
prosecutions faces an ever greater problem. Systemically, not only is one forced to 
admit that this reduction of complexity constitutes a necessary systemic prerequisite to 
the very act of defining a system, but that the mode o f functioning o f the system itself is 
influenced by the mode with which other systems treat their own complexity generation
o o
(and reduction! ). Amongst an increasing white noise that is therefore being generated 
by the system of AML-cases where financial institutions submit their STRs, the system 
of ML-prosecutions finds it even harder to operate. It must be pointed out here that the 
researcher found it at very least ironic that some FIUs (e.g. AUSTRAC ) proudly 
proclaim an increase in the volume o f STRs as if such an increase in itself constitutes a 
measure of the effectiveness of the national AML system. It is interesting here to note 
that in Australia, 10.7million STRs in the year 2005 led to 1,743 investigations, a mere 
percentage of 0.016% of the total number of reports, the same percentage as for 2002- 
2003. In previous years this was at 0.02 per cent for 2001-2002 and 0.009 per cent for 
2000-2001, namely roughly the same insignificant order of magnitude. In Japan, to 
bring up another example, 98,935 STRs led to only 18 prosecutions90.
Exploring this dynamic behind the interaction of generated STRs and prosecutions 
raises the potential of theorizing further on the systemic nature of both technology and 
its interaction with AML, as well as regarding AML as a system in itself. This first 
points towards the aspect -  through observation -  that the designation o f an entity like
88 Reduction o f  complexity in one system may o f  course trigger an increase in the complexity o f  another 
as in this case.
89 The Australian FIU even congratulated the UK FIU (former NCIS, now SOCA) upon an increase in the 
number o f  STRs received year after year.
90 http://www.fsa.go.jp/en/index.html
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‘the totality of the AML system’ becomes paradoxical for analytic purposes. The 
somewhat fashionable and recent term that the world of AML has adopted, that of a 
‘holistic’ approach in AML, is therefore misguided; the ‘total’ can only be identified by 
exclusion of something else; no observation within that hypothetical ‘totality’ can take 
place without another internal differentiation that would re-assimilate the difference 
between system/environment. This may apparently create a series of problems, but one 
way to reframe this is by asking: once the AML system has been identified as the 
system to be studied, what potential internal differentiations can a researcher attempt in 
order to observe instances of AML subsystems, and where possible, to generalise these 
instances into properties of the system itself as emergent phenomena?
Following on from the role that technology comes to play in AML, in the example 
exploring the relationship between the number of STRs received in Greece and the 
number of prosecutions, it becomes evident that the description developed in Chapter 
IV, where systems were seen as ‘islands of reduced complexity’, can be seen differently 
and expanded to include technological effects. Technology reconstructs the initial 
reduction of complexity that comes with defining a system as an ‘island of reduced 
complexity’. Technology reconstructs the methods for the reduction of complexity 
through automation/non-automation, and has considerable effects on other systems with 
which it becomes coupled. While aspects of reduced complexity within the 
technological realm can be hinted at with Luhmann’s concepts of functional 
simplification, they do remain insufficient once interactivities between systems are 
further taken into account.
This implies that the interaction between systems of technology and human activity 
systems (like in the aforementioned example between the systems of generating AML- 
cases and AML-prosecutions) can generate considerable asymmetries in the handling of 
a problem domain like ML. Technology for example, through the application of its code 
on automation/non-automation, and its interaction with a problem domain like AML, 
comes to reduce the complexity of the system that it is supposed to counteract (like ML 
through profiling software, data mining platforms, behavioural modelling exercises, etc) 
simply by automating aspects of ML (and of course, automatically leaving some other 
aspects non-automated). This however must not in any way be taken as a causal 
mechanism; the delusion of linearity at the level of technology creates a multitude of
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complexities for the system of AML, regardless of the subsystems that one may 
designate. This implies that a necessary reduction of complexity in one subsystem may 
lead to an increase of complexity in another subsystem within the broader system 
examined.
The increase of STRs prevalent within a number of different national AML systems 
worldwide, and supported to a large degree by technological implementations at various 
levels, becomes a background of white noise to other subsystems that have limited 
information processing capacities (through their own modes of reduced complexity). At 
the same time, technological implementations generate an increasing complexity within 
which other subsystems operate. Hence, an increase in STRs, supported by technology, 
introduces more and more white noise, more and more complexity, and within the 
generation of such a complexity, other subsystems (like prosecution authorities relating 
to ML cases) find it hard to cope with an information overload that they either have to 
ignore (because of their own modus operandi in dealing with complexity), or must 
attempt to reduce further in a number of ways that does not affect their own processing 
capacity.
The technological construction of AML-reality
In modem Philosophy, a very important stream of thought that deals with social 
constructions has been advanced by John Searle in what is known as the social 
construction o f reality (Searle 1995). This practically implies that humankind and 
organising societies come to refer to a reality (the environment of their system) that is 
socially constructed, and is rendered into reality by interaction between systems and 
their environments. In this section, it is argued -  following from the treatise of 
technology as a system in its own right -  that reality is technologically constructed by 
means of interpenetration, where the code of technology (automation/non-automation) 
affects other systems. It is important to stress here that this viewpoint is considerably 
different from the general hypothesis researchers make while examining the effects of 
technology in various problem domains like Anti-Money Laundering. However, before 
generalising this assertion for all systems, the example of the AML system is used to
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outline how it becomes technologically constructed and how such a process differs from 
the common viewpoint that technology has come to occupy in AML-stakeholders (such 
as typically a financial institution incorporating technological artefacts for money- 
laundering purposes).
Current Anti-Money Laundering practices generally place technological artefacts (be 
they combinations of software and/or hardware) in a number of ways within the AML 
system, but the underlying assumption behind most of these implementations is that 
technology is a tool with which ML can be targeted. Extrapolating from Chapter V and 
the instances of technology being used (POSEIDON, CHIMERA, Electronic Updates 
Systems, FTEM, Case Management System, etc), information systems can be classified 
into the following categories:
i. Information Systems that target money-laundering explicitly (such as the
CHIMERA system) or used for AML purposes (such as the CMS in Drosia 
Bank). Such information systems are typically integrated within transacting 
systems of stakeholders that may be affected by money-laundering, and they 
aim at preventing ML taking place (e.g. blocking a transaction from a person 
who is on the OF AC list) and/or simulating money-laundering behaviour in 
order to flag up suspicious transactions for further scrutiny. Technologies 
that may participate in such information systems can be profiling, data 
mining technologies and the like.
ii. Information Systems that affect money-laundering processes within financial
institutions and/or other stakeholders, where the purpose behind their design 
was originally irrelevant to AML per se (the POSEIDON system and the 
FTEM system can serve as two such examples).
While research usually focuses on the first instance, and tries to establish causal links in 
demonstrating how technology targets ML, through the case of Drosia Bank it becomes 
evident that there exists a much more complex infrastructure of information systems; 
such information systems are prone to considerable interdependencies that make it 
difficult to determine a causal link between how one information system influences ML 
and how that information system is subjected to influences from other information
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systems or human activity systems. The interdependencies created and the complexity 
they help generate, re-construct the idea that technology is a subordinate form that is 
employed by financial institutions or other stakeholders to target ML. In orchestrating 
the emergent complexity of interdependencies, technology therefore becomes a system 
in itself; and in doing so, beyond the realm of the social construction of AML as an 
ideal (via the socially constructed idea of money as analysed in Chapter I), technology 
constructs the reality of Anti-Money Laundering by creating bottom-to-top processes 
that often counteract top-to-bottom designations of how AML should function.
Let us return for a moment to the image that was presented at the beginning of this 
chapter in order to indicate how perceptions of AML come to be constructed, and how 
technology enters the picture.
From a stakeholder operating at the Transnational level, say the European Commission, 
Money-Laundering is defined in a well-structured manner, and such definitions are 
communicated to the stakeholders operating at both national and local levels. This 
communication does of course little to resolve the semantic issue of determining 
suspicion, but, as has been previously analysed, this is due in no small part to the 
unavoidability of collapsing the code of the AML system to only one part of the 
distinction between suspicion/non-suspicion.
In looking beyond the oversimplification, which both determines AML/ML through 
legislative initiatives and generates the impression that their structural coupling is under 
some stringent causal control, one can find that the ‘reality of AML’ is constructed 
through a multiplicity of complex interactions. Not that there is such a thing as one 
AML reality; one would have to neglect the existence of observers and their role in 
defining reality in the first place.
Norm Diffusion 
United Nations &  Compliance
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The point to emphasize here should be that the near total disregard for bottom-to-top 
processes, which become in many ways constitutive of a phenomenon being studied, 
create dynamics that restrict alternative perspectives. For the case of technology this 
appears to be particularly of interest as in a large number of fields, society has come to 
rely on the ceaseless and uninterrupted functioning of technology, and has increasingly 
developed its own structures on the basis of this precondition. But once the 
consequences of this precondition appear not to be working and technology propagates 
systemically adverse effects within other systems, then surprisingly it is not the 
precondition (of uninterrupted functioning) that is put into question. A system then (e.g. 
let’s take the AML system here) re-organizes itself in order to interpenetrate more with 
the system of technology, and hence subjects itself further to the distinction of 
automation/non-automation without questioning either the precondition or the actual 
pragmatic effect of technology.
When it comes to examining the incorporation of technology within the AML system 
and the emergent systemic character of technology, it appears that the precondition of 
technological functioning creates far more complexities than expected.
What the word ‘technology’ comes to mean in this context is another oversimplification 
that needs to be pondered further, and this has been one of the main goals of this 
dissertation. Whereas technology for AML as commonly perceived would refer to only 
those technological artefacts that attempt to simulate ML behaviour for capturing 
suspicious transactions, one may observe that, by treating technology as a system in its 
own right, analytical differentiation (internally within the system of technology) may 
begin. Such an internal differentiation considers technology as a system with an 
environment, and of course, as a system with subsystems. Furthermore, if AML 
technology is treated as a system, then the subsystems may relate to different 
technologies that do not have to relate directly to the specificity of suspicion. These 
subsystems can however be considered in relation to AML, insofar as they systemically 
affect the constitution of the problem domain and the construction of its suspicious/non- 
suspicious code.
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In this manner, as it became evident within the scope of Chapter V on the empirical 
findings, what we can refer to as a system o f technology affecting AML is of 
considerably broader scope than technologies that attempt to simulate suspicious 
transactions. Beneath the complex interactive patterns of different information systems, 
the systemic code of technology based upon automation/non-automation comes to 
construct and reconstruct the fundamental systemic code of AML (suspicious/non- 
suspicious).
In this way, what we term technology is the unity of the various technological- 
subsystems (CMS, CHIMERA, POSEIDON, FTEM, etc). Each of these technological- 
subsystems may in turn be perceived as an observing system in itself that incorporates 
the unity of the distinction between automation/non-automation. Every technological 
subsystem therefore -  based on the fundamental premises of observation as developed 
previously -  is acting as a system in itself. Technological subsystem upon technological 
subsystem, automation upon automation (but also, non-automation upon non­
automation), construct a complex array of variable interactions that come to define the 
methods through which the distinction between suspicious/non-suspicious is to be 
realised, thereby defining what AML is for a stakeholder that has assimilated the 
technological subsystems within its own organisational structure. In other words, and 
what has already been alluded to in the heading of this section, one may speak of the 
technological construction o f AML-reality.
The technological construction of AML-reality implies that within the duality of re­
organization of the systemic codes (those of technology and AML respectively), 
bottom-to-top processes that arise from complex interactions come to counteract top-to- 
bottom designations of how AML should function, or even how it is defined. In other 
words, technology and the myriad complex interactions it comes to engulf when a 
variety of technological subsystems are examined for the purposes of AML-relations, 
acts as an entity defining AML, thereby propagating to the environment of ML.
If such is the technological complexity encapsulated within the realm of a single 
financial institution like that of Drosia Bank -  as amply demonstrated in Chapter V -  
then it is difficult for one to grasp conceptually the underlying technological complexity
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in all the financial institutions at a national level, each with its own evolution, 
organisational structure, procedural resolutions of system/environment conflicts, and 
ultimately, operative closures. This complexity however remains hidden to a large 
degree by the further necessary reduction in complexity posed by communication 
between stakeholders. Thus, the communication between financial institutions and FIUs 
appears to be collapsing in the form of a singularity (that of an STR) while much of the 
underlying complexity orchestrating the suspicious/non-suspicious code for AML 
remains hidden.
Beyond the conventional realm of suspicion, therefore, a Suspicious Transaction Report 
not only fulfils the function of communicating suspicion by creating a temporal 
asymmetry between suspicion/non-suspicion (without the code being dissolved as 
previously analysed), but also its very existence serves the systemic function of cutting 
down on the underlying complexity for communication to be facilitated in a highly 
informationally-structured manner. The complexity that is collapsing into the form of an 
STR remains hidden. It remains hidden by necessity, for otherwise the FIU would suffer 
an immense information overload; ironically the FIUs nevertheless suffer information 
overload even in the simplified forms of STRs. Combining intelligence and informing 
Law Enforcement Agencies remains no easy task when one intelligence agency has to 
act as a collection point for financial institutions (and other stakeholders at a national 
level).
In exposing the underlying complexity within a single financial institution, whether 
technologically supported and not, there is a number of benefits to be considered in the 
broader AML system, which would also include the FIUs, so that feedback mechanisms 
would reduce the white noise in the hope of a more effective communication of 
suspicion. This is expanded further on the section below on ‘Theoretical and Practical 
Contributions’, but prior to that -  and as a stepping stone towards this aspect - it is 
useful to consider the relationship between technology and human activity systems 
embedded in AML, and to extrapolate from that to develop a general systemic 
consideration.
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From Bureaucracy to ‘Electreaucracy’
In this section I would like to put forward a concept that attempts to encapsulate the 
technological problematization of systemic interferences that various technological 
artefacts have come to construct. The previous section described how information 
systems and human activity systems interfere with each other within the problem 
domain of AML. This interference at the level of the technological code 
(automation/non-automation) upon traditional organizational structures that depend on 
human activity systems, I call ‘Electreaucracy \
A similar, although quite different idea named ‘Cyberocracy’ has been developed 
previously by Ronfeldt (1992). That concept can be seen as an aspect of the post- 
bureaucratic state, much as the information society was seen as an aspect of a post­
industrial society. Furthermore, the concept was applied to indicate both major changes 
in the nature and conduct of government, and various sources of informational power 
that dominate government (ibid).
For bureaucracy, a concept analysed at length in organizational theory and diversity, 
Max Weber first contended that it was the organizational manifestation of the rational 
spirit. Accordingly, it was such an efficient and powerful means of controlling men and 
women that, once established, the momentum of bureaucratization was irreversible 
(Dimaggio and Powell 1991). Long before the concept was assigned a pejorative 
meaning, that of impeding progress and efficiency, Weber saw competition amongst 
capitalist firms in the marketplace as the major drive towards bureaucracy (ibid). Within 
the scope of the institutionalisation of the concept of bureaucracy, along came the 
negative meaning, and debates raged in organizational theory concerning structural 
differences and what form an organization should take to become more efficient within 
its bureaucratic precondition: loosely structured, unstructured, hybrid forms, and all 
sorts of mystically-structured organizations all suddenly made their appearance.
In what I term Electreaucracy, information acquires a double contingency. Information 
succumbs to a technological encapsulation that is based on the fundamental code of 
automation/non-automation, and at the same time information has to be communicated 
to traditional bureaucracies by means of interoperation. Bureaucracy and Electreaucracy
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are then bound together by the transcendental property that is complexity. Regardless of 
the different operations that each entail, both in the bureaucratic order and within 
Electreaucracy, one can find processes of complexity that are structurally coupled; that 
is, processes whereby the complexity within a Bureaucracy stimulates processes within 
Electreaucracy that affect the latter’s efficiency and vice versa.
Engineering and design disciplines have had a large impact in the rebalancing of these 
two sides. Bureaucracy was (and still is) seen as something that can be improved with 
the imposition of technology. This viewpoint implies that one can study how a 
bureaucracy operates, and subsequently incorporate (by design) a technology that 
automates part of that bureaucracy. This also implies the belief that technology is 
constructed on the basis of available information concerning the operative closure of the 
bureaucracy, and that information becomes somewhat subordinate to the function of the 
bureaucracy itself. Internal Complexity, however, is present in any structure; and 
Electraucracy implies just that.
Electreaucracy is essentially about the organisation of informational elements on the 
basis of the fundamental code of automation/non-automation. The consequences of such 
organising, in conjunction with more traditional bureaucracies come to create 
interesting yet often problematic dynamics. The delusion of easier manipulation of 
electronic information by technological means collapses when one looks more closely 
into how what is being manipulated within the realm of Electreaucracy comes to affect 
the bureaucracy in ways that often become highly contradictory. Complexity is hence 
seen as something that needs to be solved; not as something that is generated by 
stakeholders and by the means they employ in order to operate in any organisational 
structure.
In this respect, the example given previously in this chapter regarding a nearly static 
number of Greek prosecutions in respect to a continuous increase in STRs is 
characteristic of this problematization. While Electreaucracy operates in an electronic 
realm of large database systems, sophisticated manipulation of data, etc., a more 
traditional bureaucratic order is based on hierarchical management, and constructs its 
response to electreaucracy by means of optimization. The negative effects become
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evident as volume becomes noise, noise generates complexity, and complexity is 
forcefully reduced by bureaucracy.
Theoretical and Practical Contributions
In this brief section my intention is to summarise some of the key theoretical and 
practical contributions of the dissertation.
When it comes to considering theoretical contributions, two criteria can potentially be 
used to examine their validity. One criterion would be the expansion of an existing 
theory in some well-identified manner. This theoretical expansion usually takes place 
with the help of empirical evidence that -  by extrapolation -  assists in generalised ideas 
that can be incorporated within the theory. The other criterion for a theoretical 
contribution involves the applicability of the theoretical ideas to a practical problem 
domain. Even though the latter case may appear to constitute a practical contribution, it 
primarily constitutes a theoretical contribution as it allows for the theory to be tested 
and applied within a potentially novel problem domain where the core of the ideas 
underpinning the theory have not been previously used for that purpose.
In respect of the first criterion for a theoretical contribution as portrayed above, it has 
been discussed that within Luhmann’s theory of Social Systems there is a technological 
treatise that describes technology by means of functional simplification and closure. 
Devoid of general systemic properties on technology, Luhmann’s theory fails to 
examine technology as system, and hence the systemic effects, which (a series of) 
technological artefacts may have upon a variety of problem domains, is underplayed by 
technology’s perceived supportive role. Technology is hence seen as subordinate to 
other systems. In this dissertation I feel that the empirical evidence and the treatise 
provided outline a picture of complexity within the technological realm that exhibits all 
the systemic properties of interest (e.g. self-reference, code, autopoiesis). It then 
becomes evident that technology as system creates emergent phenomena that counteract 
top-to-bottom processes by other systems (e.g. the legal system). In countering such 
top-to-bottom processes, a more complex organisational structure emerges at the level
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where information becomes treated in an automated manner. By treating technology as 
a system, and by examining the systemic effects and circumstances that technology 
comes to construct as it becomes structurally coupled with other problem domains, 
deep-seated effects are revealed that must be considered (if any meaningful intervention 
is to take place). Technology is therefore recognised as a system in itself, and the effects 
of such a recognition involve an increase in complexity caused by technology and its 
systemic interference (and interpenetration) with other systems.
As for the second criterion concerning a theoretical contribution, the very application of 
systems theoretical ideas on the problem domain of Anti-Money Laundering constitutes 
a contribution in itself. Even though this application of Systems Theory also involves a 
practical contribution, if one looks at this matter from a purely theoretical standpoint, it 
does readily demonstrate the theoretical diversification of Systems Theory and the 
theory’s potential for analysing complex problem domains like AML. By treating the 
problem domain of AML at the core level of key ideas from Systems Theory I feel that 
an important goal has been achieved. Beyond the realm of description, where every 
stakeholder within AML talks about some sort of vague ‘AML system’ and 
hypothesizes on the effects that various external or internal elements have on that 
system, Systems Theory allows for a discussion on what specific properties can be 
considered within the system, and why they are important. On a theoretical level it 
provides the AML domain with a description of its systemic characteristics that 
becomes invaluable when considering a variety of implications within that domain, be 
they technological or not.
In summarizing the key theoretical contributions outlined above, this dissertation has:
a. Provided a theoretical description for Systems Theory by taking the theory’s 
core theoretical ideas and using them for a re-description of technology in the 
systemic sense. This has allowed for a description of technology as system by an 
examination of the systemic properties of code, function, autopoiesis and self­
reference.
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b. Applied Systems Theory to the domain of Anti-Money Laundering, thereby 
providing yet one more application domain where the versatile systems 
theoretical ideas can find fertile ground for further elaboration.
Regarding practical contributions, these refer to the problem domain of Anti-Money 
Laundering and target more pragmatic realisations that could lead to improvements in 
the domain itself. However, such improvements can only be realised in a self-referential 
manner, from the perspective of the system utilising them (otherwise the only 
meaningful relationship underpinning general effectiveness would be that between the 
total number o f submitted STRs to the number o f prosecutions -  that relationship 
however has been analysed and shown to be arbitrary in itself, and hence no single 
measure can exist for monitoring their effectiveness). A few basic issues that can be 
considered as practical contributions are:
a. The consideration that each financial institution constitutes a complex AML- 
stakeholder, and an examination of AML working processes must be 
methodologically sound because a complex array of information systems 
interdependencies and manual processes for determining suspicion come into 
play. For the particular stakeholder studied in this dissertation (the case of 
Drosia Bank), a variety of information systems were examined and these had a 
much broader effect on the construction of suspicion than was originally 
expected. The internal effects of the increase in the volume of STRs that the 
bank has had to cope with, as well as the complexities underpinned by the 
POSEIDON system, constitute just two examples of what areas can be looked at 
in the deconstruction of an STR-system of a bank. Whether the same 
methodology can be applied to different financial institutions remains a question 
to be explored, but regardless of the results, in highly context-specific 
circumstances there are areas that can clearly be extrapolated and used to 
examine the conditions in other financial institutions. One such example is the 
extent of asymmetry in STR-generation throughout the branch-network of the 
financial institution studied. The same analysis of other financial institutions can 
be attempted, and potential reasons for any stark differences that may be 
uncovered can be examined more deeply (and further attempts made to
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investigate qualitatively where these differences can be attributed). In this way, 
beyond the inexorable trend for the quantification of everything within AML (a 
condition often imposed by Central Banks that appear to be eager to see the 
‘whole’ picture), financial institutions could undertake a qualitatively-based 
study, in order to strengthen areas where further improvement can be identified 
within their handling of AML-related issues. Integration of the risk-based 
approach may then become informed by both quantitative and qualitative 
techniques that not only derive from the institutional order (say regulatory 
guidelines), but also become customised at the level of the financial institution 
itself.
b. The practical relationship between technology and Anti-Money Laundering, as 
examined in this dissertation, re-creates the constructed associations between the 
two. Technology is not seen as a solution to the problem domain of Anti-Money 
Laundering, and is by no means reduced to what are broadly known as profiling 
technologies. Profiling technologies (such as Searchspace, Mantas, Norkom, 
etc.) are but a small technological subsystem that affects Anti-Money 
Laundering. These target the automation of suspicion and its algorithmic 
identification, while they ‘contribute’ towards a substantial increase in the 
number of STRs. Beyond such technologies, the central thesis of this 
dissertation revolves around a study of peripheral yet highly interdependent 
information systems that influence AML within a financial institution. Together 
with a number of working processes that are context-specific, these systems 
come to construct the dynamics of identifying suspicion. The interdependencies 
of various information systems within a financial institution, along with the 
managerial and operational issues raised in any business setting, demonstrate 
that there is a deeper link between technology and AML, and that this link 
should be considered very carefully. Within the modem realm of technology, a 
considerable irony comes into play. For within the domain of AML, technology, 
which constitutes the basis for automation and quantification, is utilised for the 
purpose of demonstrating compliance. When however, as the MLRO of Drosia 
Bank commented in an interview, we come to realise that ‘Compliance is not 
quantifiable’, we reach an interesting antithesis. Technology, which is the basis
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for automation and quantification, is used for the purpose of demonstrating 
Compliance, while compliance in itself cannot be easily framed in these terms.
Epilogue
The function of an epilogue is often one that resembles truth in literary drama. Thus, it 
remains a delusional construct that projects the idea of closure, a concept that has been 
systemically fought throughout this dissertation. In this sense, the dissertation in itself 
can be looked upon as a system in its own right; a system with structure, organization, 
and conceptual elements that are exchanged for alternate interconnections, and hence, 
for the production for alternative interpretations. The system grows, re-constructs itself, 
and supposedly culminates with a few closing remarks; an epilogue that closes the loop 
and brings the system to an end. This however, strays considerably from the association 
that the author seeks to make with the concept of self-reference. A system can be further 
expanded; it can inform its environment if some (or all) of its elements are 
communicated to other observers; it can even seek to reconstruct conceptually a 
problem domain. If it fails in all of these tasks, the system dies.
Regardless of what evolutionary steps will be taken for the conceptual core presented 
throughout this dissertation, the distinctions have now been made. As Pinter remarks, ‘a 
writer’s life is a highly vulnerable, almost naked activity...the writer makes his choice 
and is stuck with it91.’
The hope, however, that a theory of self-referential systems has been considerably 
elaborated on a pragmatic problem domain like AML, and has also been expanded to 
include technological effects, does remain the author’s hope. What has become evident 
throughout this dissertation, and in particular through the presentation of the empirical 
findings, remains the underlying informational complexity, which is considerably more 
deep-seated than an application of a profiling technology. The first practical results as a 
consequence of this thinking are discussed in the Appendix as an example of the risk- 
based approach applied to a financial institution. Further research can expand on this
91 http://nobelprize.org/nobel prizes/literature/laureates/2005/pinter-lecture.html
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theoretical and empirical agenda of deconstructing a suspicious transaction system of a 
financial institution. National or International implications can be further scrutinized 
within these dynamics.
Finally, all that the author of a dissertation requires of its creation is some degree of 
intemal-validity. While the methodology has been laid out in some detail, and the 
author has attempted to integrate as many aspects as were of interest from the empirical 
data gathered, it remains inconclusive whether considerable variability in this research 
agenda would have been displayed by another observer, and ultimately, by another 
author.
The impossibility of such a possibility remains a paradox. One observer cannot create 
preconditions for the observations of another. What the author hopes of the reader is 
some degree of compassionate understanding and a recognition that the underlying 
logical mechanisms that gave rise to this construct, which we call dissertation, are 
equally self-referential. They are equally self-referential to the construct to which they 
give rise (the dissertation), and equally self-referential to the construct that the latter 
describes (AML & Technology). Logic therefore, and even more explicitly, the logic of 
the author behind the construction of this dissertation, remains a self-referential system.
Logic, serves the function of being able to justify itself, and hence in doing so remains 
inescapably intertwined with any entities it produces. In this regard, logic creates a 
distinction: the distinction between logic/illogic.
While the author retains the right to this asymmetry in the previous distinction, the 
author can only hope that the second-order observer, the reader of this dissertation, will 
have found the distinctions between logic/illogic, truth/error, consistency/non­
consistency, considerably imbalanced and asymmetrical.
What side of each distinction has been chosen shall be left unexplored.
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Appendix I: 
A treatise of the Risk-Based Approach with practical considerations:
An informal account o f the self-reference in the risk-based approach and an 
application to a financial institution in the UK
For the purposes of this Appendix, I will somewhat change the style of writing to a 
more informal one and attempt to describe the story of how this deep theoretical treatise 
and way of thinking has -  almost as an emergent phenomenon -  came to be applied for 
a first time in a financial institution in the UK, and has influenced my viewpoint 
regarding what is now known as the risk-based approach This is more of a personal 
account, and acts a postscript at the same time.
The technique about which this Appendix is written, was conceived of almost 
accidentally while thinking in systems theoretical terms about a pragmatic problem that 
I had to resolve and/or explore. I shall describe here the events as they unfolded, briefly, 
yet accurately (as far as my memory allows), and always in the first person singular, so 
that the story is told as vividly as possible.
In the year 2004 I started working at the London School of Economics as a research 
analyst for a European Commission project on AML entitled ‘Spotlight’. From my 
personal research into the field of Anti-Money Laundering I was already aware that 
when it came to technology and AML, the results were really poor. At the time, the 
average in the industry was about 4% True Positive Rate, and thus for every one 
hundred suspicious transaction reports that was flagged by technology, only four came 
out being truly suspicious after careful manual examination and proper scrutiny. By 
anyone’s standards, and despite the difficulty and complexity of the problem domain, I 
thought that was rather poor. It still is, but when it comes to technology determining 
suspicion, it has never been easy territory.
In dealing with the issue of attempting to model ML our team therefore requested some 
assistance from a financial institution that was a Spotlight partner at the time. We 
requested a large financial transaction dataset (of raw transaction data) that would be 
extracted from the financial institution. This dataset would be used for the simulation of
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models for ML, but no one could actually articulate what those models would ‘look 
like’, how effective they would be, how they would be tested, etc. In fact, as far as I 
could see at the time, no consensus could even be made about what might even 
constitute a ‘model’, and resolution of the semantic problem was (and still remains) 
necessary. Three years down that line and I have come to the conclusion that semantic 
problems of this type are practically without a solution.
Nevertheless, research must go on. I remained in negotiations back in 2004 with the 
head of the money-laundering analysis team of the financial institution who was dealing 
with the issue of extracting the transaction dataset. This lasted for about three months as 
we needed to test the format of the database, ensure that there was data integrity, and 
mostly, that personal details like names and addresses were removed. Anonymized 
modelling of ML, however, was somewhat of a novelty at the level of raw transactions 
so it had to be dealt differently. There was a need to associate customers with substitute 
codes so that we could know what transactions corresponded to the same people. Thus, 
Gordon Brown for instance became SEC01363845, an unidentifiable alphanumerical 
combination for which however different transactions in different points in time could 
be linked.
The anonymization sequence was one story. The other one was the extraction of the raw 
financial transactions and their manipulation for the purpose of spotting suspicious 
behaviour linked to ML. We were discussing the time frame for these transactions so we 
decided to have at least 3-months of data. The extraction process took several weeks 
because of security reasons, and then they were sent off at my office at LSE. A 
colleague still recalls the horror engrained in my face when I was faced with about 15 
DVDs containing an approximate 250million financial transactions that were dispatched 
with a courier92 service.
So far so good ... I will omit a lot of technical details of how these transactions even 
came to reside in a single database for manipulation, and cut straight to the point.
92 Fortunately, unlike the HM Revenue & Customs loss of 25million peoples’ data (including National 
Insurance numbers, addresses, bank details, etc) our transactions were not lost (and had been anonymized 
for that event).
202
What does one do with 250million raw financial transactions when looking for 
suspicious ones?
My opinion was (and remains) that there are two distinct possibilities if one wants to 
analyse financial transactions for ML:
i. You have a model. That model describes ML as best as possible through a series
of parameters. You then apply that model to the financial transactions and 
receive a set o f transaction data that are considered to be suspicious. That 
set is subsequently examined manually by staff members of the financial 
institution, and it is determined (case by case) what occurrences within the 
set are really worthy of submission to the FIU as potential ML-cases.
ii. You attempt to deconstruct, from financial transactions, specific transacting
patterns that could potentially relate to suspicion. This deconstruction is not 
done by filtering out potentially suspicious transactions from non-suspicious 
by applying a model of some sort, but much rather as a bottom-to-top 
process. Data can potentially be data-mined and subsequently patterns of 
transaction behaviour may emerge from this more granular examination of a 
dataset.
In the first circumstance I thought results were really poor anyway. A problem of such 
complexity cannot be modelled easily. Financial institutions around the UK (those that 
we had access to at least, and others we’ve heard of) used about 6-7 parameters for 
modelling ML in an automated fashion. So much for those overly expensive software 
packages that came with more than a hundred predetermined queries to simulate ML ... 
These parameters were quite simple, and mostly had evolved around age, time of 
association with the financial institution, etc.
But let us go back to the problem. What does one do with 250million financial 
transactions? According to the two methods presented above, the first one would be 
impossible for our research project. It would mean that we would have to take precious 
time out of already busy staff members that deal with ML-cases in order to test all sorts 
of different models and see if what they come up with is confirmed as truly suspicious
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after proper scrutiny, KYC and the like. This path was never taken therefore. I had the 
feeling it wouldn’t work anyway after a discussion I had with the Head of the statistics 
team who said to me that: '‘you may have a profiling query that tries to capture ML 
behaviour and it may be idle for 6 months or more... then one day, it may flag out 
something that may turn out being suspicious... with these things you never quite know
I started looking at the second possibility more closely, and differentiated the question 
slightly to accommodate the new possibility. How does one manipulate 250million 
transactions without imposing a model for cutting down on the unnecessary 
complexity?
First of all, the problem was not only one of complexity, but also of volume. 
Manipulation of that large a number of transactions is uncommon (at least for daily 
practice) for the second technique of bottom-to-top manipulation. I thought that 
similarities would have to be drawn to other disciplines that deal with uncommonly 
large datasets, and I would have to investigate how such disciplines make systematic 
inferences from within the data. As a former Physicist, I immediately thought of the 
field of Astrophysics, so I started looking into the manipulation of large numerical 
datasets there. I always thought that the key to such a complexity remains in the 
visualization of the data along with the possibility for interaction of that visualization, 
processing and methods of cutting down on the complexity.
And so after some time I managed to project the 250million financial transactions on a 
3-dimensional malleable plane that could be manipulated, rotated, parameterized, 
filtered, etc. I must say, it looked beautiful. But it wasn’t of any help whatsoever. It 
looked like a constellation somewhere in the universe, and the telescope was supposed 
to find ‘suspicious transactions’. I played around with it, but abandoned it almost 
immediately. I came to realise that complexity is a fundamental property of system, and 
that it can be further described as a transcendental property. Hence, transactional 
complexity turned into numerical complexity, numerical complexity into profiling and 
algorithmic complexity and the latter into visual complexity. No matter what form it 
took, complexity was present.
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I went back to the last settled question: ‘How does one manipulate 250million 
transactions without imposing a model for cutting down on the unnecessary 
complexity?’ and started pondering the issue of the constitution of a model. Something 
had to be applied for inferences to be made and complexity to be reduced. But what 
would that something be? What model should attempt the reduction in complexity?
This systemic re-arrangement in the form of the above question made all the difference 
as the model came to be something completely different from an association of 
parameters describing what a money-launderer should look like. Based on the 
theoretical grounds of systems theory I had known that systems are most of all self- 
referential. They have mechanisms for referring to themselves and to their constitutive 
elements, they create internal system/environment differences, and hence they create 
internal differentiations. Systemically, if any perceived improvement (for the system 
itself) is to take place it therefore has to be based on two basic characteristics. It has to 
generate a distinction or difference, and it has to functionally utilise that difference by 
means of a second-order observation (it has to observe how it is observing). With that 
systemic principle, I sought to identify the distinction that could be thus utilised, and 
further to consider the issue of 2nd order observation. It turned out that even though 
these two were intertwined, the latter step was much more apocalyptic in its exposure 
(and relation) to ML-modelling.
The distinction that was primarily utilised was that between the:
i. STRs that were submitted by staff members o f the financial institution, were
found to be positively suspicious after manual analysis by the AML-team and 
were consequently submitted to SOCA (the UK FIU),
ii. STRs that were submitted by staff members but were found pot to be suspicious
after manual analysis by the AML-team.
One side to the distinction had to be chosen for application, but it is worth noting that -  
for the description that follows -  complementary (yet different) results would be 
retrieved had the second option been chosen instead, and of course, different 
distinctions can be utilised for the purpose of uncovering elements of suspicious 
behaviour within raw transaction data.
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However, the purpose on this occasion was not to spot suspicious transactions. It was to 
reverse-engineer the process of STR, and extract a set of characteristics that could be 
used as a mechanism for modelling the behaviour of money-launderers. As those 
characteristics would have to be used within the scope of automated technology (which 
was performing rather poorly), the issue of effectiveness was put into question within 
the distinction between manual VS automated True Positive Rates. For instance, 
whereas staff members performed very well, and typically around 50-60% of the 
potential STRs that they forwarded internally to the MLRO would turn out as truly 
suspicious after manual examination, technology did poorly (at around 4-5%). All the 
difficulties created by the poor performance of technologically-based solutions could 
therefore be repositioned in the form of a feedback loop between the manual generation 
o f STRs and the automated rules for establishing suspicion as shown in figure A1 
below.
Figure Al. Feedback loop between manual generation o f STRs and automated rules for
establishing suspicion.
For this purpose, and to see what was the qualitative and quantitative information that 
could be extracted from all these millions of transactions, I changed the concept of a 
model for ML considerably. I then made the following differentiation:
i. A model is not only what simulates ML behaviour and breaks it down to all
sorts of different attributes that describe who potentially is a money- 
launderer.
ii. A model can be anything that reduces the initial complexity o f transaction sets
in order to infer further characteristics that may in their own turn 
recursively redefine how we view and simulate and model ML.
Manual 
generation 
ofSTRs
Automated 
rules for 
establishing 
suspicion
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Instead of creating a top-to-bottom process that specified what money-laundering 
characteristics would be, another model was created (of a somewhat different type). I 
asked the Head of the ML-analysis team of that financial institution to give me all the 
corresponding account numbers of customers that had already been reported to the FIU. 
These were in the reference form discussed previously, whereas the original account 
numbers remained with the financial institution. The question that can be put here is: 
“Can a long list of account numbers constitute a model for ML?’.
The answer is positive provided that the model is used functionally to differentiate the 
transaction set and reduce the underlying complexity. Its specific function is to: be 
applied to the totality o f the available transaction set and act as a filter that isolates 
from the totality o f the transactions that take place in the financial institution, only 
those raw transactions from a bank’s transacting database systems that correspond to 
the account numbers that are specified in the model. These account numbers are those 
specified before, that is, those that correspond to customers that have been already 
flagged as suspicious for ML andforwarded to the FIU.
I describe the entire process in the steps below:
i. First, we may differentiate between staff reports that are further considered to be
suspicious and those that are not. This is only possible after manual 
examination from ML-analysis teams examines each internal STR one-by- 
one, and determines whether further reporting to the respective FIU is 
necessary.
ii. The reports that staff members send from the branch-network of a financial
institution and that are considered to be suspicious after careful manual- 
examination from a ML-analysis team, are typically logged onto a Case 
Management System regardless of their forwarding to the FIU or not
iii. Various data fields are kept within the Case Management System for which a
typical field would be the account number.
iv. Extraction of the following subset of the Case Management System therefore
becomes possible: 'all the account numbers o f those customers that have 
been considered to be suspicious after manual analysis from staff members 
o f ML-analysis teams ’
v. A query can then be performed to isolate from the raw transaction data of a
certain period (say the past 3-months), a subset of raw transaction data that 
corresponds to all the transactions that have taken place by such customers.
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The content of the query itself is quite simple, thereby constituting of an x- 
line query (say in SQL) where x equals the total number of customers 
identified in step iv), and where each line corresponds to an account number.
vi. The output of this query on the totality of the raw banking transaction data
becomes another raw transaction dataset, but one referring only to 
customers that have already been identified as suspicious following the 
initial manual examination.
vii. This new raw transaction dataset effectively holds information on the transacting
patterns followed by money-launderers. Further discovery of such patterns 
and their isolation can be done through data-mining software that can isolate 
the aggregate typologies where launderers operate.
viii. The discovery of trends and the customisation of this methodology remain at 
the core of the selection of particular parameters and characteristics for 
further modelling. Thus, if say a financial institution is holding more than y- 
number of data-fields in their transaction databases, and only 10% of those 
data-fields appear to be important in ML-behaviour (for their own clientele 
and customer-base), then it makes sense that efforts around the selection of 
parameters, etc, would have to be appropriately customised.
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The aforementioned steps are depicted in the following diagram:
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/  i
Query of all such 
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all transaction data
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Determine risk-based categories and typologies, 
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Select specific parameters that would describe 
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__________________________________" - 3—
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in order to:
Apply risk-based categories and customised parameters to 
new profiling queries for real-time systems
Figure A2. Outline Process for the reverse-engineering o f  STRs on the basis o f raw 
transaction data from a financial institution
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With this methodological structure, the output of the process remains distinctly different 
from what could be achieved with a normal statistical analysis. Day-to-day transactions 
corresponding to people that have already been considered suspicious and reported to 
the FIU are isolated from the greater total transactional sets. In this manner, the 
reduction in complexity is done while important information can be extracted from this 
endeavour that reveals money-laundering behaviour that could be further used for 
modelling purposes.
So what? What can be gained by following such an approach, and why can it be 
described as a second order observation in theoretical terms? What does it have to do 
with the risk-based approach?
The connection and the reply to the above questions can be made simpler if we are to 
follow an example that would clarify it. The reduction of complexity that was achieved 
by this technique was considerable. From the initial 250million transactions, a few 
hundred thousand were left that corresponded to those account numbers that constituted 
the filtering model. Nothing however could compare that reduction (which still 
produced a considerably large amount of transactions but more manageable) with the 
further surprising reduction in complexity that was uncovered by means of data-mining 
and by considering different categories.
For instance, from a total of more 100 
transaction categories that were recorded at 
any single time in the transacting databases of 
the financial institution, following data-mining 
and manipulation of the raw transaction data 
that corresponded to previously suspicious 
customers, only 14 transaction categories were 
identified to be relevant to those that have 
been already reported for suspicion.
Transaction Category Distribution from Suspicious Set
I
Transaction
Codes
Figure A3. Distribution for transacting categories
Even further, what becomes evident within those transacting categories shown in figure 
A3 above, is that from within the subset o f  transacting categories that appear to be 
more relevant fo r  money-laundering cases, there are particular transacting categories 
that occupy a larger percentage in the overall distribution.
This exposes a connection to the risk-based approach as the likelihood of suspicion for a 
ML activity may come to rest upon a fabric of interdependent characteristics that are 
isolated from raw transaction data. This implies that there is a higher propensity to 
consider someone as a suspicious customer when specific characteristics are considered. 
If say a customer is transacting in one of the major categories that take up a large part of 
the distribution in Figure A3 above, then a probability may be assigned to such a 
customer; a probability that may quantify the likelihood of someone committing ML. 
The estimation however of such a probability must not be taken to be linked only with 
transacting categories. A series of other characteristics can be used for the same purpose 
(demographic and socio-economic data, etc).
In presenting some of this work in a number of seminars for government agencies in 
Europe, Central Banks and financial institutions, I have come to realise that there 
appears to be a consistent point of confusion that most people in the audience will relate 
to. They ask whether it is possible to use this process when in fact it will only give you 
things you relate to cases you already know (about previous money-laundering cases) 
and it is therefore not something dynamic (whatever ‘dynamic’ implies).
Another conceptual term needs to be distinguished here in terms of modelling money- 
laundering; that of behavioural modelling. Whereas a model is a collection of attributes 
regarding suspicious behaviour, a behavioural model digs considerably deeper into 
considering a series of social, economic, demographic, cultural, political and other 
domains that can be used to model the behaviour of a launderer. Behavioural modelling 
in conjunction with the process described previously, not only gives a dynamic nature in 
the process of modelling ML-behaviour, but also places the modelling of suspicious 
cases on a risk-based attribution of characteristics.
I have always felt that if any improvement is to be made in this aspect of modelling 
money-laundering behaviour then there would be a need to consider modelling beyond
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the classical realm of typologies that are published so widely (like those coming from 
the FATF). This implies customisation at the level of the financial institution and 
presupposes that every financial institution has a different clientele base, something that 
is dependent on a variety of factors like location, network, and others. But as every 
financial institution has its own clientele base, it also has its own suspicious customers’ 
base. Decomposition therefore of those characteristics that are more relevant for the 
suspicious customers’ base of a financial institution makes the risk-based approach even 
more relevant. As a typology is an abstract entity that attempts to encapsulate 
interdependent characteristics that may (or may not) describe what money-laundering is, 
attributes that are extracted behaviourally in a bottom-to-top fashion and touch upon the 
specificity of a single financial institution have a better chance of being integrated and 
incorporated within a risk-based approach.
Of course, the example that was discussed previously regarding the risk-based 
attribution of transacting categories is the simplest example possible. The plot thickens 
when one considers combinations of different characteristics that may be used for the 
purpose of modelling and where one can combine in such a risk-based manner more 
than one attributes (say transacting typologies, location, etc). Subsequent profiling of 
suspicious customers then acquires a different character; one that is informed not only 
by already known typologies but also of behavioural characteristics of the pre- 
established suspicious customer base of a specific financial institution.
n  j
The difference therefore relies specifically on a 2 order observation of the system 
itself. What makes the difference is that what essentially and informationally constitutes 
a financial institution is carried -  as information -  through the individual financial 
transactions that are recorded in the institution’s databases. Resolution or even an 
attempt of manipulating previously known information of other types (such as previous 
STRs, etc) must be brought to the level of financial transactions and recursively be 
affected by them.
How institutions observe is therefore equivalent to how institutions set themselves up to 
receive information which is organizationally and technologically structured. For the 
example of financial institutions such information becomes structured in the form of 
financial transactions and it is those transactions that informationally constitute the way
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in which the institution observes. For a 2nd order observation to take place, another 
observer must be introduced that will guide another observation. Such a subsequent 
observation will -  via a secondary frame -  utilise raw transaction data and reconstruct 
the information they encapsulate on the basis of a secondary distinction (imposed by the 
frame).
What is further used to guide the observation is what we could call a frame for that 
observation. In this particular example, that frame has been the set of account numbers 
of customers that have been already identified as suspicious after careful manual 
analysis and inclusion in an original STR. The set however could have been 
considerably different. For instance, fraud data could have been utilised, or marketing 
data, leading to demographic characteristics that could enhance modelling aspects of 
ML. Combinatory possibilities become endless as elements can be reproduced and 
recombined.
In dealing with this problem, the methodology described above was applied to a 
financial institution in the UK and was further enhanced by the institution itself by the 
use of profiling data for simulating money-laundering behaviour on the basis of socio­
demographic data (those were bought off a private company and the marketing 
department of the financial institution helped in their analysis). The externally bought 
data was utilised to enhance particular profiles, thereby estimating the propensity of 
someone being involved in money-laundering activities.
This endeavour within the scope of this methodology (based on the self-referential re­
informing of suspicion) created considerable dynamics in the adaptation of technology 
to the simulation of ML-behaviour. This resulted into a gradual increase in the True 
Positive Rate of the financial institution. In the beginning of the implementation of 
automated technologies, the True Positive Rate was less than 1% (how many reports 
flagged by technology are considered to be suspicious after further examination). This 
has now been improved up to 17% for automated monitoring of suspicion, while for 
staff members it is much higher at more than 60% (from about 25%).
This increase might suggest that the true positive rate of technology can be attributed to 
its association with an increase in the effectiveness of staff-member reporting. The rate
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of increase for a four-year period is shown below in Figure A4, which represents the 
percentage of Disclosures/Referrals for staff members only. Even though the increase 
clearly suggests that there has been a dramatic improvement in the success of staff 
members reporting suspicion, it is unclear whether this success can be correlated with 
the improvement of the automated monitoring of technology (as further data would be 
required for this correlation). Considering however that the feedback loop between 
manual/automatic is informationally exploited within its duality, the relationship 
appears to be close (even though an increase in the true positive rate o f manual 
reporting can be attributable to increased vigilance, continuous training, etc). In the 
figure below the increase in this effectiveness is represented.
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Figure A4. Increase in Rate o f Disclosures to FIU/ Referrals from Staff members
With the improvement observed in the example outlined in this Appendix, it is useful to 
consider the function of the risk-based approach within this description. It is of course 
clear that the very introduction of the risk-based approach implies some sort of 
prioritisation. While I have attempted a deep theoretical treatise on this issue 
elsewhere93,1 do want to highlight a set of issues that are important.
93 The reader may be interested in: Demetis, D and Angell, I (2007): The risk-based to Anti-Money 
Laundering: Representation, Paradox and the 3rd Directive. Journal of Money Laundering Control, 
Vol. 10, Issue 4.
214
The purpose of the risk-based approach in itself has been to reduce the complexity that 
is generated when financial institutions and other stakeholders within the broader AML 
system report excessively to the Financial Intelligence Units, thereby creating a 
considerable increase in white noise. However, for the effective reduction of complexity 
it is useful to ponder the question of how risk can be represented and subsequently 
attributed to the entire process of simulating ML.
What has been outlined in this Appendix constitutes both a method for a deeper 
representation of risk at the level of interaction between different financial transactions, 
and a recursive mechanism that exploits these financial transactions in tandem with a 
frame that focuses the observation. This in itself is something considerably different to a 
simple analysis from within the cases of STRs themselves.
With that in mind, I think it would still be useful to stress that risk constitutes a highly 
elusive entity, and that whatever representation, manipulation, and application is 
attempted will generate a further risk. This creates another system which is also self- 
referential in nature as risk is generated out of risk when categories are considered for 
any modelling process.
It is therefore very difficult to assume the role of Pythia94 and hypothesize on the long­
term effects of the introduction of the risk-based approach on the broader AML system. 
For the time being it would appear that financial institutions are somewhat nervous of 
the regulators’ interpretation of the risk-based approach. Risk-based supervision and 
tolerance of money-laundering cases if proper ‘systems’ and organizational structures 
are in place at financial institutions is not much consolation due to the very nature of 
risk (thereby extending suspicion). From a regulatory point of view, a standard 
approach in dealing with the subject matter of the risk-based approach is extremely 
difficult (if not impossible) to attain and this affects a variety of AML-related aspects 
within a financial institution (and ultimately compliance itself). Overall, the shift 
towards a risk-based approach does constitute an improvement as it structurally couples 
with the elusive nature of suspicion. Risk and suspicion are therefore bound together
94 Pythia was the priestess presiding over the Oracle of Apollo at Delphi
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and it is right that more restrictive practices have been abandoned (or claimed to have 
been abandoned).
Through this example, however, I would like to stress that the applicability of the risk- 
based approach has to be considered at the level of individual stakeholders that have to 
customise the different risks of being exposed to ML and who take actions under the 
different variations such risks imply. Certainly, different variants of this methodology 
can be attempted (and I am confident that many of them probably will) while the most 
important question to ponder will revolve around the self-referential nature of any 
system and how self-reference can re-inform (and hopefully improve) parts of a system.
As far as technology and AML is concerned I still remain pessimistic (despite the 
somewhat optimistic tone of this Appendix). The interactions between bureaucracy and 
electreaucracy, the volume of STRs, and the white noise that comes with them, the 
difficult problem domain of ML that needs to be simulated, as well as a variety of other 
problems, all generate uncomfortable dynamics between technology and AML. Despite 
the improvement mentioned, it is not to be forgotten that a 17% True Positive Rate in 
automated monitoring implies that from a hundred suspicious transactions that 
technology generates, only 17 are truly suspicious while an unpleasant 83 remain non- 
suspicious. Determining whether a flagged transaction (from technology) is suspicious 
or not requires however manual analysis of the reports, and that in itself implies 
considerable workload. The problem is unlikely to go away as the nature of modelling 
ML behaviour is highly complex, and automation is based on the interactive patterns of 
a myriad information systems that perplex the issue. As e-transacting becomes more and 
more prevalent, the asymmetry will tend to increase, and it is doubtful whether such a 
high (!) percentage will be sustainable. It all looks like there is plenty of scope of further 
research, but then again, that constitutes another self-referential system in itself; 
research out of research.
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Endnotes
I The evolution of the legislation with the aim of countering money laundering is clearly reflected in the 
documents that source from various initiatives. The problem of estimating the money laundering market 
is also a semantic issue because once the definition of what constitutes ML changes according to the 
legislation, so do the models that pursuit these estimates, in order to incorporate the additionally defined 
elements according to the norm-producing institutions.
II Interestingly enough, Tanzi (1999) refers to the example of Australia to demonstrate that depending on 
the methodology that is employed to estimate the underground economy, there can be enormous 
variations in the estimates like 1.4% to 47.1%. It should be noted at this point that Australia is considered 
to be the country with the most rigorous legislation and measures against ML and still, it is further 
estimated that from all the cases that are prosecuted for money-laundering, only 1% of the laundered 
money can be eventually confiscated [ Lilley, P. (2000). Dirty Dealing. London, Kogan Page.] A similar 
example given by Tanzi is that of the United States where estimates range from 6.2% to 19.4% of the 
GDP.
1,1 The formulation of an industry that is beyond good and evil partly relies on their interconnectedness 
and that one cannot exist or be defined without the other (dialectic reasoning). It is also interesting to 
consider that money-laundering is considered to be a problem per se. However, far beyond the arguments 
that money-laundering is a crime and a problem (mainly sourcing from its connections to drug-trafficking 
and the fact that it may create another round of crime as it generates money that are subsequently used for 
illegal purposes), there are some in the literature that do not portray money-laundering as a problem. For 
instance, it can be argued that money-laundering does not even undermine the status quo. Far from that, 
Ditton and Brown argue that the very existence of money-laundering could actually support the status quo 
because it gives -  to the people -  a feeling of fantasy equality that can be achieved through it that is 
actually in favour of a stabilized society whereby the structures differ. If that feeling of fantasy equality 
that could be achieved through underground economies did not exist, then the authors argue that people 
would be more likely to revolt. [ Ditton, J. and R. Brown (1981). "Why Don't they Revolt? 'Invisible 
Income' as a Neglected dimension of Runciman's relative deprivation thesis." The British Journal of 
Sociology 32(4): 521-530.
]
,v The case of the Chinese hackers was the first case of theft in a bank by remote means but still, a home 
made modem was installed in the bank’s systems. Brothers Hao Jing-long and Hao Jing-wen managed to 
transfer 720,000 Yuan from the bank. Their attempt to layer their illicit-got profits came by transferring 
the funds into 16 different accounts they had managed to setup with false names. Having done this, they 
withdrew 260,000 Yuan from several different branches of the bank.
v The typical distinction for the laundering process is done in the placement, layering and integration 
stages. With CL, the layering stage which is the complication of the money trail in order to blur the 
origins through complicated transactions, can be done much more easily at the click of a button. 
Similarly, and if one manages to get a fictitious account in a bank through the latter’s online banking 
systems, the placement stage is also part of the CL. Furthermore, since the placement stage is considered 
to be the stage where the launderers are more easily caught, the danger exacerbates.
VI However, the confiscation of the proceeds of crime remains an extremely touchy subject which once 
again boils down to the ‘who polices the police’ quote. Interestingly enough, the Asian Secretariat of 
the Financial Action Task Force is self-funded by the confiscated money — Gilmore, W. (1999). 
Dirty Money: The evolution of money laundering counter-measures. Strasbourg, Council of Europe 
Press.
The danger is therefore clear because maximization of government profit might actually lead to 
confiscating what is convenient. Ethical issues also arise because the same money that sources from 
criminal activities is used to fund FATF style agencies. Ironically, the agentive function of legitimate 
money is promptly ascribed to criminal money once governments are involved.
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v" The extent to which money laundering can create economic instability is very difficult to be 
established. Catherine England suggests that there are several cases where Greesham’s law on ‘Bad 
money drives out good money’ is not valid. Also, there is a very dubious connection between the 
underground and the ‘upperground’ economy and there have been several occasions where legitimate 
businesses were funded by criminal money.
VU1 In the ‘Customer Due D iligence’ work o f  the Basel committee, risk is categorized in four categories: 
reputational, operational, legal, and concentration risk. Reputation risk is portrayed as the potential that 
adverse publicity regarding a bank’s business practices and associations, whether accurate or not, will 
cause a loss o f  confidence in the integrity o f  the institution. Operational risk (which becomes more 
elaborate in Basel II), is the risk o f  direct or indirect loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal 
processes, systems or events. Legal risk essentially refers to the possibility o f  lawsuits disrupting the 
operations o f  a bank. Banks may become subject to lawsuits resulting from a failure to observe 
mandatory KYC standards. Finally, concentration risk refers to banks that are not able to identify credit 
concentrations in order to set limits to restrict the banks’ exposures to single borrowers. Essential 
elements o f  a KYC policy that are analyzed in the paper are customer acceptance policy, customer 
identification (including general issues and specific issues like those for trust, nominee and fiduciary 
accounts, corporate vehicles, introduced business, politically exposed persons, non-face-to-face 
customers) , ongoing monitoring of accounts and transactions, risk management. KYC guidance 
from the Basel Committee has been contained in three papers: The Prevention of Criminal use of the 
Banking System for the Purpose of ML 1998, The 1997 Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision 
and the 1999 Core Principles Methodology.
IX There are three ways to exchange information: a) The Mutual Legal Assistance (MLAT) where 
evidence is transmitted that can be used for prosecution and judicial procedures, b) Communication 
between the FIUs for exchanging intelligence that might lead to evidence, based on a memoranda o f  
understanding (MOU), established by the Egmont group (however FIU exchange o f  intelligence is 
problematic and non-computerized - dissertation research), c) The supervisory channel where 
information is mostly communicated for supervisory purposes, specific assets or liability accounts 
because o f  risk and reputation concerns (i.e. politically exposed persons).
The three channels are o f  course complementary and there is a need to co-ordinate between interested 
governmental bodies within a jurisdiction, and o f  course across national boundaries.
x The EU Directive o f  1991, Article 12 made clear that : “Member States shall ensure that the provisions 
o f  this Directive are extended in whole or in part to professions and to categories o f  undertakings, other 
than the credit and financial institutions referred to in Article 1, which engage in activities which are 
particularly likely to be used for money-laundering purposes”. However, what is severely problematic in 
such a statement is that the professions that are potential avenues for money laundering are not explicitly 
defined (and how could they?). Furthermore, the feasibility o f  actually including several professions for 
the purposes o f  combating ML and then having those responsible for being alert to ML, is something that 
must seriously be taken under consideration. For example, how feasible would it be to have all the 
jewellery shops (or auction houses) be alert for the FATF black-list?
xl The shocking story o f  the Pentagon selling biological and chemical equipment through the Internet was 
actually discovered by the Congress. The latter had set up a fictitious company through which they 
bought (o ff  the pentagon) the equipment. Obviously, the contradiction between the fact that the US was 
(and is) fighting terrorism and the Pentagon selling equipment that could be bought by would-be-terrorists 
has sent shock-waves across the government. Interestingly enough, the story was minimally published. 
Furthermore, it seems that there was a clear policy in the Department o f  Defence o f  the United States 
which prohibited any selling o f  items. Thus, according to the policy o f  the DOD it would not have been 
legal to sell these items. The fact that this occurred shows the degenerate side o f  capitalism whereby the 
supposed pillar o f  the US defence can partially jeopardise national security in order to make profit.
xn Attorneys Jonathan Levy and Tom Easton represent Holocaust victims in the Vatican Bank Claims 
(http://www.vaticanbankclaims.com) as they seek restitution o f  the illicitly transferred funds.
xul It is interesting to note that concerning the concept o f  the paradigm shift and the notion that Kuhn had 
developed for that, ST and in particular the version that Professor Luhmann suggests, departs from
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Kuhn’s description and uses the concept of systemic differentiation that is further utilised to describe a 
paradigm shift. More specifically, and according to Luhmann, whenever a high degree of centralisation of 
difference is being utilised by a great number of observers, then that may constitute a paradigm shift.
MV I wish here to make a differentiation between the importance of an observer and the existence of an 
observer. Whereas in no one can deny that it takes an observer even to point out any cause-and-effect 
relations, the identification of an operation that can be characterised as cause-and-effect is de- 
contextualised and hence becomes observer-irrelevant.
^  It should not appear confusing at this point that reductionism comes into play. Even within 
interpretivist research, the fact that many embrace reductionism within the construct of their theories 
(with Actor-Network Theory being a classic example) while ignoring its consequences at the same time is 
truly intriguing.
XV1 It is interesting enough to see how the concept of emergence is found in other disciplines. In artificial 
intelligence, the analogy is quite straightforward and there is the belief that it is not the several parts of 
the system that create the intelligence but it is the interaction between them that creates the interesting 
behavior. This again, brings me to a consideration of the AI system at a macro-level, assembled by its 
sub-systems. There is however a considerable difference that I find here regarding the use of the 
interactivity between different elements and the projected emergence which I would characterize as 
elusive. The problem remains that the interaction is programmed in a sequence of algorithmic 
representations that guide the interactions between the different systems and the interaction by itself is not 
an intrinsic property of the elemental complexity but a set of guided rules for creating the difference. The 
difference between logical or biological intelligence is therefore often ignored and misplaced [Angell, I. 
(1993). "Intelligence: logical or biological." Communications of the ACM 36(7): 15-16&119.
xv" In game theory, it is also considered that the ability to generate random behaviour is critical however it 
is viewed that as individuals are poor at behaving randomly, that the randomness mechanism in game 
theory can be found not in individual players but in their interaction [West, R. and C. Lebiere (2001). 
"Simple Games as Dynamic, Coupled Systems: randomness and other emergent properties." Journal of 
Cognitive Systems Research 1: 221-239.
xvni While talking about a daunting infinite regression (that progresses!) in the construction of any system, 
one cannot but associate this to one of the most crucial observations on the problems of philosophy and 
subsequently theory construction that have been observed and discussed by Nietzsche (amongst others); 
that is, a description about one of the most major problems of philosophy whereby something exists in its 
opposite (truth in error, and in this scenario, regression in progression), a matter that cannot clearly be 
resolved but one that could possibly -  I would add -  be a testament to the process of systemic 
differentiation about the ontological impossibility of a system in isolation (that is, without an 
environment) [ Nietzsche, F. (1977). Logic, Epistemology, Metaphysics. A Nietzsche Reader Penguin 
Books.
MX Sooner or later of course, the quest for entropy and negentropy has an end and entropy catches up thus 
leading to the not so comforting thought of the maximum state of entropy (being systemic death). 
Particularly for cognitive systems such as human beings and insofar as the philosophical quests include 
pursuits of this level, a common argument (from Martin Heidegger) would be that the purpose of all 
human life, all of its manifestations and archetypal forms of construction are self-referential (created from 
and for the human) so that the human mind is constantly preoccupied and able to keep straying away from 
its cognitive processes that conceptualise the thought of the maximum entropy [Heidegger, M. (1994). 
Basic questions of philosophy : selected "problems" o f "logic". Bloomington, Indiana University Press.
** It is indeed important to offer some reflections on complexity and the elements that constitute a system; 
for the problem of atomism may rise here when one ponders the question of the elements that can be 
further dissolved. And indeed, one would be right to observe here that there is little that can forbid us to 
go down that road, that is, to say that if we view elements at a microscopic level then we will see that
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those in their own turn are highly complex and therefore what constitutes the unity of an element is 
something highly debatable and frail. As Luhmann observed (p.24-25 in Social Systems), ‘whether the 
unity of an element should be explained as emergence from below or as constitution from above seems to 
be a matter of theoretical dispute... we opt decisively for the latter’. And not without reason, one could 
add; elements are elements (this is an ontological issue) only for the system that employs, registers, and 
functions through them.
XM In the scenario examined in the previous footnote whereby information processing can also occur 
between two abstractions it becomes even more evident that input is internalised. In the scenario for 
example of the addition between two numbers, then self-reference implies that the technical system will 
need to refer to itself and the abstraction within it for the addition to be carried out. This further separates 
an esoteric system/environment relationship between one abstraction (one number) and another 
abstraction (another number). One may serve as a system and one as an environment while a third 
abstraction (an operator like +) becomes the function with which both system and environment are 
engaged into a structural coupling and further produce the output of the result (which in its own turn may 
be further internalised for further information processing).
3001 It would be perhaps interesting to say here that when the first Greek Law on Anti-Money Laundering 
was introduced into the banking sector, the totality of the banking sector appeared to be negative in the 
reporting of suspicious transactions and for a brief period of time there were no official documentation 
from financial institutions (the STRs were sent anonymized from the institution and the commitment or 
signature of an MLRO did not exist as such). Despite the fact that this situation was overturned soon, it 
accurately portrays the anxiety that senior management displayed over the introduction of the legislation 
(and its security implications) in the first place.
xx,n This brings out the issue of the effects of making fines for non-compliance on AML available to the 
public. One would expect that the underlying reason for making the fines public has to do with signaling 
to the market sound competition and letting the market decide how this would affect different 
stakeholders. In the UK for example and other countries, financial fines for non-compliance on AML are 
made public but that does not appear to have a considerable effect (unless we are talking about a really 
serious incident that is re-enforced by other factors as well). What usually happens is that there is a slight 
drop in the stock market price of the institution, a drop that is however considerably temporal and 
followed by a quick recovery.
XMV The number of interviews is not mentioned or recorded due to the nature of the research undertaken. I 
was given an office within the working space of the Money Laundering Analysis Team whereby I had 
access to the electronic systems provided and used by the team and was given the opportunity to interrupt 
personnel while they were working to ask about items of investigation, money-laundering issues, etc. In 
several occasions I was able to interview personnel from the MLAT separately (in another room) if there 
were items of investigation that required further pondering or analysis. That was required a few items 
with the Manager and the Deputy Manager of the MLAT of the Bank. Overall, I visited the bank five 
times (in time intervals that exceeded 3-4 months) with an average of seven days per visit while also 
being in contact with staff members by telephone interviews for additional items of interrogation. An 
estimated number of unstructured interviews and discussions concerning AML would definitely be more 
than one hundred.
Even though what information should be collected for the development of ‘transaction profiles’ was 
not clearly stated in the KYC policy of the Bank, the intention of such a collection denotes a clear internal 
will of the Bank to move towards a profiling of transactions that will be clearly automated (due to the 
volume of transactions being carried out).
XXVI From the point of view of the Financial Intelligence Unit this becomes even more problematic as 
different financial institutions also require different Identification documents sometimes. This was a 
problem that several financial institutions were facing as well because due to the lack of homogeneity in 
identification measures, competition was unfair and customers were inclined to prefer some institutions 
rather than others. Lack of homogeneity also exists in requesting identification documents for the opening 
of a bank account between the primary and the secondary holder.
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xxv,‘ Live systems of course create other problems but this particular aspect here opens another important 
element in the discussion concerning Anti-Money Laundering. The fact that there is no time-limit 
restriction that would justify a suspicious transaction report towards the Financial Intelligence Unit means 
that the possibility remains open that various financial institutions would willingly accept the proceeds of 
crime and then also report an STR. If the legal obligation is only towards reporting suspicion then this 
becomes inevitable that to some degree financial institutions have the flexibility of passing on the 
problem (and the volume of suspicious transactions) to Financial Intelligence Units while at the same 
time dealing and/or investing the proceeds of crime that they have received. This issue of timeliness in 
reporting a suspicious transaction remains of course elusive but it is an issue that has been given some 
additional attention recently through the 3rd Anti-Money Laundering Directive.
xxv,n The online system requires authentication from both the teller and the chief teller so that the teller can 
carry out transactions. Everything is recorded and kept for a considerable amount of time.
”ax Querying databases always implies some sort of profiling (simple or complex). In this scenario, the 
Automated Centre for Transaction Recording would computationally execute a query that would match 
several fields in different accounts. For instance, if a person had the same last and first name and Police 
ID number or Tax Number, then that would be flagged out as a positive match and the case would be 
further investigated so that multiple accounts could be united into one number in the POSEIDON system.
xxx I am not making a value judgment here at all. As it will become obvious, my position on automated 
systems for Anti-Money Laundering is not one of superiority pertaining to their imposition from 
regulators.
5000 XML -  Extensibility Markup Language -  is useful in facilitating the sharing of information across 
different infrastructures as it allows for users to share data between them, and also to define their own 
elements.
xxx" The fact the one alludes to a description like ‘combating the phenomenon of money-laundering’ 
points at exactly the problem of philosophical atomism and the difficulty in recognizing the unavoidable 
differentiation that occurs within the domain once observation commences to examine aspects of the 
problem domain itself. This means that the phenomenon of money-laundering is treated as a unity 
whereas it can only be treated as such at the level of other subsystems at the same level with which ML is 
structurally coupled (like AML).
XXXJU It is interesting to note that studies have emerged in the field of crossing power and the constitution 
of AML within a Foucaultdian perspective
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